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tiuss r~usM: That would be delightful. Cecily, you will read your
Political Economy in my absence. The chapter on the fall of the Indian
Rupee you may omit. It's a bit too sensational. Even these metallic
problems have their melodramatic side.
Oscar Wilde, The Importance of Being Earnest.
Preface
Some of the chapters of this thesis have appeared elsewhere. Chapter 2 is a
slightly revised version of De Jong and Van der Plceg (1991). Chapter 3 is
forthcoming in the Journal of Applied Econometrics. Chapter 5 is virtually
identical to De Jong, Nijman and Róell (1993).
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This study consists of five empirical essays on European financial markets. As the
title suggests, the study is in two parts. Exchange rates in the European monetary
system are the subject of the papers in part I. Stock mazkets aze analysed in part
II. This chapter serves as an introduction to both parts.
Part I: Exchange Rates
1.1 A brief history of the European Monetary System.
The monetary landscape in the wuntries of the European Community in the 1980s has
been dominated by the participation of many countries in the European Monetary
System, the EMS. From 1979 onwazds, the EMS has tried to bring exchange rate
stability which is seen by many analysts as a necessary prerequisite for economic
integration and convergence to a single market within the EC. The exchange rates of
currencies that participate in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS have only a
limited fluctuation margin vis à vis the other currencies. In the economic
literature, the fluctuation mazgin is called a target zone. The first years of the
EMS were not the most successful ones. Especially in the 198213 period, when the
socialist government in France followed an expansionary economic policy, there were
numerous crises, especially involving the French franc, but also the Danish krone
and Belgian franc were prone to various devaluations.
After the crisis of March 1983, the French government decided to radically
change its economic policy and bring it more in line with the restrictive German
fiscal and monetary policy. This started a relatively stable period in the EMS,
with few official realignments (except for the Italian lira). New countries like
Spain and Portugal entered the EMS and finally in 1990 the British pound was
included in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the EMS. The stability lasted
until September 1992, when the British pound and the Italian lira dropped out of
the ERM, and the Spanish peseta and Portugese escudo were devalued. Only the core
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currencies of the EMS were unaffected. On August 2, 1993, the EMS all but collapsed
under the speculative attacks on the French franc. The EC finance ministers decided
to extend the fluctuation mazgins to t1546, which is much wider than the t2.254b used
before. All currencies, except the Dutch guilder, are now effectively freely
floating against the Deutschemazk.
During all the years of the EMS, Germany had the strongest currency, the
Deutsche Mark, which has never been devalued against any other EMS currency. German
interest rates traditionally are lower than those of other EMS countries. Some
economists, e.g. Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989a) argue that the EMS has functioned
as a greater Deutschemazk azea, where the other countries peg their currencies to
the Deutschemazk. The gain for these countries is increased exchange rate stability
and credibility of monetary policy.
1.2 Macroeconomic implicatioas of exchange rate target zones.
An obvious reason for having fixed or managed exchange rates (such as a target
zone) is exchange rate stability. Especially in the EC with its common agricultural
policy and convergence to one single market, exchange rate stability is of vital
importance. Freely floating exchange rates often show large movements which
sometimes seem out of line with the underlying economic determinants, cf. the very
strong US dollaz in the mid 1980s. Mussa (1986) conducted a lazge cross-country
study into (semi-)fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes and concluded that
indeed fixed exchange rate regimes increase both nominal and real exchange rate
stability. Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989a) conducted a similaz study for European
exchange rates before and during the EMS and find evidence that the EMS has
stabilised exchange rates.
A less obvious reason for countries to join a fixed exchange rate regime is
to gain credibility for their monetary policy. Pegging a weak currency to a strong,
low-inflation currency such as the Deutsche Mark increases the cost of a high
inflation policy, because such a policy leads to forced devaluations, which
countries perceive to be costly (Giavazzi and Pagano (1988)). In the absence of
exchange rate targets, governments may want to pursue a high inflation policy for
several reasons. First, the government might want to create infladon for
stabilisation reasons. Barro and Gordon (1983) argue that as soon as nominal
contracts are agreed, it is optimal for govemments to create surprise inflation to
decrease the real cost of labour and thus boost the economy. Rational agents
anticipate this policy and increase nominal pay rise demands, up to the point where
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it becomes too costly for the govemment to create additional surprise inflation.
The economy hence ends up in a`bad', high inflation equilibrium. Pegging the
exchange rate may put the economy back to a`good', low-inflation equilibrium by
increasing the cost of surprise inflation for the govemment.
Another important reason for inflationary policies is to generate
seigniorage, i.e. an inflation tax on nominal money and debt holdings. For some EC
countries, mainly in southern Europe, seigniorage traditionally is an important
source of government revenues. Participating in the EMS limits the possibility of
an inflationary policy and hence diminishes seigniorage revenues. The relation
between seigniorage policies and fixed exchange rates is analysed by Van Wijnbergen
(1991) and Grilli (1988). Grilli presents a model where the government trades off
distortionary taxation with costly inflation, given the desire for exchange rate
stability. Grilli demonstrates that entering the EMS shifts the optimal seigniorage
level downward and tax revenues upward.
Chapter 2 presents a model for inflation that rests on two building blocks: a
tradeoff between costly tax collection and seigniorage, and intertemporal
taxlseigniorage smoothing. The government finances its expenditure by tax and
seigniorage revenues in an intertemporal setting. Both rules and discretion
outcomes are derived. We analyse what entering the EMS changes to the optimal
policy rules. It is demonstrated that especially for countries with a high public
debt and an inefficient tax collection system, the credibility gains from entering
the EMS can be substantial. In the empirical part, several implications of the
theoretical model are tested on data from EMS countries and the US. The data
provide weak support for one of the theoretical predictions, cointegration between
domestic and foreign inflation and tax rates. The model is also confronted with
more traditional `stagflation'-type theories of inflation, which appear to
empirically dominate the taxlseigniorage model.
1.3 Interventions and reaGgnments.
In the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the EMS, exchange rates are allowed to
fluctuate in a band around the central parity. Before August 1993, this band was
t2.253b of the central parity (t65b for certain weak currencies)1. Within the given
band, the exchange rates are allowed to fluctuate freely. There is a divergence
1 On August 2, 1993, all bands, except the DeutschemarklDutch guilder band, were
extended to t15 R6 . This was announced as a temporary measure, but when the old bands
will be restored is unknown.
indicator that signals if one of the exchange rates deviates more than 3l4 of its
band from a weighted average of all central parities. In practice, this system has
not been important, see Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989a, Chapter 2).
More important is the intervention policy if one of the bilateral target
zones is under strain. If the exchange rate hits the upper or lower limit of the
band, intervention by central banks to support the weak currency is compulsory.
There is a Very Short Term Finance facility, under which central banks provide
loans to each other to buy the weak currency and sell strong currencies. In
principle, the volume of the loans is unlimited, but of course the strong countries
often do not want to support a very weak currency under attack indefinitely. If so,
there are two options. Either the currency reverts to free floating (as has
happened in September 1992 with the pound and the lira) and effectively drops out
of the ERM, or the central parity is adjusted, a so called realignment. The
monetary committee of the EMS has to decide on the time and magnitude of a
realignment. Usually, realignments have been small, in the sense that the old and
new target zone partly overlap. This is an advantage of a target zone system over
completely fixed exchange rates, where the exchange rate always jumps at a
realignment. In the EMS, the exchange rate itself needs not jump if the old and new
tazget zone overlap. Nevertheless, here have been several lazge realignments where
the exchange rate made a jump.
1.4 Target zone models of exchange rates.
Since the seminal paper of Krugman (1991), which first circulated in 1988, a lazge
literature on modelling exchange rates in a target zone has emerged. Krugman and
Miller (1991) discuss the main characteristics of these models. The approach is
dominated by the use of latent variable models in continuous time, which aze solved
and analysed by using stochastic calculus and various types of `smooth pasting'
conditions. This section gives some background to this literature. It introduces
the reader to the models and mathematics used in the target zone literature, and to
the major points of interest. This section is not meant as a comprehensive review
of the literature. For this, we refer to Svensson (1992) and Bertola (1993).
1.4.1 The Krugmnn (1991) model.
Krugman (1991) derives his target zone model from an `asset pricing' equation
for the exchange rate
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(1.1) e(t) - f(t) f aEde(t)Idt, az0,
where f(t) is called the economic fuudameutal. For an interpretation of this model,
it is instructive to see how it can be derived from the well-known monetary model
of exchange rate determination in continuous time2:
(1.2)
m(t) -p(t) - y(t) -ai(t)
m'(t)-P'(t) - Y'(t)-ai~`(t)
i (t) -i'(t) - Etde(t)Idt
p(t) -p'(t) - e(t)
where p is the logarithm of the price level, m the logarithm of the nominal money
supply, y the logarithm of real national income, i the instantaneous (very short
term) interest rate and e the logarithm of the exchange rate (the price of foreign
currency expressed in domestic monetary units); foreign variables are denoted with
a~`. The first two equations are the domestic and foreign money demand functions,
respectively. The third equation is the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition
and the last equation the purchasing power parity (PPP) condition. Solving this
model for the exchange rate e, given m and y, one obtains
(1.3) e(t) - (m(t)-m~`(t))-(y(t)-y'(t)) i- aEtde(t)Idt,
which is precisely (1.1) with f(t)-(m(t)-m~(t))-(y(t)-y~`(t)). So, in the monetary
model, the exchange rate is determined by two factors: the relative money supply
(corrected for income differences) and the expected rate of change of the exchange
rate itself. Solving (1.3) forward, and assuming that there are no speculative
bubbles, one obiains
(1.4) e(t) - r exp(-as)Etf(t fs)ds.
0
This equation makes clear that the exchange rate is determined by the present
discounted value of all expected future fundamentals. The important parameter for
the forward-looláng behaviour of the exchange rate is the interest semi-elasticity
of money demand, a.
2 Baillie and McMahon (1989) provide a more elaborate introduction to this model.
The monetary model serves only as an economic motivation of equation (1.1).
T'he target zone literature typically assumes that the fundamental f(t) is an
unobserved stochastic process. No attempt is made to observe the fundamental, or to
regress it on explanatory variables3. The first generation target mne models
assumes that f(t) is a regulated Brownian motion. The Brownian motion (a continuous
time random walk) is describeà by the following stochastic differential equation
(1.5) df(t) - ~dt -F o~dW(t),
where W(t) is a Wiener process. The regulated Brownian motion follows (1.5) within
an interval (f,f), but the process is `regulated' (reflected) at the bounds f and
f. Recalling the monetary model, regulation of the fundamental corresponds to
intervention in the foreign exchange market by means of expanding or contracting
the money supply, in order to keep the exchange rate within the target zone.
The solution of the target zone model has some interesting properties. Most
prominent is the non-linear, S-shaped form of the exchange rate within the band.
The S-shaped curve and the regulation on the boundaries of the target zone have
important repercussions on the stochastic behaviour of exchange rates within a
target zone. If the exchange rate were freely floating, it would be a random walk
itself, with (by assumption) homoskedastic normal increments. In sharp contrast,
the exchange rate in the target zone exhibits mean reversion, non-normal increments
and conditional heteroskeáasticity. These are well known stylised facts of exchange
rates and the target zone model is able to generate these properties endogenously.
Beetsma (1991) investigates these properties and concludes that the target zone
model is not capable of generating enough non-normality and conditional
heteroskedasticity to explain observed exchange rate behaviour.
Other empirical papers that analyse the Krugman model are Smith and Spencer
(1991), who use the Method of Simulated Moments to estimate the Krugman target zone
model, and Fiood, Rose and Mathieson (1990) who test the non-linear relation
between exchange rate and fundamental directly. Both papers reject the
specification of the Krugman model using EMS data. Bertola and Caballero (1992) and
Beetsma and Van der Plceg (1993) show that the observed probability distribution of
EMS exchange rates within the band is not in line with the predictions of the
Krugman model. The Krugman model predicts a U-shaped distribudon of the exchange
rate, with most probability mass concentrated near the edges of the band, whereas
3 An exception to this rule is the work of Pesaran and Samiei (1992a,b).
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empirically one finds a distribudon that is concentrated around the central
ParitY.
Chapter 3 is concerned with estimating the Krugman (1991) tazget zone model
and testing its implications for the behaviour of exchange rates in the EMS. Eazly
research used the Method of Simulated Moments to estimate the model. We demonstrate
that this estimator is inefficient and computationally unattractive. We propose an
efficient Maximum Likelihood estimator that is based on a very accurate and
computationally attractive approximation to the exact predictive density of the
exchange rate in the continuous time tazget zone model. Monte Carlo experiments are
used to assess the properties of this estimator. In the empirical part we estimate
the model with data on recent EMS exchange rates. We find that the Krugman (1991)
tazget zone model is misspecified, because it cannot sufficiently explain the
observed kurtosis and conditional heteroskedasticity of relative changes in EMS
exchange rates.
1.4.2 Irara-marginal interventions.
Following the empirical rejections, the Krugman model has been extended in
several directions, which all add more realism to the model. The most important
extensions are the modelling of intra-marginal in[erventions and realignments.
Although the EMS arrangements only explicitly demand `mazginal'
interventlons, i.e. interventions if an exchange rate hits the band, central banks
often use intra-marginal interventions to manage their exchange rates. For example,
Koedijk et al. (1992) present evidence that the Belgian central bank intervened in
the foreign exchange market at least once in most of the weeks of the period under
consideration (1979 to 1991). Dominguez and Kenen (1992) provide additional
evidence on the importance of intra-mazginal interventions in the EMS.
Intra-mazginal interventions are modelled by Lindberg and Sbderlind (1991) as
a mean-reverting fundamental instead of the random walk assumed by Krugman.
Lindberg and Sóderlind estimate their model on Swedish data by the Method of
Simulated Moments. The mean reversion is significant, indicating that the Krugman
model is misspecified for the Swedish exchange rate. Mean reversion in the
fundamentals seems a priori important for EMS currencies as well because central
banks often use intra-marginal interventions.
1.4.3 Target zone credibility.
Until now, all models that we referred to assumed that the tazget zone is
fully credible. Even without an explicit model for realignments, there are ways to
assess the credibility of a target zone. In a series of papers, Iars Svensson
demonstrated how to use interest rate differentials to derive the market's
expectations of future devaluations. The simplest test of target zone credibility
(Svensson, 1991a) is to check whether observed interest rate differentials at
several maturities are consistent with the exchange rate staying within the tuget
zone. More complicated is the modelling of realignments. Especially in continuous
time, ad hoc assumptions aze needed to exclude riskless arbitrage possibilities at
a realignment. Bertola and Caballero (1992) assume that there is a fized
probability of realignment if the exchange rate hits the band. If there is a
realignment, the exchange rate jumps to its position in the new target zone, but if
there is no realignment there is a discrete intervention that puts the exchange
rate back to its central parity. Using the Bertola and Caballero model, Bartolini
and Bodnaz (1991) fmd a significant realignment risk in the DeutschemazklFrench
franc rate in the 1980s.
Another model for realignments is given by Bertola and Svensson (1993). They
assume that there are two state variables: one random walk fundamental and a
Poisson jump process for the central parity. In this model, there is a fixed
probability per unit of time, independent of the position of the exchange rate
within the band, that the central parity is shifted. If one is willing to assume
that UIP holds, the interest rate differential is equal to the expected rate of
depreciatíon, which can be decomposed into two parts: the depreciation within the
band and the expected rate of devaluation, i.e, parity shifts due to realignments.
An estimate of the first part can be obtained from a target zone model, and the
interest rate differential is observable, so that one immediately obtains an
estimate of the expected rate of devaluation. The second part then gives a measure
of time-varying realignment risk.
The two-state model of Bertola and Svensson (1993) with realignment risk is
analysed by Rose and Svensson (1991) for the French franclDeutschemark exchange
rate. They use a cubic approximation to the Bertola-Svensson model to predict
exchange rate changes within the band and find significant mean reversion within
the band. Assuming uncovered interest parity holds, the expected rate of
realignment can be assessed fmm the observed interest rate differentials. Rose and
Svensson demonstrate that the EMS bands have never been fully credible, but they
also show that it is difficult to predict realignments accurately.
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1.4.4 Discrete rime target zone models.
A different approach to target zone modelling is taken by Pesaran and Samiei
(1992a). T'hey incorporate rational ezpectations in a discrete-time model with a
limited dependent variable, and derive an implicit solution for the expecta6ons
variable. Although their model has current expectations instead of future
expectations, the model also implies an S-shaped relation between exchange rate and
expected fundamental. T'he relation is however not deterministic but stochastic. The
results show that the target zone model fits the data of the DeutschemarklFrench
franc ezchange rate during the EMS period better than a model that dcesn't take the
presence of a band on this exchange rate into account.
Koedijk, Stork and De Vries (1993) also propose to use a discrete time target
zone model, but in the spirit of the Krugman model the ezchange rate function is
forward looking and the fundamental is a random walk with reflecting barriers.
Koedijk et al. do not provide an explicit solution to the model, however, but
approximate the exchange rate solution by a GARCH process with mean reversion. They
show that conditional heteroskedasticity and mean reversion are significant for EMS
exchange rates. Moreover, they are able to predict some realignments quite
accurately.
In Chapter 4 a discrete time alternative to the continuous time target zone
models is proposed. We account for intra-marginal interventions by assuming that
the fundamental is mean reverting. Unlike the assumption made in most continuous
time models, the process that generates the fundamental need not be Gaussian. We
prove existence of a unique solution and provide a straightforward method to
compute the solution. An advantage of the discrete time setup is that, once the
discrete time model is solved, the likelihood function and moments of the
distribution of the discretely observed data are immediately available. T'he model
is estimated on exchange rates from the EMS. The mean reversion of the fundamental
is significant, which suggests that intra-marginal interventions are important for
EMS currencies. 1'he deviation from normality is empirically important as well; a
Student-t distribution for the innovations in the fundamental is strongly preferred
over the normal distribution. Using the estimates of the parameters of the model,
time series of expected depreciation within the band are constructed. These series
are used to assess the credibility of the EMS tazget zones.
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Part II: Stock Markets
1.5 The quality of securities markets.
In the fmance literature, considerable attention has been paid to the quality of
securities mazkets. Important aspects of the quality aze transaction costs and
liquidity. According to Kyle (1985), liquidity covers such various issues as the
cost of a round-trip small transaction (tightness), the ability to absorb lazge
orders (depth) and the speed at which prices revert to their efficient price after
a transaction (resiliency).
Transaction costs and liquidity are important issues for the organisation of
a stock market. Several papers raise the question how mazket structure affects
transaction costs and liquidity. Madhavan (1992) and Pagano and Rcell (1992)
distinguish three classes of trading systems: batch auctions, continuous auctions
and dealership mazkets. In a batch aucrion system all orders aze collected
periodically (usually one or several times a day). An auctioneer determines an
equilibrium price at which buy and sell order flows match, and all transactions aze
executed at that price. This trading system is most often used for stock series
with a relatively small trading volume. For stocks with a high trading volume most
exchanges use continuous trading systems. In a continuous auction system liquidity
is provided by the public limit order book. Market orders are ezecuted immediately
at the best available prices in the limit order book. Contrary to the order driven
auction system is the quote driven dealership market. On such a mazket one or more
designated market makers (dealers) post bid and ask quotes on a bulletin board.
Potential traders contact the mazket makers and usually can negotiate a price for
their transaction. Of course, these are highly stylised trading systems and most
actual securities markets use hybrid systems. For example, on the New York Stock
Exchange the mazket maker (specialist) competes with the public limit order book in
providing liquidity.
Another important difference between stock mazkets, related to the trading
system, is the amount of information about the history of trading that is publicly
provided. For example, on most continuous auction markets, the complete limit order
book and the prices and quantities of previous trades aze publicly available
information. On the other hand, on some dealership mazkets disclosure of trading
information is not obligatory, or only with a considerable time lag. These
differences in information provision have important consequences for the liquidity
of the stock market. Madhavan (1992) demonstrates that if mazket making is
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competitive and the trading history is publicly available information, the
dealership system and the continuous auction system are eguivalent. This result
does not hold when we consider a dealership market without publication of trading
information. Pagano and Rcell (1992) argue that such a market has higher
transaction costs (for anonymous traders) than a continuous auction mazket. On the
other hand, traders who can identify themselves as liquidity traders may benefit
from the slow disclosure of trading information and directly negotiate a price with
a mazket maker that is better than they would obtain on a continuous auction
mazket.
The aim of our analysis is to provide summazy measures of transaction costs
and liquidity on the mazket for French equities. The two main exchanges where
French shares are traded are the Paris Bourse and SEAQ International in London.
These mazkets have a different trading structure: the Paris Bourse is best
described as a continuous auction mazket whereas SEAQ is a dealership market.
Hopefully, the results shed some light on the advantages and disadvantages of the
particular trading systems used by these exchanges.
1.6 The bid-ask spread.
An important implicit transaction cost is the bid-ask spread. In the market micro
structure literature (cf. Stoll (1989)), broadly three components of the bid-ask
spread aze distinguished. The first component can be called processing cost. This
includes the pure cost of processing an order and the compensation for the services
of a dealer, i.e. the compensation for being in the mazket and providing liquidity
to traders. If processing costs were the only reason for the existence of a bid-ask
spread, measurement of the average cost of trading would be easy by averaging
observed (quoted) spreads over time. Roll (1984) provides a method to estimate the
bid-ask spread from a series of transactions prices if no quote data are available.
Nowever, there aze two phenomena that complicate this simple picture of transaction
costs: inventory control and asymmetric information.
Consider a mazket where all trades are processed by a market maker or
specialist who has an obligation to absorb order imbalances. Because sales and
purchases do not come in at the same time, the market maker's inventory usually
deviates from the desired level. The mazket maker runs the risk of price
fluctuations on these inventory holdings and if he is risk averse he will demand a
compensation for this risk. This intuition is formalised in the model of Ho and
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Stoll (1981), who show that the inventory control cost is an increasing function of
trade size and share price volatility.
The third type of cost for the mazket maker arises in the presence of
asymmetric information between the mazket maker and his potential counterparties in
trading. This theory was first proposed by "Bagehot" (1971) and formalised in the
models of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985). A trader with superior
private information about the underlying value of the shares will try to buy or
sell a large number of shares to reap the profits of this knowledge. This creates
an adverse selection problem: the market maker, who is obliged to trade at the
quoted prices, incurs a loss on transactions with better informed counterparties.
To compensate for this loss he will charge a fee on every transaction, so that
expected losses on trades with informed traders are compensated with expected
profits on transactions with uninformed "noise" traders. Because the informed
parties would tend to trade a large quantity in order to maximise the profits from
trading on superior information, the adverse selection cost is related to trade
size: lazge transactions aze more likely to be initiated by informed traders than
small transactions, cf. Easley and O'Hara (1987) and Madhavan and Smidt (1991).
Therefore, the adverse selection cost is an increasing function of trade size, and
the market maker's quotes for large transactions will be less favourable than the
quotes for small ones. How strong this dependence is determines the depth of the
mazket, i.e. the ability to absorb lazge orders without moving prices too much.
1.7 Price dynamics and the components of the bid-ask spread.
One of the points to which we pay considerable attention is the composition of the
bid-ask spread. In order to estimate the different components of the bid-ask
spread, it is necessary to assess the different dynamic effects of adverse
selection, inventory control and processing cost. The estimates of the price
effects of transactions aze interesting in their own right as well. They provide a
measure of resiliency, i.e. how long it takes for prices to converge to their new
equilibrium price.
An important distinction is between permanent and transitory price effects.
Consider the following decomposition of the stock price, due to Hasbrouck (1993):
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The first part, ~t, reflects the underlying semi-strong form `efficient price' of
the stock. Although equilibrium returns are probably correlated over longer
horizons, for the analysis of mazket micro structure, a good working hypothesis
might be that ~t is a mnrtingale, i.e. E(~t~It-1)-~t-1' `"'here It 1 is the publicly
available information at time t-1. It is cleaz that in the presence of asymmetric
information trading affects the expectations of the share's value: a trade
initiated by the buyer will cause an upward revision of ~t. Because ~t is a
martingale, this effect is permanent. The second part, st, is a disturbance term
that measures the deviation of the transaction prices from the efficient price.
T'hese deviations aze assumed to be transitory, hence st is (weak-sense) stationary
and in the absence of new shocks the transaction prices eventually converge to the
efficient price, ~t.
T'he processing cost and inventory control effects belong to the stationary
part of the price, st. The processing cost is strictly transitory, in the sense
that the costs aze paid by the initiator of a transaction to the counterparty, but
it dces not affect future prices at all. The price effect of inventory control will
be transitory, because it is expected that in the long run the market maker will
rebalance his inventory. If we make the additional assumption that the stationary
part is not affected by asymmetric information, the three cost components are
identified by their different dynamic effects. Note that this is quite a strong
assumption: it implies that all new information revealed by the trade is
immediately reflected in the efficient price ~t.
Summary of Chapter 5.
This chapter analyses the cost of trading French shares on two exchanges, the Paris
Bourse and London's SEAQ International. We have available a large data set
consisting of all quotes, limit orders and transactions for a two month period. The
richness of the dataset allows the analysis of the transaction costs for urgent
transactions by the quoted bid-ask spread. In London, market maker quotes are
directly available, but in Paris the quoted spread in Paris has to be constructed
from the public limit order book. T'he estimates clearly show that the Paris mazket
is tight, but not very deep. Often the limit order book does not provide enough
liquidity for even medium sized transactions. The quoted bid-ask spread may however
not give a good indication of actually realised transaction costs. Therefore, we
also estimate the realised bid-ask spread. Non-parametric estimates of the realised
spread are sensitive to some data imperfections, especially reporting errors in the
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time of transactions in London. We propose a correction for this timing bias.
Moreover, the non-parametric analysis needs an estimate of the `true' value of the
shares. We therefore also propose a model-based estimator based on transaction
prices only. The empirical results show that for small to medium-sized transactions
the Paris Bourse has lower implicit transaction costs. The market in London,
however, is much deeper and provides immediacy for larger trades. Contrary to the
predictions of most theoretical models we find that the realised spread is
decreasing in trade size, rather than increasing.
Summary of Chapter 6.
In this chapter, we estimate the components of the bid-ask spread and the price
effects of transactions on the Paris Bourse. To estimate the components of the
spread, we extend the Madhavan and Smidt (1991) model to allow for size-dependent
processing costs, but given the lack of inventory data, without inventory control
cost. The estimates of this model suggest that the processing cost is lower for
large transactions than for small ones. This result explains why sometimes the
realised bid-ask spread declines with trades size. In line with theoretical
predictions, the adverse selection cost increases with trade size.
In this chapter we also discuss several methods to measure the price effects
of trading. Simple non-parametric methods and a more general method based on Vector
Auto Regressions are discussed. The empirical results are that the long run price
effect of a transaction on the Paris Bourse is much larger than its initial price
effect. Moreover, there is no reversal of the trade sign, which suggests that
inventory control is unlikely to be relevant on the Paris Bourse. A plausible
explanation for the observed effects is that new information is revealed only
slowly in the prices. Using the long run price effect as a measure of the adverse
selection cost, we estimate that between 5096 (for small transactions) and 804b (for
large transacdons) of the spread is due to asymmetric information.
Part I: Exchange Rates
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Seigniorage, Taxes, Government Debt and the EMS
2.1 Introduction.
Although there has been a considerable literature on the international coordination
of stabilisation policies under alternative exchange-rate regimes (e.g., Giavazzi
and Giovannini, 1989b; McKibbin and Sachs, 1988; Kenen, 1987; van der Piceg, 1989)
and some literature on the credibility gains associated with pegging one's exchange
rate and tying one's monetary policy to that of a well-disciplined foreign central
bank (e.g., Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988), the allocative and public-finance aspects
of budgetary and monetary policies under alternative exchange-rate regimes have
received relatively little attention. The standard azgument is that taxes should be
smoothed over time and that government debt should be allowed to increase when
there is a temporary increase in government spending - due to say a waz (Barro,
1979). When seigniorage is also a source of revenues for governments, it is clear
that inflation and nominal interest rates should go up and down together with tax
rates and that seigniorage and tax revenues should be smoothed because only then
the marginal intratemporal and intertemporal distortions of the various types of
tax revenues aze equalised (e.g., Mankiw, 1987; Grilli, 1989). It can be azgueá
that southern European countries such as Italy have a larger black economy, higher
costs of tax coilection and thus relatively a greater need for seigniorage revenues
than northern European countries such as Germany. Some economists have therefore
advocated that there is a crawling peg between the currencies of northern and
southern Europe in order to accommodate the required inflation differential (e.g.,
Dornbusch, 1988). This argument against the European Monetary System is less
convincing than it looks at first sight, because it ignores the attempts of
countries of the European Monetary System to obtain low inflation and monetary
discipline through pegging their currencies to the Deutschemark (Gros, 1988).
The objectives of this chapter aze to reconsider the public-finance aspects
of budgetary and monetary policies in the light of inembership of the European
Monetary System and also in the light of the high levels of unemployment faced by
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Europe, to analyse the incentives for a surprise inflation taz in order to wipe out
government debt, and to provide empirical evidence on these issues for the main
European countries. Section 2 ezamines how the standard theory of tax and
seigniorage smoothing should be modified to allow for a desire to have a nominal
anchor in the shape of pegging one's exchange rate to the Deutschemark. Section 3
discusses the incentive to levy a surprise inflation taz in order to erode the real
value of nominal government debt and considers both discretion and rules outcomes.
Section 4 assesses the case for joining the European Monetary System in terms of
the monetary discipline the Bundesbank offers to other members. Section 5 departs
from the assumption of purchasing power parity and allows for the effects of
economic policy on levels of unemployment and considers the implications for
optimal budgetary and monetary policies. Section 6 provides empirical evidence on
the co-integration of tax rates on the one hand and inflation or nominal interest
rates on the other hand and on whether membership of the European Monetary System
induces departures from taxlseigniorage smoothing. Section 7 provides some non-
nested tests against a more conventional cost-push story of inflation. Section 8
concludes the chapter with a summary of the results.
2.2 Taxlseigniorage smoothing witó an EMS-anchor.
Consider the government budget conshaint
(2.1) D- rD f G- TT - emY, D(0) - D~,
where D, G, Y, r, T, e and m denote the stock of real government bonds, the level
of real exhaustive government spending, the level of real output, the real interest
rate, the direct tax rate, the growth rate in the nominal supply of high-powered
money and the ratio of money balances to the national income (i.e. the inverse of
the velocity of circulation), respectively. It is more convenient to ezpress the
items in the government budget constraint as fractions of the national income:
(2.1' ) d - (r-n)d -1- g - z - em, d(0) - d~,
where d-DIY, g~GIY and n~l'~Y. The solvency condition requires that the government
debt does not grow at a rate faster than the interest rate, that is
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T
liml.~d('1~exp(-f [r(s)-n]ds) - 0.
t
This implies together with equation (2.1' ) that the current government debt plus
the present value of the stream of future government spending must be less than the
present value of the stream of future direct tax and seigniorage revenues:
(2.2) dfl f fOg(t)exp[-J'~(r(s)-n)ds]dt s~[T(t)-~e(t)m]exp[-,f~(r(s)-n)ds]dt.
For simplicity, the quantity theory of money is assumed to hold. Hence, m is
constant and the rate of inflation, n, equals the excess of monetary growth over
the growth in real income, e-n. Relative purchasing power parity implies n-n~`te,
where n~` denotes the foreign rate of inflation and e denotes the rate of
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Perfect capital mobility implies that
the home interest rate is tied to the foreign interest rate, r-r~`.
The government chooses direct taxes and monetary growth to minimise the
following welfare-loss function:
(2.3) W - fOexp[-J'p(r(s)-n)d(s)]-[~(t)2fRln(t)2fR2e(t)2ldt, R1,R2L0.
Hence, the govemment wishes to minimise the excess burden caused by direct taxes
and by inflation. The distortions correspond to the dead-weight losses of taxation
and are proportional to real output. There is a slight problem in justifying the
cost of inflation in terms of welfare triangles under the money demand schedule,
since under the quantity theory this schedule is flat. Nevertheless, even
anticipated inflation is costly (e.g., Fischer and Modigliani, 1975; Driffill,
Mizon and Ulph, 1989) and it seems sensible to include it in the government's
objective function. At the same time the government also wishes to stabilise the
nominal exchange rate or, if one does not like the assumption of relative
purchasing power parity, to minimise the inflation differential with other
countries. The case of floating exchange rates corresponds to R2-0 (cf. Mankiw,
1987). In general, the magnitude of p2 determines the strength of the EMS-anchor
(cf. Grilli, 1989).
The first-order conditions for the government are t-x and plnf~2e-ma, where a
denotes the marginal cost of an additional unit of government debt. The marginal
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cost of direct taxes, the marginal cost of inflation (per unit of real money
balances) and the marginal cost of government debt should thus be equalised. It




must hold. A regime of floating exchange rates is characterised by 52-0, so that
inflation rates and direct tax rates move up and down together in order to equalise
the marginal distortions of both types of revenues. A regime of fixed exchange
rates is characterised by ~2 ~~, so that home inflation is tied to the foreign
infladon rate. In general, this theory predicts that EMS countries without capital
controls have a convergence of inflation rates (witness, for example, the closeness
of inflation rates in the Netherlands and Germany) whilst for other non-EMS
countries inflation rates (or nominal interest rates) and direct tax rates should
be co-integrated and more or less independent of the foreign inflation rate. Of
course, some EMS countries (such as Italy and France) had capital controls in which
case they should have been able to follow an independent monetary policy and engage
in some taxlseigniorage smoothing without completely forsaking the objective of
relatively fixed exchange rates.
The first-order conditions also require that direct tax rates follow a random
walk, ie(s,t)-0, s~ t, where te(s,t) denotes the expectation of i(s) given all
information available at time t. The reason is that the government smooths the
distordons of raising tax revenues over time. Similarly, ne(s,t)-R21(pl}~2)
n~`e(s,t) for s~ t, must hold.
Given equation (2.4) and expectations about future government spending, the
government must choose the level of taxes and of seigniorage revenues to satisfy
the intertemporal budget constraint (2.2). For a constant real interest rate, one
obtains:
(r-n)d-nmfgp - m'n~`p
2( .Sa) T -
1~-m I(pl~'
[(r-n)d-nmfgp]m f R2[n~`fm2(n`-n`~~(RIfR2)l
(2.Sb) a - e-n -
~ItR2-1-m
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where m' ~s2ml(pl ts2) and the permanent level of exhaustive government spending is
defined as
(2.6) gp(t) á ( r-n) J~exp[-(r-n)(s-t)]ge(s,t)ds.
t
The permanent level of the foreign inflation rate, Ap, is defined in a similar
fashion. A permanent increase in the level of exhaustive government spending,
caused by expected increases in future government spending, requires higher taxes,
seigniorage revenues and inflation, but a temporary increase is financed by issuing
government debt. An increase in the expected level of future foreign inflation
raises anticipated seigniorage revenues and thus permits a cut in current direct
taxes, seigniorage revenues and inflation. A temporary increase in foreign
inflation raises inflation, but leaves the optimal direct tax rate unaffected. A
permanent increase in foreign inflation leads to a smaller increase in inflation
and to a cut in the direct tax rate. The public sector borrowing requirement can be
written as
p2m
(2'~ d - g - gp -~~ n`-np),
1} 2
so that, when times are bad in the sense that exhaustive government spending
exceecls its permanent level or foreign inflation is (and thus seigniorage revenues
are) below its permanent level, the government borrows.
The above theory of taxlseigniorage smoothing corresponds to an extension of
the familiar "Golden Rule of Finance", which says that governments should tax in
order to finance government consumption and should borrow in order to finance
investment projects with a market rate of return. The reason is that investment
projects with a market rate of return leave the permanent level of government
spending (net of the return on investment projects) unaffected, whilst government
consumption increases the permanent level of government spending.
Some would argue that the desired inflation rate should equal minus the real
interest rate as full liquidity requires driving the nominal interest rate, i, to
zero (cf. Friedman, 1969). In that case, the term ~1n2 in the welfare-loss function
(2.3) should be replaced by p1(n fr)2 and one finds that:
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mtfp2i~ [(r-n)(dfm)fgp]m f R2[i'fm2(i'-i~l(R1fp2)l
(2.8a) i-rfa- ~ }p --
1 2 p1fR2fm ~
(r-n) (d fm) f gp - m' ip
(2.8b) ~ - ,
1 f m I(~1~
where again m' -p2ml(Rlt~2). Only when there are no distortions from raising direct
tax revenues and when there is no EMS-anchor (S 1~ m) are nominal interest rates
driven to zero and is full liquidity attained. In general, when there is a need to
raise revenues for the public sector, there is a trade-off between zero tax
distortions and the desired (negative) level of inflation which, typically, leads
to positive optimal tax rates and positive optimal inflation rates (cf. Phelps,
1973).
When there is a wide-spread black economy and the dead-weight burden of non-
monetary taxes is relatively much higher than that of inflatíon (pl, low), it is
optimal to extract relatively little revenues from conventional taxation and
relatively a lot from seigniorage. It follows that for such economies inflation and
nominal interest rates are rather higher than for economies with a relatively
insignificant black economy. One could argue that this is a reason why some
southern European countries find it optimal to have higher inflation rates than
northern European countries (cf. Dornbusch, 1988, Canzoneri and Rogers, 1990).
Under a regime of floating exchange rates nominal interest rates aze now co-
integrated with direct tax rates, whilst under fixed exchange rates they are tied
to foreign nominal interest rates. The public sector borrowing requirement can now
be written as
(2.9) d- B- gp - pp~i~`-i~~
1} 2
so that when foreign nominal interest rates are high and expected to fall the
government pays off its debt.
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2.3 Nominal bonds and the surprise inflation tax: Rules versus discretion.
So far, we have assumed that the government issues real (or indexed) bonds. In
practice, governments usually issue bonds with a guaranteed nominal rate of return,
i-rfne, where ne denotes the expected rate of inflation and r denotes the ez-ante
real interest rate. This implies an appeal to the Fisherian hypothesis, so that the
(unobservable) ex-ante real interest rate (or real interest rate for short) is
determined by consumer preferences and production technologies, more or less
independent of the expected inflation rate. For given tastes and technologies, any
change in the nominal interest rate must then be due to a change in the expected
inflation rate. The realised or ex-post real interest rate, i-n, is relevant for
the borrowing and lending activities of the government. It follows that the
government budget constraint becomes
(2.10) d-(rfae-n)d f g- t- em,
where d(0) is a non-predetermined variable as the price level at time zero is non-
predetermined. The realised or ex-post interest rate decreases with unanticipated
inflation, which is one way in which the government can reduce the level of the
inflation-corrected deficit and reduce the growth of the debt-GDP ratiol.
Two outcomes should be considered (cf. Kydland and Prescott, 1977). The first
is the rules outcome, which prevails when the government is believed to have
sufficient discipline not to succumb to a surprise inflation taz and wipe out the
real value of outstanding debt. The government can then credibly influence
expectations of the private sector, so that in the determination of its optimal
policy it can assume that ee-e and ne-n. Hence, the rules outcome (denoted by the
superscript R) is observationally equivalent to a situation where the government
issues real or indexed bonds. However, the rules must be enforced or else the
government has an incentive to renege and reoptimise. This time-inconsistent
behaviour usually takes the form of a surprise increase in monetary growth, because
this permits a corresponding reduction in distortionary taxes.
1 The government debt-GDP ratio, d, is no longer a predetermined variable, because
an increase in the level rather than the growth of the nominal supply of money
induces an equal increase in the price level and thus wipes out the real value of
government debt at "the stroke of a pen". However, the present analysis is
concerned with unanticipated increases in inflation.
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The second is the discretion outcome (denoted by the superscript D), which
occurs when the government cannot make credible announcements about monetary policy
and must therefore take ee as given. It follows that equation (2.4) is replaced by
(2.11)
p (mfd)zDf~2A'
~ - sl}s2 ~
so that for a given tax rate inflation is higher (lower) in equilibrium than under
the rules outcome when the government has accumulated debt (assets). The reason is
that the private sector does not believe the announcement of lower monetary growth,
because the government is then tempted to levy a surprise inflation tax. Upon
substitution into the intertemporal government budget constraint, one obtains for
dp~0:
(2.12a)
D - (r-n)d-nmf - m' n' R
i t m mf pl fp2 G ~,
o - ([(r-n)d-nmi-g (mfd)1 (R~ t m"[(m~-d)(a~-a~ f(d -d)a']l
(2.12b) n Il plfs2tm mf J f R2Il Rlf~2fm mt J'
where again m' -~2m1(~ 1 f~2) and m" -m~(p l fs2). It is easy to demonstrate that, when
g-gp, n-np and d -dp~ 0, t~ G TR and n~ ~ nR must hold. Hence, a lack of monetary
discipline for countries with a lazge government debt leads to lower taxes and
higher inflation than would be the case when governments enjoy a reputation for
sticking to rules.
2.4 The case for joining the EMS.
One could argue that the fact that the Banca d'Italia is dependent on the whims of
politicians is the reason why Italy with a government debt of around 100~b of its
national income has a higher inflation rate and a greater reliance on seigniorage
revenues than Germany with the excellent monetary discipline afforded by the
Bundesbank and lower government debt. Another reason might be that Italy has a
greater black economy and a less efficient tax system than Germany (proxied by
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relatively low values of pl and ~2)2 and therefore finds it optimal to extract
relatively more from seigniorage than from direct taxation (cf. Canwneri and
Rogers, 1990). Indeed, some have azgued that these aze good arguments why there
should be a crawling peg between the currencies of northern and southern Europe as
this would accommodate the requ'ued difference in inflation rates (e.g., Dornbusch,
1988).
However, these two azguments for Italy against the EMS compare the discretion
outcome for Italy with the rules outcome for Germany and completely ignore the
monetary discipline the Bundesbank gives to the Banca d'Italia under a firm
membership of the EMS. Some consider the gain in central bank credibility and the
accompanied tying of one's hands as the main advantage of the EMS3. In that case,
the appropriate question to ask is whether Italy is better off under a
discretionary regime with floating exchange rates as would be the case under an EMS
with wide bands (small S2) or better off under a rules outcome with fixed exchange
rates as would be the case under an EMS with narrow bands (large p2) or possible
under an EMU. The point is that under a float Italy has to stand on its own feet
and make do with the reputation of a central bank which is not independent of the
wishes of spending ministers and trade unions, but under the EMS Italy can enjoy
the advantages in terms of monetary discipline of the Bundesbank. Of course, the
price Italy may pay for membership of the EMS is a sub-optimal government revenue
mix.
One should then trade off the gains in monetary discipline derived from tying
monetary policy to the policy of the Bundesbank against the losses arising from a
sub-optimal government revenue mix, i.e. too low seigniorage revenues and too high
distortionary tax rates (cf. Gros, 1988). For example, comparison of a discretion
outcome under a pure float (p2-0, denoted by the superscript F) with a rules
2 Indeed, Barro's (1979) azgument to include taxes in the government's welfare-loss
function was to capture the government's costs of collecting taxes. The idea here
is that these costs are for Italy much higher than for Germany. Equations (2.5)-
(2.6) or (2.9)-(2.10) then immediately show that ceteris paribus Italian tax rates
aze lower than German tax rates whilst Italian inflation is higher than German
i~nflation.
Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) discuss this within a context where central banks and
unions are locked into nominal wage contracts, and where the former have an
incentive to engage in surprise monetary expansions in order to erode the real
value of wages and boost employment. Wage indexation used to be prevalent
throughout Europe, so that there presumably is not much of a possibility to wipe
out the real value of predetermined nominal wage contracts with unanticipated
inflation. This is why it is reasonable to consider the incentives for wiping out
the real value of government debt. The interaction between both effects are
considered in van der Plceg (1991).
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outcome under the EMS (R2 ~ m, denoted by the superscript E) yields when Germany
has zero inflation:
F - ([(r-n~-nmf (mfd)1 g
(2.13a) a Il s~m mf 1 1 a - a' - 0,
-( (r-n~-nmf 1 g
(2.13b) ~F Il fm m f s1JI c ~ -(r-n)d-nmfgp.
It can be shown (for the case of g-g~ that it pays countries to join the EMS as
long as (p 1-m2)d ~(p 1 fm2)m. Hence, countries with a lazge priority to keeping
inflation low (high ~1) and a lazge outstanding nominal government debt have an
incentive to join the EMS, because the losses arising from the increase in tax
distortions are outweighed by the gains arising from the increase in monetary
discipline. However, countries with a lazge nominal government debt and which care
more about removing tax distortions than about achieving low inflation aze less
keen to join the EMS. This may be a reason why the United Kingdom was less keen to
join the EMS than Italy. Germany achieves a stable price level, because this is the
sole objective of the Bundesbank and because the Bundesbank is independent of the
fiscal authorities in Germany.
This section considered the implications of the use of a surprise inflation
tax to wipe out the real value of outstanding nominal government debt. Similar
arguments can be made (e.g., Calvo, 1978; Turnovsky and Brock, 1980; Barro, 1983)
when the asset menu includes no (or only real) government bonds and the demand for
money depends negatively on the expected rate of inflation (e.g., m-~(rfn~, ~' c0).
The rules outcome then also typically leads to lower inflation in equilibrium than
the discretion outcome. If one allows for the ongoing strategic interactions
between the monetary authorities and private agents, the government finds it
optimal to have temporary bouts of inflation in order to accumulate government
assets. The resulting interest income finances the increase in government spending
(Obstfeld, 1991; van der Plceg, 1991).
2.5 Public fmance aspects of unemployment poGcy.
1
The basic model of tax and seigniorage smoothing has been extended to allow for an
EMS-anchor (Section 2.2) and for nominal bonds, expectations and surprise inflation
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taxes (Sections 2.3 and 2.4). Here the basic model is extended to allow for the
endogenous determination of government spending. It also departs from purchasing
power parity by having imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods, and
allows for the use of budgetary policies to fight unemployment. Without such
modifications the model only seems relevant for long-run issues.
Aggregate demand increases when government spending or world trade increases,
when the real exchange rate depreciates, when taxes or the rate of interest falls,
and when real money balances (wealth) increase. It is therefore given by
(2.14) yd - á0 f àlw~` f àc2g -i- á3m - á4t - á5r~` t áóc, ai z 0,
where yd and w~` denote the ratios of the demand for home goods and world trade to
the full-employment level of the national income, Y, and c denotes the real
exchange rate (the relative price of foreign goods in terms of home goods).
Aggregate supply increases with the capital stock and decreases with the real
producers' wage. Since the wedge between the real producers' wage and the real
consumers' wage increases when the tax wedge increases or the real exchange rate
depreciates, aggregate supply can be written as
(2.15) ys - á.7k - ágc - à.9T - á10~ } all'
where ys and k denote the ratios of the supply of home goods and the capital stock
to the full-employment level of national income and r~ denotes the real consumers'
wage. A depreciation of the real exchange rate increases import and consumers'
prices and thus increases, in exactly the same way as an increase in taxes dces,
the wedge between producers' and consumers' wages and reduces the aggregate supply
of goods. For simplicity, the beneficial effects of unanticipated inflation on
aggregate supply aze ignored. This can be justified when all wage contracts aze
indexed to the price level or when one restricts attendon to rules outcomes.
Equilibrium in the goods market (yd - ys L y) yields an expression for the real
exchange rate, which can then be used to solve for the unemployment rate:
(2.16) u i 1-y - a0 - alw~` - a2g - a3m -~ a4T -F asr~` - ac.~k t a10`~,
where ai-áil(áófá~g)~0, ix4 and a4-(á4fá9)I(áófág)z0. In contrast to the familiar
Mundell-Fleming model with nominal wage rigidity, a fiscal expansion has real
effects because it induces an appreciation of the real exchange rate, a cut in the
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wedge and thus a drop in unemployment. The labour market fails to clear quickly,
since the real consumers' wage is assumed to be fixed by institutions at a too high
level. Altematively, in a bargaining model the level of the real consumers' wage
decreases with the unemployment rate in which case the ai in (2.16) would become
smaller in magnitude.
The government chooses t, e and g to minimise the following welfare loss
function:
(2.1~ W s JOexp[-(r-n)t][t2f~la2f~2e2fp3u2ts4(g-g)2ldt,
where g denotes the desired ratio of govemment spending to the national income.
The government is now also concerned about achieving full employment and a decent
size of the public sector. These additional concerns seem to be a very important
feature of the political economy of westem Europe. The political colour of the
incumbent government matters: left-wing governments tend to have a higher value of
g than right-wing governments. The first-order conditions yield
(2.18) T f R3a4u - R3a2u i- ~4(g-g) -[pln ~- ~2(n-n~`)~~m - a.
and xe-0, where x denotes the marginal cost of an additional unit of government




(2.19b) 7- R3(~~4)u f Rq( g-8).
An increase in unemployment, due to, say, a world recession or an increase in the
real consumers' wage leads to an increase in inflation and seigniorage revenues or
a cut in tazes (given a~). It also leads to higher government spending or higher
direct tax rates. There is (given g, u and n~`) a positive association between
inflation and tax rates and a negative association between inflation or tax rates
and government spending. Upon substitution into the intertemporal government budget
constraint, one obtains:




l f m I(R 1~-s2) f(1IR4) J~
(r-n)d-nmf g -m'rz~f~ u
(2.20b) g- S f(R3~iRq)u - P p 3 p~
( R4[lfm I(Rlfp2)]fl
(r-n)d-nmi-g ~-~ u -m'a~` S
(2.20c) rz- f P 3 P P m~ 2 rz~`,
l (Slfp2)[lf(1IR4)]fm , pl}S2
(2.20d) d- g-g p- m' (a~-n~ f~3(u-u~,
where m' -p2ml(plf~2) and R3rzR3[(ac2ls4)fa4]~0. The signs of these and other
budgetary and monetary responses are presented in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Optunal budgetary and monetary responses.
g gp u up rz' rzP (r-n)d n
t 0 f - f 0 - t -
g 1 - f - 0 f - t
g-~ 1 - f l- - 0 f - f
(r-n)dfg-i 1 - f l- 1 0 t -f- -~
rz 0 f 0 f -4- - -f -
á 1 -1 f - - f o 0
A transitory increase in the desired level of exhaustive government spending leads
to an equal increase in the actual level of exhaustive government spending, which
is financed entirely by borrowing. A permanent increase in the desired level of
exhaustive government spending leads to a smaller increase in actual exhaustive
government spending and to an increase in direct taxes, inflation and seigniorage
revenues, but dces not affect government borrowing. An expected increase in the
desired level of future exhaustive government spending implies a cut in current
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exhaustive government spending, an incre.ase in current tax and seigniorage
revenues, and current saving of the government. A high level of debt service dces
not affect government borrowing, but leads to high taxes and monetary growth and to
low levels of exhaustive government spending.
A temporary increase in unemployment leads to government borrowing, a cut in
taxes and a boost in exhaustive government spending. Since a large component of
government spending consists of unemployment benefits and other transfers, it is
not surprising that current government spending should respond to current
unemployment. A permanent increase in unemployment, however, leaves government
borrowing unaffected and gives rise to an increase in both seigniorage revenues and
inflation. The effect on taxes and exhaustive government spending is ambiguous,
because both instruments stimulate unemployment and both are wstly. If government
spending is more (less) effective than taxes to cut unemployment, i.e. oc21a4
(oc2 ca4), then government spending should be increased (taxes should be cut).
A temporary increase in foreign inflation leads to a smaller increase in
inflation and seigniorage revenues, which is fully used to pay off government debt.
A permanent increase in foreign inflation leaves government borrowing unaffected
and leads to a smaller increase in inflation. It is also used to cut taxes and
boost exhaustive govemment spending. An increase in real growth allows a cut in
tax and inflation rates and an increase in government spending.
The present model of taxlseigniorage smoothing with an EMS-anchor has been
extended to allow for a number of important features such as unemployment,
imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods, and endogenous government
spending. Of course, it is possible to include other features which may be of
interest. For example, one could allow for capital controls, which in the past have
allowed countries such as Italy and France to have fixed, but adjustable exchange
rates and an independent monetary policy (witness the differendal between on-shore
and off-shore interest rates). Since most of the capital markets of Europe have
been liberalised from ist July 1990, this extension will become less relevant.
2.6 Empirical evidence on the co-integration of inflation and tax rates.
In this section we present some empirical results on the model of tax and
seigniorage smoothing presented in Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.5. The analysis is
undertaken for the US and for all EEC countries with the exception of Luxembourg
which has no independent monetary policy. The aim of the empirical analysis is
twofold. First, from a theoretical point of view we want [o investigate the causes
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of inflation in Europe and judge which model seems best fit to ezplain the historic
pattern of infladon. Second, we look for cross-country differences in inflation
experience and public-fmance policies. The results may give some indication of the
steps that are to be undertaken for the "convergence" of monetary and fiscal policy
that may be needed for a monetary union in Europe.
Vazious authors have investigated the intertemporal theory of tax and
inflation smoothing for the United States. Manláw (198~ finds a positive
correlation, both in levels and in fust differences, between nominal interest
rates and federal taz revenues. Manlàw takes this as evidence supporting the
theory. Trehan and Walsh (1990) note that tax and inflation smoothing imply that
both tax and inflation rates must have a unit root. Hence, equalising the
intratemporal distortions of tax and inflation rates leads to a co-integrating
relation between tax and inflation rates. The presence of a long-run or co-
integrating relation can be tested by testing for a unit root in the residuals of a
regression in levels, see Engle and Granger (198Tj. The rejection of a unit root in
the resíduals points at the existence of such a long run relation, i.e. there is
co-integration between tax and inflation rates. Trehan and Walsh (1990) cannot
reject the null hypothesis of no co-integration between US tax and inflation rates,
not even when they allow for nonstationarity in the velocity of circulation (m1).
Moreover, the theory of tax and seigniorage smoothing can explain only a very small
pazt of the observed variation in inflation. Trehan and Walsh conclude that revenue
smoothing considerations have not been significant elements in determining the
behaviour of seigniorage in the US.
Poterba and Rotemberg (1990) find a positive relation between after-war tax
rates and inflation rates in the US, but this result does not carry over to the
four other lazge countries they study, namely, France, Germany, Japan and the UK.
Grilli (1988) reports evidence of co-integration between tax and inflation rates
for the EEC countries (excluding Portugal and Luxemburg). He also extends the model
with an exchange rate anchor to allow for the European Monetary System, in a way
similaz to ours. Grilli reports evidence of co-integration between domestic
inflation and tax rates and foreign inflation for some countries. He also finds
that the effect of foreign inflation seems to be stronger for the large countries,
Germany and the UK especially, which seems to contradict the hypothesis that it is
particulazly small countries who tie their exchange rate to the Deutschemark and
are willing to give up an independent monetary policy.
Much of previous empirical work has relied on testing for unit roots in tax
and inflation series, and on testing for co-integration between those variables. In
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our view there are some problems associated with this type of reseazch. First, it
relies heavily on statistical tests for unit roots, which have a notoriously low
power in small samples (e.g. Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1989). Second, the
equations often do not allow for any dynamics and give only estimates of long-run
(co-integrating) parameters or, if the model is estimated in first differences, of
short-run effects. The omission of dynamics in the equation results in a loss of
efficiency in estimating the parameters (see Wickens and Breusch, 1988), especially
in small samples like ours with only 25 observations. Domowitz and Hakkio (1990)
azgue that in the presence of costs of adjustment the resulting dynamic pattern can
be expressed as an error-correction mechanism. For the problem under consideration,
it is very plausible that there are significant costs in adjusting taz rates.
This is why we prefer to estimate the relation between inflation, tax rates
and foreign inflation by means of an error-correction mechanism of the form:
(2.21) Ant -~fl t y l~Tt t~2~nt }~3(nt-l~lTt-1~2Rt-1) } et'
If necessary, lagged fust difference terms could be added, but this specification
appeared to be sufficient to guarantee serially uncorrelated disturbances in our
applications. The parameters a~l and 72 aze the initial effects on inflation of a
rise in taxes or foreign inflation. Trehan and Walsh (1990) argue that one should
not pay too much attention to such short-run effects, because the tax-inflation
tradeoff can in the short run be obscured by a variety of other factors. Some of
these issues aze investigated in Section 2.7, where we present an alternative model
of inflation. The more important parameters are sl and S2. These parameters show
the magnitude of the long-run effect on inflation of a rise in tax rates and
foreign inflation.
If one is willing to accept that nt, Tt and nt are co-integrated, then
(-1,s1,82) is the co-integrating vector of these variables. The significance of the
long-run relations can be assessed in two ways. First, the error-correcting effect
should be significant, i.e. a~3 should be negative and significantly different from
zero. Note that if the time series of nt, ~t and nt contain unit roots, the error-
correction term is non-stationary under the null-hypothesis a~3 -0 and consequently
the usual critical values for the t-statistics do not apply. Pagan and Wickens
(1989) mention that in such cases, given the significance level, the critical
values aze higher.
This brings us to the next point, estimation of the model. One cannot
estimate equation (2.21) by OLS. The problem is that, due to the simultaneity of ~t
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and nt, one of the regressors, ntt, is correlated with the disturbance term, et.
(Foreign inflation nt, is assumed exogenous, and the lagged variables are
orthogonal to et as well.) Therefore, an instrumental variable for n~tLTt Tt 1 is
needed. Since Tt 1 is already included in the regression, an instrument that is
conrelated with Tt but not with et will also be adequate. The obvious candidate is
gt, the national income share of gross government expenditure, which is assumed to
be weakly exogenous, as in the derivation of the model in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. The
whole set of instruments that we use to estimate (2.21) by IV is (1, g, n~, t 1,
n~`1, a-1). There is an outlier in the gt series of Portugal, which is corrected by
using a dummy for the year 1980.
In the specification of (2.21) the long-run parameters al and a2 cannot be
estimated directly by linear IV; only r3 and the products r3a1 and a~3a2 can be
estimated directly. To obtain estimates of al and a2 one could divide the estimates
of ~3a1 and a~3s2 by the estimated r3 (Indirect Least Squares) but the computation
of standard errors for these IIS estimates is cumbersome. A more attractive
estimator is obtained by rewriting equation (2.21). Replacing nt-1 by xt o~t' Tt-1
by ~~ott and at 1 by nt-nn~ one obtains the following equation:
(2.22) nt --a~01a~3 f al~t f a2nt -
(a~lia~3ta1)eTt - (a~2ia~3ta2)en~ f (a~3flla~3)ont f (-lla~3)et,
which gives direct estimates of a 1 and s2. In equation (2.22) the error term is
correlated with two right-hand side variables, nnt and tt, and therefore OLS yields
inconsistent estimates. Note that, from an econometric point of view, both (2.21)
and (2.22) correspond to the Euler equation of the tax and seigniorage smoothing
model. In the spirit of Hansen's (1982) Generalised Method of Moments, we exploit
the orthogonality of et to a set of instruments to estimate the parameters. Because
our Euler equations are linear, the GMM estimator of equation (2.22) is equal to
the familiar Instrumental Variables estimator, with the same set of instruments
used before to estimate (2.21). This IV estimator is numerically identical to the
ILS estimator; its advantage is that standard errors are easily computed using the
standard expression for the variance-covariance matrix of the IV estimator.
Before presenting the estimates it must be noted that we treat velocity (m-1)
as a constant and consequently we do not include it explicitly in the model. T'he
foreign country is Germany, except for Ireland, where it is the UK, and for
Germany, where it is the US.
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Table 2.2 Estisates of tazlseigniorage ~oothing cia EMS-anchor
model in terms of inflation rates.
model: Ant - YO } álA7t } 2'2A~t } 2'3(at-1~17t-1~2~t-1 )} Et
71 2'2 73 81 S2 R2 s. e. LM
US -2.055 0.761 -0.172 -0.863 -1.006 -0.59 2.846 2.56
(0.64) (1.37) (0.52) (0.17) (0.19)
UK 1.043 1.216 -0.338 0.558 1.560 0.41 2.990 0.97
(1.75) (2.12)' (1.94) (1.04) (1.39)
BEL -0.038 0.530 -0.545 0.016 1.789 0.66 1.159 0.06
(0.06) (1.95)' (2.89)' (0.13) (3.90)r
DEN 0.420 0.582 -0.572 0.012 1.522 0.53 1.747 1.40
(0.67) (1.58) (2.62)' (0.18) (2.58)'
FRA 0.701 0.813 -0.447 0.173 1.482 0.49 1.479 0.62
(1.11) (2.75)' (2.08)' (0.77) (3.30)'
GER -0.418 -0.035 -2.759 -0.04 1.230 2.88
(0.42) (0.16) (0.15)
ITA -2.13 -0.04 -0.157 -0.672 5.465 0.34 2.635 0.31
(1.99)' (0.05) (0.82) (0.25) (1.28)
NETH -0.157 0.737 -0.568 -0.163 1.477 0.50 1.401 1.46
(0.28) (2.70)' (3.08)' (1.59) (3.65)'
GRE 2.666 2.662 -0.778 1.832 2.866 0.28 4.086 0.45
(0.87) (1.62) (2.32)' (6.12)' (4.30)'
IRE 0.917 0.691 -0.625 0.072 0.952 0.66 2.043 0.07
(1.83) (5.45)' (2.81)' (0.46) (6.19)'
POR -0.217 0.160 -0.521 0.704 3.283 0.44 3.856 2.28
(0.13) (0.21) (2.86)' (2.99)M (2.92)'
SPA -0.850 0.266 -0.285 -0.105 2.946 0.31 2.786 2.31
(0.84) (0.50) (1.75) (0.24) (1.92)
t-.,ti.6a in encka,; ~inaic.w .iymficaoce ,t sx leve~;
umple pariod: 1962-1987;
gre x(1) Lgrenge Multiplier teri for 5rotorder xrial corcelatioo.a.e.: etandard ertor of rc uion; IM: Z
The results presented in Table 2.2 do not generally support the theory. The
short-run effect of taxes on inflation (a~l) is not always positive, and almost
nowhere significant. This seems to support the view of Trehan and Walsh (1990) that
in the short run other effects dominate the wrrelation between tax and inflation
rates. The estimated value of the catch-up term (a~3) is always negative, although
it is not always significant. This suggests that the error-correction mechanism may
not be such a bad description. The long-run effect (al) is significant for only two
countries, Greece and Portugal. Precisely these countries relied heavily on
seigniorage to finance their budgets in the seventies and the eighties. For the
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other countries, however, other aspects than seigniorage revenue seem to determine
the rate of inflation.
One of those other influences is specified in the model; the desire for
exchange rate stability is modelled through the objective of minimising inflation
differential with abroad, by the inclusion of the foreign rate of inflation as an
explanatory variable. This effect is significant, both in the short run (72) and in
the long run (s2), for most European countries, except Italy, but not for the US.
Germany is excluded since it is considered to be the "foreign" country for the
other members of the European Monetary System. This demonstrates that exchange rate
policy has been relatively unimportant for the US, whereas it is an important
element in macroeconomic policy for most European countries, except perhaps Italy.
The reason that exchange rate stability vis-à-vis the Deutschemark did not show up
significantly for Italy may be due to the presence of capital controls.
Table 2.3 Estimatea of taxlaeigniorage aooothing cuo EMS-anchor
~odel in teros of nooinal intereat rates.
model: Ait - á0 } 710it } T20it }~3(it-1~17t-1~2it-1) } Et
~1 ~2 y3 gl S2 R2
s.e. LM
US -0.302 0.755 -0.223 0.173 0.507 0.55 1.669 0.01
(0.26) (4.22)' (0.91) (0.10) (0.52)
UK 1.844 0.059 -0.814 0.862 -0.407 0.36 2.327 2.26
(1.95) (0.20) (2.11)' (3.63)' (0.91)
BEL 1.771 0.518 -1.148 0.384 0.426 0.34 1.944 3.84
(0.91) (2.64)' (2.59)' (3.74)' (1.70)
DEN -0.269 0.363 -0.362 0.464 0.490 0.23 2.730 3.52
(0.38) (1.22) (2.13)' (2.67)' (0.61)
FRA 0.981 0.656 -0.609 0.354 1.057 0.77 1.118 0.17
(2.72)' (5.95)' (3.52)' (3.37)' (5.10)'
GER -0.952 0.844 -0.459 -0.524 1.037 0.61 1.597 0.03
(0.98) (4.23)' (1.62) (1.25) (2.45)'
ITA 0.905 0.688 -0.337 0.249 1.632 0.31 1.928 0.04
(1.00) (2.20)' (1.65) (0.47) (2.32)'
NETH 0.198 0.703 -0.680 0.126 0.398 0.68 1.461 5.61'
(0.20) (4.71)' (3.11)' (1.15) (1.43)
GRE 0.776 0.298 -0.400 1.025 0.783 0.21 1.089 2.48
(1.07) (1.50) (1.71) (5.72)' (2.20)'
IRE -0.036 1.229 -0.874 0.348 1.299 0.47 2.834 2.42
(0.04) (3.37)' (3.32)' (1.43) (2.93)'
Ndu ~ee Tabk 2.2; wrtqk peeiod for Cmece i~ 1964-1986.
For Powg~l ~nd Spain m Qaod ineee"t nte dau vero milabk.
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A variant on model (2.21) or (2.22) is a relation between nominal interest
rates and taz rates. Table 2.3 shows the results of that model. The results are a
bit confusing; the "taz" effect becomes more significant for the iJK, Belgium,
Denmark and France, and remains important for Greece. The effects of foreign
nominal interest rates seems not to be as clear as the effects of foreign
inflation. The effects seem to contradict the results of the EMS-anchor model,
especially for Italy and the Netherlands. This can be ezplained in two ways: either
capital controls have been important (Italy) or the central bank of the country
under concern has a better reputation and discipline than the Bundesbank (the
Netherlands).
Table 2.4 Estimatee of taxlaeigniorage tradeoff with uneoployaent.
model: Ant - ~0 } 2'lA7t } ó2~Rt } ~3Aut } ~4(Rt-l~ltt-1~2nt-1~3ut-1) } et
~1 72 y3 r4 S1 d2 S3 R2 LM
US -0.844 0.355 -2.439 0.005 -228.4 -91.3 321.1 0.53 0.15
(0.58) (0.98) ( 1.98)' (0.02) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
UK 1.559 0.669 -1.761 -0.264 2.412 1.748 -2.100 0.52 0.31
(2.88)~` (1.09) (2.28)' (1.36) (1.42) (1.02) (1.22)
BEL 0.378 0.423 -0.37 -0.603 0.137 1.740 -0.115 0.74 0.08
f0.20) (0.66) (0.42) (1.47) (0.21) (1.93) (0.16)
DEN 0.129 0.649 0.61 -0.745 -0.011 0.948 0.169 0.56 1.56
(0.25) (1.61) (1.63) (2.99)~ (0.14) (2.27)~ (0.67)
FRA 0.539 0.806 -0.11 -0.370 -0.491 1.620 0.827 0.50 0.07
(0.77) (2.59)' (0.10) (1.48) (0.28) (2.53)' (0.41)
GER -0.967 -0.032 -0.601 0.025 9.268 -12.02 0.866 0.12 1.99
(1.00) (0.18) (1.14) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03)
ITA -1.908 0.024 -1.820 -0.146 -1.312 6.323 3.820 0.51 0.56
(1.53) (0.03) (1.21) (0.74) (0.19) (1.09) (0.35)
NETH 0.416 0.362 -0.371 -0.810 0.191 1.069 -0.542 0.63 0.95
(1.10) (1.22) (0.96) (3.99)' (1.42) (3.68)' (2.28)~
GRE 3.609 3.026 0.355 -0.909 2.093 2.488 -0.507 0.17 0.00
(0.93) (1.48) (0.26) (2.11)~ (4.75)' (2.53)~ (0.66)
IRE 1.355 0.600 -0.059 -0.916 0.701 0.702 -0.696 0.67 0.21
(2.38)' (3.99)~ (0.10) (3.31)~ (2.42)~ (5.27)~ (2.14)~
POR 1.929 0.392 -2.479 -0.281 1.638 4.746 -3.113 0.25 0.60
(0.60) (0.30) (0.62) (0.50) (0.33) (0.67) (0.21)
SPA 0.816 -0.119 0.023 -0.523 1.914 1.055 -1.509 0.41 1.07
(0.73) (0.18) (0.03) (2.42)~` (1.89) (1.10) (1.91)
Nae~ ~ee T~bk 2.2.
The results of estimating the model with unemployment, based on equation
(2.19), are presented in Table 2.4. In general, unemployment dces not seem to be an
important determinant of inflation in the way predicted by the model of Section
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2.5. In fact, for the US and the UK changes in unemployment exert a significant
downward pressure on inflation rates, whereas the model predicts a positive effect.
In the long run unemployment does not seem to have a big impact on the rate of
inflation, except in the Netherlands, Ireland and Spain, where there is a negative
long-run effect of the unemployment rate. The effects of taxes and foreign
inflation do not seem to be affected much by the inclusion of unemployment in the
tax-seigniorage equation.
2.7 Non-nested tests against cost-push theories of inflation
One wonders how well the model of tax and seigniorage smoothing compares with
alternative models of inflation in the EEC, especially in the seventies. The
taxlseigniorage smoothing model treats inflation, money supply or nominal interest
rates, as policy instruments, i.e. variables that the government can manipulate at
will. However, the demand for money function is notoriously unstable and a variety
of external and internal shocks hit the economy continually. One may well have
doubts that under such circumstances inflation is the result of deliberate
government policy to smooth seigniorage revenues and obtain an optimal tax-
inflation tradeoff.
According to Bruno and Sachs (1985) the high inflation spells of the 1970s
must be primarily explained by raw materials price shocks and the subsequent upward
wage-price spiral, caused by pressure to keep real wages at an unrealistically high
level. T'he spiral is only brought to rest when monetary authorities take severe
measures to stop inflation, thereby forcing a slowdown in activity in the real
economy and causing high unemployment. Such a view of inflation is better captured
by an augmented Phillips curve. It differs from the traditional Phillips curve in
that it takes expected inflation into account, but also unexpected external price
shocks and various supply side variables, such as productivity growth and the level
of real wages relative to the full-employment level (the so-called "wage gap"),
play a role. Bruno and Sachs do not account explicitly for the changes in prices of
imported goods other than of raw materials. For the smaller European countries,
however, imported inflation may be very significant, because their economies are
very open and a large proportion of consumption goods is imported. This affects
inflation, since the measure used is the relative change in the consumer price
index. This is also the reason why another important source of imported inflation
is depreciation of the exchange rate. We do not take this as a separate effect, but
include it in the raw materials prices and the prices of imports. Hence, raw
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material price inflation (ttA) is the relative price change of raw materials in US
dollazs (tt~) plus the rate of depreciation of the currency against the dollaz
(éUS). Similarly, inflation in import prices (,fM) is defined as the foreign
inflation rate (R~`) plus the rate of depreciation of the nominal ezchange rate (é).
The estimation results of such a cost-push model of inflation are presented in
Table 2.5.
Table 2.5 Estimates of cost-push ~odel of inflation.
at - SO } S1Dt } S2nt-1 } S3Rt } ~4~t-1 t ~Snt } Sónt-1 } ~7~t } ~8~t-2 } Et
S1 ~2 ~3 S4 S5 ~6 ~7 ~8 R
2
US 2.394 0.842 0.058 0.062 -0.867 0.95
(4.33) (12.24) (4.27) (4.27) (4.88)
UK 7.524 0.445 0.071 0.089 -0.101 -0.940 0.80
(2.89) (2.90) (1.52) (1.00) (0.96) (3.22)
BEL 3.240 0.473 0.050 0.230 -0.390 0.88
(3.03) (4.22) (2.82) (3.68) (3.47)
DEN 3.366 0.314 0.052 0.047 0.283 -0.418 0.78
(2.51) (2.04) (1.96) (1.86) (2.65) (2.16)
FRA 4.013 0.908 0.073 0.022 -0.190 -0.570 0.90
(3.48) (5.37) (3.84) (1.16) (1.24) (2.89)
GER 0.817 0.736 0.034 -0.312 0.77
(1.12) (5.75) (2.10) (2.23)
ITA 6.260 0.393 0.087 0.029 0.024 0.031 -0.820 0.91
(2.27) (2.57) (2.17) (0.69) (0.20) (0.22) (1.88)
NETH 0.650 0.557 0.020 0.010 -0.040 0.334 -0.258 0.76
(0.52) (3.09) (0.67) (0.35) (0.20) (1.79) (1.73)
GRE 5.040 0.295 0.140 0.115 0.193 -0.122 0.90
(1.59) (1.42) (2.73) (2.14) (1.76) (0.47)
IRE 1.127 0.228 0.042 0.026 0.324 0.170 -0.003 0.89
(0.53) (1.07) (1.30) (0.80) (3.20) (1.25) (0.01)
POR 10.041 0.206 0.138 0.143 0.101 -0.121 -0.654 0.94
(4.80) (1.29) (3.43) (3.39) (1.15) (1.33) (1.54)
SPA 5.296 0.415 0.013 0.081 0.123 -0.071 -0.275 0.83
(2.26) (2.26) (0.31) (1.95) (1.33) (0.75) (2.44)
Na~e~: ~a T~ble 2.2; metàod of ewimuion: OIS;
~mpk period for Greece, Port~pl and Spain: 1964-t987.
D7487: dummy veriable for 19741987 period.
In this model, the slowdown in productivity growth and the increase in the wage gap
resulting from the fust oil shock is proxied by a dummy variable that is zero
before 1974 and one from 1974 onwazds. Following Bruno and Sachs (1985), expected
inflation is prozied by lagged inflation. Because the effect of raw materials price
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shocks and imported inflation sometimes appeared to occur with a lag, both current
and lagged nR and AM are included in the regression equation. The equations are
usually free of serial correlation, but for France nt 2 is included as a regressor
to get rid of serial correlation. Some very insignificant regressors were omitted
from the equations.
The results indicate that the cost-push model explains the inflation for most
countries quite well. The R2 of most equations is fairly high, and for each country
some significant effects show up. The effect of lagged inflation is significant,
but the coefficient is smaller than one for all countries. This means that there is
some delay in the adjustment of prices to the external shocks, perhaps due to
staggered wage contracts as in Taylor (1979) or Alogoskoufis (1990). There is a
clear trend-break in 1974 for all countries except Germany, the Netherlands and
Ireland.
The timing of the effect of the raw materials price shocks is not the same
for all countries, sometimes nt is significant, sometimes ni-1 and sometimes both,
but it is clear that raw material price changes are important determinants of
inflation in all countries. In this respect also the sharp rise and subsequent fall
of the dollaz azound 1985 is important for the European countries since most raw
materials prices aze expressed in US dollazs. Imported inflation seems to have been
important especially for the smaller European countries, Belgium, Denmark, the
Netherlands, Greece and Ireland, and to a lesser extent Portugal and Spain. The
larger countries, the UK, France and Italy and the US appear to be less sensitive
to import price fluctuations. For all countries there is a significant Phillips
curve effect. High unemployment exerts a downwazd pressure on inflation, only for
Ireland and Greece the effect is rather weak.
We specified and estimated the cost-push model of inflation primarily as a
simple alternative to the tax~seigniorage smoothing cum EMS-anchor model of
inflation. The empirical specifications of models (2.21) and (2.23) aze not nested,
so we cannot perform a direct test of one model against the other by examining the
significance of one or more explanatory variables. We perform the test of non-
nested hypotheses proposed by Godfrey and Pesaran (1983) on the cost-push model
(MI) against the taxlseigniorage smoothing cum EMS-anchor model (M2). To carry out
the test, M2 is specified as a simple regression of nt on a constant, nt-1' 7t'
Tt-1' nt and nt-1' This is not fully correct, as tt is endogenous and should be
instrumented. However, we do not know of any test of non-nested simultaneous
equations. Therefore, for purposes of carrying out the non-nested tests, we
estimate both models here by OLS.
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Table 2.6 Non-nested tests of cost-push model (Ml)
versus taxlseigniorage cum-EMS ancbor model (M2).
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The results in Table 2.6 show that in most cases the tax~seigniorage smoothing cum
EMS-anchor model is rejected against the cost-push model. Exceptions to this rule
are Germany, the Netherlands and Ireland. For the latter two countries the cost-
push model of inflation is even rejected against the taxlseigniorage smoothing cum
EMS-anchor model. Especially the objective of maintaining a stable exchange rate
with Germany and the UK, respectively, has been the dominant determinant of
inflation for these two countries. This is not surprising, since the Netherlands
has been one of the most loyal members of the European Monetary System and until
Ireland joined the European Monetary System it had been tracking the pound sterling
very closely. For Germany the outcome is undecided, the data cannot make a cleaz
choice between the two models. The cost-push model clearly is a better model of
inflation for the US, the UK, Denmazk, Greece, Portugal and Spain. The conclusion
for Portugal and Greece is somewhat unexpected, because Table 2.2 suggests that the
tax effect was important for these countries. For Belgium, France and Italy the
test rejects both models against each other, indicating that we have to look for a
better model of inflation for those wuntries.
2.8 Concluding remarks
The tax and seigniorage smoothing model has been extended to allow for an exchange
rate anchor and stabilisation policy. An analysis of the time inconsistency of
monetary policy arising from the use of a surprise inflation tax to wipe out the
real value of debt illustrated the gains from membership of the European Monetary
System. By tying one's hands to the policy of the Bundesbank, one obtains the
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discipline of the Bundesbank. T'hese advantages may outweigh the disadvantages in
terms of a sub-optimal government revenue mix when there is a large outstanding
stock of nominal government debt and when the system of tax collection is quite
efficient. The exchange rate anchor seems to explain a lot of the inflation in EMS
countries. We fmd little evidence in favour of co-integration of taxation and
seigniorage revenues. A comparison of the revenue-smoothing model with a cost-push
model of inflation clearly prefers the latter model for most countries, except
those that have pegged their currencies firmly to a foreign currency (the
Netherlands and Ireland).
Data appendix.
General government expenditure as a fraction of national income (including interest
payments), g. Source: OECD Economic Outlook, various issues.
General government revenues as a fraction of national income, z. Source: OECD
Economic Outlook, various issues.
Standardised unemployment rate, u. Source: OECD Economic Outlook, various issues.
Consumer price index, P. Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1990
(IFS) line 64.
Short term interest ra[e, i. Source: IFS line 60b, except UK: line 60c; Italy,
Ireland, Spain: OECD Main Economic Indicators.
Money base, M. Source: IFS line 14.
National Income, Y. Source: IFS line 99b (GDP), except US, Belgium, Germany and the
Netherlands, IFS line 99a (GNP).
Exchange rate of US dollar, e. Source: IFS line ahx.
Commodity price index in US dollars, R. Source: IFS line d(pp. 182I183).
Debt, D. Source: IFS lines 88 and 89, various na[ional statistics4.
Inflation, rz ~ eln(P).
Government liabilities, m f d-(MfD)lY.
Depreciation of exchange rate, è- eln(e).
Raw materials price shock (in US dollars), rzUS - eln(R).
Raw materials price shock ( in domestic currency), rzR - aus f e'
Impor[ed inflation, nM - rz~` -F é.
4 The government debt data for Ireland were kindly provided by Jercen Kremers of
the Dutch Ministry of Finance.
Chapter 3
A Univariate Analysis of EMS Exchange Rates
Using a Target Zone Model
3.1 Introduction.
Following the seminal model of Krugman (1991), a large theoretical literature of
exchange rate determination in target zones has developed. The crucial observation
in these models is that the tazget zone influences the expectations of future spot
prices because the central banks witl intervene if the exchange rate deviates too
much from its central parity. Hence, in a forwazd looking model of exchange rate
determination, the presence of a tazget zone has an impact on the exchange rate
itself, even if there are currently no interventions. One of the most striking
implications of the Krugman model, and neazly all other theoretical models, is the
non-linear, S-shaped relation between fundamentals and exchange rates.
In this paper, we develop several methods for estimating the Krugman (1991)
tazget zone model. For this model the likelihood function is known, though quite
complicated, so efficient estimation and testing based on the method of Maximum
Likelihood is possible. However, for almost any extension of the model that is
present in the literature, the likelihood function is not known, so other
estimators are needed. An alternative class of estimators is given by the
Generalised Method of Moments. A recent development in GMM estimation is the Method
of Simulated Moments, where the model is simulated to compute the moments of the
theoretical distribution. Although the computational burden of simulating
artificial data and computing their moments is high, simulated moments estimators
seem well suited for applications in target zone models, because in these models
the stochastic process generating fundamentals and exchange rates is explicitly
specified, and simulation of the model is conceptually straightforward.
In the empirical part of this chapter the Krugman target zone model is
estimated and tested on EMS exchange rate data over a relatively stable period,
January 1987 to October 1990. The results indicate that there are significant non-
linearities in the exchange rate processes of the Belgian franc, the French franc
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and the Danish lcrone, possibly caused by the impact of the band on expectations of
future variables. For the other currencies, however, there seem to be no non-
linearities at all, which result may be explained by the presence of an implicit
band that is narrower than the official EMS band. The specification of the model is
tested by comparing some moments of the theoretical distribution with the sample
moments. These tests reveal that the Krugman target zone model is misspecified: the
model is not capable of explaining the full magnitude of the observed conditional
heteroskedasticity and leptokurtosis in exchange rate returns.
The organisation of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 reviews the Krugman
target zone model briefly. Section 3 discusses Maximum Likelihood estimation, and
Section 4 Method of Simulated Moments estimation of the Krugman target zone model.
Section 5 presents the empirical results and Section 6 concludes the chapter. Two
Appendices give deiails on the simulation of the model and the computation of the
specification tests.
3.2 A simple model of exchange rate determination in a target zone.
In this section we describe the basic target zone model of Krugman (1991). In this
model, the logarithm of the exchange rate, e(t), is a function of the economic
fundamental and its own expected rate of change
(3.1) e(t) - f(t) f a.Et(de(t)~dt), a10.
Excluding `bubble' solutions, this implies that e(t) is the present discounted
value of all expected future fundamental values
(3.2) e(t) - á'rexp(-sla)Et[f(t~-s)]ds.
It is assumed that, ezcept for occasional interventions, the fundamental follows a
Brownian motion with constant drift, ~, and variance, c2,
(3.3) df(t) - ~.dt -~ odW(t),
where W(t) is the Wiener process with standard normal increments over the unit time
interval. The Krugman model assumes a very specific intervention policy: f(t)
follows (3.3) until a lower limit f or an upper limit f is reached. If so, the
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fundamental is kept within the band by infinitesimal interventions at the margin.
This stochastic process is called a regulated Brownian motion with reflecting
barriers, see Harrison (1985).
The regulated Brownian motion exhibits a strong Markov property (Harrison,
1985, p.81) so that the ezpectations of f(tts), s10, depend only on the current
value of f(t). Therefore, e(t) can be written as a function of f(t) only, say
e(t)-G(f(t)). Using Ito's lemma, G(f(t)) is know to satisfy the following
differential equation:
(3.4) dG(f(t)) - [~G' (f(t)) f ~Z"(f(t))]dt f G' (f(t)).odW(t).
Of course, the exchange rate solution also has to satisfy (3.1). Substituting (3.4)
into (3.1) one obtains
(3.5) G(f(t)) - f(t) f a[~G' (f(t)) -F ~ZG"(f(t))].
T'his differential equation should be satisfied by the function G(f(t)). The general
solu6on for G(f(t)) is
(3.6) G(f(t)) - f(t) f a~ f Alexp(alf(t)) f A2exp(x2f(t)),
where a 1 and a2 are the roots of the characteristic equation
(3.~ ~Za2 f att'a - 1,
and A1 and A2 are constants that are to be determined from the relevant boundary
conditions provided by the target zone model. If the ezchange rate regime were a
free float, the exclusion of `bubble' solution implies that A1-A2-0 and hence the
solution would be linear, e(t) - f(t) f a~.
In the model of Krugman (1991) there is a fully credible target zone [e,é]
with infinitesimal interventions at the margin. The boundary conditions for the
Krugman target zone model are the value matching and the so-called smooth pasting
conditions. Svensson (1992) and Bertola (1993) give an intuitive motivation of
these conditions. With infinitesimal marginal interventions the value matching
conditions are G(f)-é and G(f)-e. The smooth pasting conditions are that the
derivative of the exchange rate function G(f(t)) at f and f should be zero: G'(f)-0
and G' (~-0. Using these conditions, the solution for the function G(f(t)) is non-
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lineu and has an S-shaped form. Note that in solving the model the value matching
and smooth pasting conditions have to be solved simultaneously in the four unknown
parameters f, ~, A1 and A2. Figure 3.1 graphs the ezchange rate solution.
Figure 3.1: Solution of Krugman target zone model
N
N
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3.3 Maximum Likelihood estimation.
2 4 6
In this section we show how the Krugman (1991) target zone model can be estimated
efficiently by the method of Mazimum Likelihood (ML). In order to apply ML, the
statistical distribution of a sequence {el(e),..,e.I.(e)} generated by the model must
be known to derive the likelihood function L(e), defined as the joint densityl of
the observations D(e1,..,e.1.~E~;e), where Ep is the set of initial conditions. Using
the prediction error decomposition, the joint density is written as the product of
conditional densities
1The symbol D is used to denote any (joint) density function.
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T
(3.8) L(e) ~ D(e1,..,eZ,~EO;e) - II D(et~Et-l~e)~t-1
where Et-1 denotes the information set formed by the initial conditions EO and all
observations up to and including et-1'
In the Krugman target zone model the fundamental follows a regulated Brownian
motion on the interval [f,f). It is therefore convenient to rewrite the likelihood
function in terms of the fundamentals. The mapping e-G(f;e) is monotone and
continuously differentiable for any e so we can apply a change of variables,
ft-G1(et;e), for all observed values of the exchange rate and rewrite the
likelihood function to
T
(3.9) L(e) - n D(ft ~ Et-1'e) ~ G~ (ft'e) 1t-1
The latter part of (3.9) is the Jacobian of the transformation, which is always
positive and continuous. Due to the strong Markov property of the regulated
Brownian motion, the history is irrelevant for the distribution of the future of
the process if f(t) is known. This property allows us to condition the distribution
of ft on the previous observation only, and the likelihood function can be
rewritten to
T
(3.10) L(e) - n D(ft~ft-1~8)'G~(ft;e)-1t-1
In our empirical work we condition on the the first observation, e, which is
transformed to the initial state of the fundamental process through ó-G-4(eo;e).
Having derived the likelihood of the exchange rate in terms of the
fundamentals, what remains to be found is the predictive density function of the
regulated Brownian motion. The predictive distribution function of the one-sided
regulated Brownian motion with regulation at lower bound f is given in Harrison
(1985, p.49). The expression is
(f-ft-s t`s ~(f}~ 2f-f-ft-s ~s z(3.11) P(f ~ ft-s) - ~ I 1- e - m( - , t~2~lc
l ~ J l ~
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The first part of this function is the usual normal distribution function, whereas
the second part represents the probability that f(t) is regulated at the lower
bound in the time interval (t-s,t]. The mazginal distribution is obtained by
letting s go to infmity which yields
(3.12) P(f) -
1-e7(f-~ if i G 0
~ 0 if TZ0
If the target zone were one-sided, one could apply these distribution functions
directly to obtain the likelihood function. However, most actual tazget zones aze
two-sided, so we need the conditional density or distribution function of a two-
sided regulated Brownian motion. This function is quite complicated2 and contains
an infmite summation, which makes computation very time-consuming.
Instead of using this exact density we approximate the conditional
distribution of a two-sided regulated Brownian motion by a weighted average of the
conditional distributions of two one-sided regulated Brownian motions, regulated at
the lower and at the upper bound, respectively. The weights aze chosen such as to
satisfy two conditions. First, the approximate conditional distribution must
converge to the exact marginal distribution as the time between f(t) and the
initial value f(0) goes to infinity. Second, the function must converge to the
predictive distribution of a one-sided regulated Brownian motion if one of the
bounds gces to infinity. The distribution function that satisfies these conditions
is
2 The density of a regulated Brownian motion f(t) with drift ~, variance QZ and
support [f,f], conditional on f(0) - fó is
Tei(f-f) exp[t(f-fo)l2] yn(f)-yn(fo)
p(f I f~ - f ~ ~.exp(-ant)
et(f-f)-1 n-14(f-t) ana lo~
7 - 2~Ic2
a z ([-f)In
yn(f) - 2n-cos(n(f-f)la) f ta.sin(n(f-f)la)
xn á PZ rn2la2 f T214~ l2
These foLrmulas are adapted and corrected from Appendix A3 of the working paper
version of Svensson (1991b).
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f-f ~s 2f-f-f ~s
(3.13) P(f ~ ft-s) - ~ t~ l-(1-P(~)~
l- ~s 1
2~-f-f ~s




P(f) - if t x 0, P(f) -- if t- 0,
et(f-f)-1 f-f
is the marginal or `asymptotic' dis[ribution of f(t), see Harrison (1985, p.90).
Numerical experimentation shows that the first derivative of this approximate
distribution function gives a very accurate approximation to the exact density
function.
In order to test the accuracy and normality of the ML estimator in a
reasonably large sample we picked a vector of pseudo-true parameter values and
generated a number of artificial time series of exchange rates, using the
simulation method of the target zone model described in the Appendix. Each
simulated series contains 1000 observations. The pseudo-true parameter values
picked are (~,o~Z,a)-(0,4,0.1) and the ezchange rate is allowed to fluctuate in a
band with bounds ~-é-2.25; these values imply first and second moments for the
exchange rate that are comparable to those of actual EMS exchange rates. For each
simulated series the parameter vector was estimated by ML using the approximate
likelihood function. In Figures 3.2-3.4, the empirical distribution functions of
100 estimates of ~, ln(QZ) and In(a) are plotted against a normal distribution with
mean equal to the pseudo-true parameter value and variance equal to the variance of
the estimates. The ML estimator appears to be normal with the correct mean,
although there is a slight overestimation of the variance of the fundamental. The
variance of the estimates of ~ and In(a) is rather big, indicating that these
parameters are not very precisely estimated.
According to Chernoff (1954), the Likelihood Ratio test of HO:a-O against
H1:a~0 has a Zxót2x~ distribution. This distribution function and the empirical
distribution function computed from 100 Monte Carlo replications with pseudo-true
parameter values (~a,a~2,a)-(0,4,0) is shown in Figure 3.5. The empirical
distribution lies everywhere to the left of the theoretical one, so that using the
critical values of Chernoff s distribution gives a conservative test.
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Figure 3.2: Empirical distribution In(alpha)
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3.4 Method of Simulated Moments estimation of target zone models.
In the Krugman model the marginal and conditional densities of the exchange rate
are known so that Maximum Likelihood estimation of the parameters is feasible. For
more complicated tazget zone models the mazginal and conditional exchange rate
distributions are usually unlcnown. An estimator for these models is provided by the
method of moments, in which the parameters are chosen such as to minimise the
distance between a vector of observed (sample) moments and the theoretical
(population) moments. However, in the target zone models computation of some useful
moments, especially the autocovariances of the first differences (returns) of the
exchange rates, n~uires multidimensional integration which may be problematic.
McFadden (1989) and Lee and Ingram (1991) show that this problem can be solved by
computing the theoretical moments by simulation. This method is especially
attractive for application to target zone models because the stochastic process
that drives the exchange rate is usually explicitly specified in these models.
We compute the moments of the exchange rate and its first difference as
follows. A number of series { ë it} of length equal to the sample size are simulated
according to the procedure described in Appendix A. For each simulated series its
`sample' moments are computed, and a consistent estimator of the population moments
is obtained by averaging the `sample' moments over all simulated series. Because
our sample starts just after a realignment there is no obvious reason why the first
observation would come from the marginal distribution. Therefore, the analysis is
performed conditional on the first observation, i.e. the simulation of each series
is starteà at the value of the fust observation.
The Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) estimator invoives minimising the
distance between the sample moments and the simulated population moments, denoted
by d(e), with respect to the parameters of the model. The most efficient MSM
estimator is obtained if one uses the inverse of the covariance matrix of the
moments, E, to define the metric in which the distance is minimised. We estimate E
by the method of Newey and West (198~ fmm the simulated values. Lee and Ingram
(1991) show that if the simulated ezchange rates are independent of the observed
series the asymptotic covariance matrix of the distance vector is (lf~) times the
variance of the moments, where n is the number of simulated exchange rate series.
In our applications n-50 so that the variance caused by simulating the moments is
relatively small. They also show that the asymptotic distribution of the MSM
estimator is
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(3.14) ,rT(ê-e~ ~~ Y N r0, (l t~)(D~ É1D)-11, D~ ad(e)lae.
In actual applications of the method of moments we want to use moments that are
most informative about the parameters to be estimated. Although the ezchange rate
is a stationary process in the target wne model the moments of the level of the
exchange rate aze not very informative about the parameters, the reason being that
the observations on the levels exhibit strong serial correlation and therefore very
long time series are needed to obtain precise estimates of the theoretical moments
of the level of the exchange rate3. Moreover, not all parameters of the target zone
model can be estimated from the moments of the marginal distribution of the
exchange rate alone, because the function G(.), and the mazginal distribution of
the fundamental depend only on the ratio ~lo~Z and the product oy~. This argument
also implies that histograms of the mazginal distribution of the exchange rate
(e.g. used by Bertola and Caballero (1992)) alone do not provide information about
all the properties of the model. Information from the conditional distribution of
the exchange rate is necessary for estimating all parameters. T'herefore, it is
necessary to use moments of the first differences of the exchange rate. T'hese
moments have the additional advantage that their variance is relatively small
because first differences of the exchange rate are not strongly correlated over
time.
In our empirical application we use five moments of the first difference of
the exchange rate. The first two moments are the expectation and the variance,
because these aze likely to be sensitive to the drift parameter, ~, and the
variance parameter, a~2, of the fundamental process. In addition, we use the third
moment (skewness) and the first and sewnd autocovariances of the first difference
of the exchange rate. These moments aze included to capture the non-linear part of
the exchange rate process. In principle a lot of other moments could be added to
this set, but given computational limitations we confine ourselves to the five
moments mentioned.
3 This azgument may also explain why the estimator in the paper of Smith and
Spencer (1991) does not work well. That estimator uses only three moments, the mean
and variance of the ezchange rate returns and the variance of the level, to
estimate three parameters, so that in principle a unique estimator could be found.
However, the variance of the exchange rate level is not very informative about the
parameters. This is probably the cause of the difficulties in finding an optimum




In this secdon we present the results of an empirical application of the target
wne model to ezchange rates of six EMS currencies against the Deutschemazk. The
model is estimated and it is tested to see whether the model can ezplain certain
"stylised" facts of the ezchange rate data.
We use samples of EMS exchange rates from the period after the realignment of
Januazy 1987. The sample ends in October 1990, well before the effects of the
German unification became known and culminated in the crisis in the EMS in
September 1992. Although the absence of realignments does not imply complete
credibility of the band, see Svensson (1991c), we think it is worth testing the
Krugman model on a sample from a relatively stable period within the EMS. The time
series we study are 189 weekly observations from 14 January 1987 until 3 October
1990 of the exchange rates of six major EMS currencies against the Deutschemazk.
The currencies are the Belgian franc, the Dutch guilder, the Danish krone, the
French franc, the Irish punt, and the Italian lira. The dependent variable et is
defined as 100 times the relative deviation from the cential parity. The upper and
lower limit on the exchange rate in the model are put equal to the official bound
of the tazget zone, i. e. a deviation of f2.25 9b upwazd and -2.25 46 downwazd from the
central parity is allowed (i-6~ and -64b for the Italian Lira until January 1990). We
use weekly data to avoid problems with missing observations due to weekends and
holidays.
The Maximum Likelihood parameter estimates and some associated test
statistics are reported in Table 3.1. The estimates of a aze significant for three
currencies, the Belgian franc, the Danish krone and the French franc. Graphical
inspection of the data series shows that these exchange rates come close to the
margin, but always revert to the central parity. Also, the volatility of these
exchange rates appears to be smaller close to the margin. The target wne model
picks up these effects. The lazge estimates of o~2 and a for the Danish krone series
and their lazge standazd errors are caused by a high correlation between the
estimators of these parameters; the estimated asymptotic correlation between QZ and
A
a is neazly one. The likelihood function is also very flat in these parameters,
which is reflected in the lazge standard errors.
The estimates for the Dutch guilder, the Irish punt and the Italian lira show
that the target zone model is essentially linear for these currencies; the point
estimate of a is very close to 0, and the hypothesis that a-0 cannot be rejected by
the Likelihood Ratio test at any usual level of significance. The failure of the
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target zone model to detect any nonlinearities in the Guilder and Lira rates is
probably not too surprising, as the Guilder is always very close to its central
parity in the sample, and also the Lira doesn't get close to the margins of its
relatively wide target zone, probably due to intra-marginal interventions.
Table 3.1 Maxunum Likelibood estimates for Deutschemark exchange rates
currency ~ c2 a LR M-norm M-arch
Belgian franc -0.148 1.399 4.089 5.32 0.89 1.19
(0.387) (2.124) (9.099)
Dutch guilder 0.028 0.170 0.000 0.00 17.01 170.75
(0.153) (0.027) (.)
Danish krone -0.028 4972.03 139.37 31.47 12.75 1.96
(0.017) (4021.01) (71.61)
French franc 1.196 8.256 4.375 7.97 316.14 19.92
(0.710) (2.889) (1.362)
Irish punt 0.181 1.625 0.008 0.00 8.93 26.47
(0.710) (0.282) (0.002)
Italian lira -1.296 5.723 0.240 0.10 105.18 3.71
(1.286) (1.515) (0.443)
Weekly data fiom 14IOI11987 to 3I1011990. Asymptdic qand~rd etron in p~ntNhe~e~.
Dependem veriable e(t) i~ 100' In(exclunge ntelceotrsl p~rity).
2
Unit of panmeten F! ~nd O' u Ilypr, unit of a is ooe year.
2
IR: 18cetibood ntio ~ea for a-0 ~ X(I).
2
M-oorm: M teri on thitd xnd founh momem of ~e ~ X(2).
2 2
M-nrcb: M tert on fint and second wtocornlation of ~e ~ X(2).
The Method of Simulated Moments estimates are reported in Table 3.2. The estimates
for the guilder and punt are similar to the ML estimates. Note that the estimate of
a for these series is close to zero and the model is again essentially linear. In
that case, the drift and variance of the fundamental (~ and a~Z) are well estimated
by the first two moments of the first difference of the exchange rate. For the
other series the MSM estimates are far from the Maximum Likelihood estimates. The
estimates of the parameters are imprecise, which is reflected in the large standard
errors, but a minimum of the distance function is always found. Thus, our choice of
moments improves upon the methods of Smith and Spencer (1991) although precise
parameter estimates cannot be obtained. A general specification test of the model
is provided by the minimum of the criterion function. If the model is correctly
56 Chapter.~
specified, the minimum has a x2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the
number of moments minus the number of parameters. The results in Table 3.2 show
that this test rejects the model for the guilder, French franc and lira. Lindberg
and Sóderlind (1992) azgue that this may be due to the misspecification of the
Krugman model which does not allow for interventions within the band.
Table 3.2 Simulated moments estimates for Deutschemark exchange rates
currency ~f o~~ a D M-norm M-azch
Belgian franc -0.432 1.505 5.109 2.05 11.99 0.18
(11.57) (77.39) (383.66)
Dutch guilder 0.541 0.172 0.100 12.67 15.28 16.23(0.248) (0.023) (0.031)
Danish krone 1.600 9.507 0.867 4.32 4.68 0.19(31.40) (385.68) (44.00)
French franc 1.094 6.853 0.737 47.44 29.30 0.54
(14.58) (182.84) (30.75)
Irish punt 0.859 1.719 0.000 1.40 52.73 20.99(0.744) (0.180) (0.003)
Italian lira 1.933 6.278 0.001 84.46 155.76 1.27
(5.371) (5.286) (0.082)
z
Noler D i~ tbe mioimum of tbe dialance furction ~ X(2).
MomenV u~ed for eriimation: mean, vuiacee, skewma, filA ~od ~econd
wtocortehtion of tbe first difference of the excbanQe nte.
See ~I~o notee w T~ble 3.1.
We also perform two specification tests, which test whether the model can
explain certain "stylised" facts about exchange rate returns, in particulaz ARCH
effects and non-normality of the first differences. The test procedure employed is
a variant of the M-test developed by Newey (1985). The principle of the test is to
check whether some moments of the exchange rate distribution generated by the
theoretical model aze significantly different from their sample wunterparts. The
moments used for testing aze computed by simulation. Details on the computation of
the test statistics are in Appendix B.
The first test, M-norm, is based on the unconditional third and fourth moment
of the exchange rate returns. The distributional assumption made in deriving the
Krugman model, as in nearly all other target zone models, is that the innovations
in the fundamental are normally distributed. The S-shaped transformation from
fundamental to exchange rate causes the exchange rate distribution to be non-normal
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and have even thinner tails than the normal. The M-norm statistic tests whether the
observed first differences show a higher degree of departure from normality than is
implied by the target zone model.
The second test, M-azch, is based on the autocovariances of the squared
exchange rate returns, (net)2. In the target wne model we expect a positive
wrrelation in the sewnd moment of the returns, because due to the S-shaped
mapping from fundamental to exchange rate the conditional variance is relatively
large when the exchange rate is in the middle of the band, but relatively small
close to the bounds. So, if the variance of the fundamentals process is small,
successive observations on the exchange rate have a similar position within the
band. This implies that the conditional variances of successive returns have
similar values, so that there is an endogenous ARCH effect in the target zone
model. The question is whether this endogenous ARCH effect in the model is strong
enough to explain the observed serial correlation in the second moments of the
returns.
The tests in Table 3.1 reveal that for all series except the Belgian franc
the model is misspecified. The M-azch test indicates that the ARCH effect in the
data on Dutch guilder, French franc and Irish punt rates is not fully explained by
the model. However, for the other currencies there is no significant difference in
observed and predicted ARCH. The M-norm test on the skewness and kurtosis of the
exchange rate returns is highly significant for all series but the Belgian franc.
Clearly, the target zone model is not capable of explaining one of the most
prominent stylised facts of exchange rates, namely, the fat-tailed distribution of
the returns.
3.6 Conclusions.
In this chapter we developed Maximum Likelihood and Method of Simulated Moments
estimators for the target zone model of Krugman (1991). It is shown that estimation
of this model is feasible. The empirical results indicate that the Krugman model is
misspecified for actual EMS exchange rate data. The Maximum Likelihood and Method
of Simulated Moments parameter estimates differ substantially. Moreover, the model
is not capable to explain two well known stylised facts of exchange rates,
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity and a non-normal distribution for the
returns. The main deficiencies of the Krugman model seem to be the restrictive
dynamics, where the scalar fundamental follows a first-order Markov process, the
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normal distribution of this process, and the assumption that there are no
interventions within the band.
Appendix A. Simulating the target zone model.
The method of simulated moments estimator and the M tests discussed in this chapter
require simulation of the stochastic process of the target zone model. In this
appendiz we describe how the numerical simulations are performed. The method is
based on the work of Duffie and Singleton (1988) who developed a method for
computing the moments of a Brownian motion. The difficulty of a discrete time
computer simulation of the continuous time regulated Brownian motion is caused by
the assumption that there is inftnitesimal intervention at the margins, so that the
process does not jump and has a zero probability of being ezactly at the margin. In
a discrete time approzimation, interventions are strictly positive, and we have to
make some assumption on where the process goes after an intervention. The scheme
used by Smith and Spencer (1991) and Beetsma (1991) is
f~(tfnt) - f(t) f unt t o.F(t)
f if f~`(t~-ot) ~ P
f(tfnt) - f if f~`(ti-nt) c f
f~`(tfot) o the r wise
It is clear that for nt~ 0 there will be a point mass at ~ and f in the distribution
of f(tfnt), whereas the mass at those points in the continuous time model is zero.
This point mass can be large if f(t) is close to f or f relative to the magnitude
of nt. A way to improve the accuracy of the simulation is to choose nt very small
if f(t) is close to f or f.
A scheme that gives no point mass at the bounds is found by reflecting the
stochastic process in the upper or lower bound if f~`(tfnt) ezceeds that bound:
f~(ttnt) - f(t) f Nnt f~nt . Ê(t)
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2~-f'(ttet)-f(t) if f'(tfet)~~
f(tfet) - 2f-f~(tfet~f(t) iff'(tfet)~f
f'(tfet ) otherwise
We prefer this scheme because it genetates no observations exactly on the bounds.
Such observations cause problems in computing the likelihood function for simulated
data because, as a result of the smooth pasting conditions, G' (f) for such
observations is zero, so that the Jacobian of the transformation from fundamental
to exchange rate and hence the likelihood function aze infinite.
The conditional distribution function of f(tfet) generated by this scheme
with initial value f(t)-ft is
P(f~ft) -
~~f-f~ t~ - ~(2f-f-~F,etl } (1-~(2i'-f-~~etl)
The first part is the usual normal distribution function, the second part
represents the probability that f(t) has been reflected in the lower bound, and the
third part is the probability mass reflected in the upper bound. Comparing this
distribution with the approximate distribution function of the continuous time
model, (3.13), we see that the discrete simulation overestimates the probabilities
of reflection somewhat, due to the omission of interventions that possibly take
place within the time interval (t,tfnt). So, for a good approximation to the
continuous time distribution it is necessary to use a simulation interval et that
is small compared with the length of the observation interval. In our applications
we use 10 drawings per observation.
Appendix B. Tests of moment restrictions.
In this chapter several tests of moment restrictions of the form Ld(e)-0 appear. In
this appendix we discuss how to test these restrictions by Newey's (1985) M-test.
Typically, d(e) is estimated by dT(e,~, the distance between observed sample
moments and the moments simulated from the target zone model, using a consistent
estimate eT of the parameter vector as the pseudo-true value. Let Q be the
asymptotic covariance matrix of ~I'.dT(e,~J, and let Q,r, be a consistent estimator of
Q. Under the null, the statistic
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has an asymptotic chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the rank
of LQL' . This rank is usually equal to the dimension of LdT(e,r), unless some
moments were used to obtain the estimator eT or some moments are collinear. The
difficult part of computing the test is finding the right ezpression for Q.
Case 1. Maximum Likelihood estimator.
Denote the gradient of the log-likelihood function by g,~,(e) and the distance vector
by dT(e). The covariance matrix of (g,~,(e)' ,dT(e)' )' is partitioned as follows
V - ~ Vgd
Vdg VddJ
Newey (1985) proves that the asymptotic distribution of the moments vector,
evaluated in the estimate e is
T
~- dT(eT) ,: Y N l0' Vdd VdgVggVgdl
Intuidvely, the variance of dT(e,~ is equal to the variance of the moments
evaluated in the true value plus a corn~tion for the fact that the moments are
evaluated in the estimated parameter vector.
Case 2. Method of moments estimator.
Let dT(e) now denote the vector of all moments used for estimation and testing.
Suppose the moments used for estimation are picked from the vector of all moments
by the selection matriz S and an estimated optimal weight matriz is used. The
variance-covariance matriz of the estimator then is
V(e~J - (FD)-l, D - ad(e~lae, F - (SD)'(SVddS')-1S
Newey proves that in this case, the asympiotic variance of dT(e,~J is
dI'dT(e,rJ ,;r N(0, VddD(FD) IFVdd VddF~~~F~)-ID' fDV(e,~JD'J
Chapter 4
Specification, Solution and Estimation of a
Discrete Time Target Zone Model of
EMS Exchange Rates
4.1 Introduction.
The recent literature on modelling exchange rates in a tazget zone relies heavily
on the use of continuous time stochastic models and stochastic calculus. Although
this approach is neat and leads to interesting theoretical insights, the empirical
applicability is limited and the fit of these models to the data is generally poor.
One of the likely causes of this poor fit is the almost exclusive reliance on
normal distributions in these models. Exchange rates exhibit properties, such as a
fat tailed return distribution and strong conditional heteroskedasticity, that are
not easily incorporated in Gaussian continuous time models.
In this chapter we propose a discrete time alternative to the continuous time
tazget zone models. In the target zone the exchange rate is kept within a band by
both mazginal and intra-mazginal interventions. The approach followed has several
advantages over the usual models. First, once the discrete time model is solved,
the likelihood function and moments of the distribution of the discretely observed
data are available immediately; there is no need to compute complex transition
densities like we did in Chapter 3. Second, more general non-Gaussian stochastic
processes aze easily incorporated in the discrete time framework.
In the empirical part, the model is estimated on Deutschemazk exchange rates
from the EMS. Using the estimates of the parameters of the model, time series of
expected depreciation within the band are constructed. These series aze used to
assess the credibility of the EMS tazget zones by the method of Svensson (1991d).
In this method, the interest rate differential with the central country is
corrected for the expected depreciation of the currency within the band. The




The setup of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2, we present the discrete
time model and provide a method to solve the model numerically. In Section 3, the
model is estimated on EMS exchange rate data assuming a fully credible target zone.
In Section 4 we assess the credibility of the EMS target zones by comparing
predicted depreciations within the band with observed interest rate differentials.
In Section 5 we conclude.
4.2 The model.
The basis of the model is the discrete time equivalent of (3.1),
(4.1) et - ft f aEtet{-1' a-al(lta), az0,
where et denotes the spot exchange rate, ft the "fundamental" and Et the
conditional expectation given all information available at time t. Solving the
model forward and excluding bubbles one obtains the "present value" solution of the
exchange rate
m
(4.2) et - . E ~lEtftti'i-0
In a discrete time framework, the exchange rate under a target zone regime is
a limited dependent variable on the interval [e,è]. There are different ways to
model this property. Pesaran and Samiei (1992) start fmm equation (4.1) and
"censor" the exchange rate at the upper and lower boundary, so that the model
becomes
(4.3) et - C(ft f aEtetf 1' e'e)'
where C(.) is the censoring function that is defined as follows:
e if x c e
(4.4) C(x; e,è) - x if e~ x C è.
è if x ~ è
Pesaran and Samiei (1992) assume that the fundamental is a linear combination of
observed variables, generated by a VAR process. In line with most current research
Discrete time target zone model 63
we do not assume that the fundamental is a function of observed economic variables.
Instead, we assume that ft is unobserved and follows a mean reverting Markov
process that is censored to the interval [f,~]:1
(4.5) ftf 1- C((1-w)~ f~ft f Etf 1' f'~'
As a consequence of the censoring of the fundamental, the exchange rate is also
bounded and thus fluctuates in a target zone. This property is intuitively cleaz
from (4.2), where due to the censoring the support of all future fundamentals is
bounded.
The parameter ~p is the degree of inean reversion in the fundamental. If ~p-1,
the fundamental follows a random walk, which is the discrete time equivalent of the
continuous time Brownian Motion assumed by Krugman (1991). If ~c 1, there is mean
reversion of the fundamental, possibly caused by intra-marginal interventions of
the central banks. This model corresponds to the continuous time Omstein-Uhlenbeck
process used by Lindberg and Sóderlind (1992) to model Swedish exchange rates. Note
that in (4.5) the mean, ~, disappears if the fundamental is a random walk (~p-1).
The reason for this parametrisation is that we want to exclude deterministic trends
in the fundamental. T'he bounds on the fundamental are restricted to be symmetric
around zero, i.e. f--~, because otherwise ~ is not identified.
The discrete time model allows a general flexibility for the distribution of
the innovations in the fundamental. Whereas the continuous time models exclusively
rely on normal distributions (Wiener processes), in the discrete time model any
known density can be used. In particular, distributions with fatter tails than the
normal are likely to empirically dominate the normal and are easily implemented in
the model. For the solution method presented here, it is necessary that the shape
of the distribution function does not depend on time or on previous state
variables. This excludes for example the ARCH process where the conditional
variance is a function of the previous innovations.
We now turn to the solution of the model given by (4.1) and (4.5). Because of
the censoring the model is non-linear and cannot be solved by standard methods
designed for linear Rational Expectations models2. However, the model has a
1 This model is an extension of the model of Koedijk, Stork and De Vries (1993) who
~ssume that the fundamental is a censored random walk.
Pesaran and Samiei (1992b) propose to define an intervention variable which
equals the `latent' exchange rate from (4.1) minus [he actual. Then the infinite
summation (4.2) is then rewritten to include all expected future interventions, and
the exchange rate is computed by backward recursion. The problem with this
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structure that is similaz to the problems of commodity pricing with speculative
storage analysed by Deaton and Laroque (1991a) and the model of saving with
liquidity constraints analysed by Deaton (1991). Deaton and Laroque (1991a,b) have
developed methods to solve and estimate these models, and their methods are easily
adapted to solve the discrete time target zone model.
The first thing to note is that the Mazkov property of the fundamental
implies that the current value of the fundamental is a sufficient statistic for the
distribution of future fundamentals. As a consequence, the expected future values
in (4.2) and hence the exchange rate et aze a function of the current fundamental
ft only. Therefore, it is possible to define an exchange rate function that gives
the exchange rate for every value of the fundamental, e-G(f). This function should
satisfy the following functional equation, derived from (4.1) and (4.5):
(4.6) G(f) - f-F afG(v)dPE(v ~ f), v- C((1-ao)~ f qof .4- e; f,f),
where Pe(v ~ f) denotes the distribution of v given ft-f. The integral on the right
hand side corresponds to the expected exchange rate in the next period, given the
fundamental in the current period.
We closely follow the approach outlined in Deaton and Laroque (1991b) to
solve this equation. The function G(f) is approximated on a grid of points f1,..,fN
on the relevant range of the fundamental. If the bounds on the fundamental were
known, this range would of course be [f,]]. In practice, the band on the exchange
rate is known and f and ~ must be solved from the `value matching' conditions,
e-G(f) and é-G(f). In our model, the exchange rate solution is always bounded
between the 450 line e-f and the free float solution e-fl(1-a). Hence, the relevant
range of the fundamental is always contained in the target zone interval of the
exchange rate, [é,e]. Therefore, we use an equidistant grid f1,..,fN on [é,e]. In
the actual computations, 50 points were sufficient.
Having defined the grid, the next step is to compute the function values
gi-G(fi) on all points in the grid. This is not feasible in one step, because the
expected value of the exchange rate, Etet} 1, depends on the function G(f). The way
to solve this problem is to start from an initial guess of the function values,
gi0),..,gNO), on the grid, feed these into the expectation formula, and compute new
function values. This method will work if (4.6) is a contraction mapping, see
approach, however, is that the interventions at time tft (T~0) depend on the
expected interventions at tf~tl, so that the recursion becomes quite complicated.
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Sargent (198~. In the Appendix we prove that (4.6) is indeed a contraction
mapping, so this method will always converge to the right solution.
Numerical computation of the integral in (4.6) goes as follows. First, split
the range of f in three parts, fsf, fcfC f and fz~:
(4.~ G(f) - f f a I PE(f ~~e t [1-Pe(f I f)lé f fJ G(v)Pe(v I~dv,
The latter integral can be approximated by a weighted summation over the initial
function values, where the weights are given by the conditional densities of the
fundamental at the j~ grid point, pe(1j ~ f;):




A good choice for the initial solution turned out to be the censored free float
solution for a random walk fundamental: gi~)-C(fil(1-a);e,é).
Figure 4.1 shows an example of the solution to the model where the
fundamental is a driftless random walk (~-1) with normally distributed innovations
with variance c2-0.003. The parameter of the expected exchange rate a is chosen to
be 0.8. These parameter values are roughly equal to the estimated values for the
Danish kroner-Deutschemazk exchange rate. In the figure the exchange rate solution
e-G(f) is plotted against the free float solution fl(1-a). The solution shows the
familiaz S-shape. However, there is no smooth pasting on the edges of the band.
Further insight in the properties of the discrete time target zone model can
be gained from the conditional expectation and conditional variance of the ezchange
rate one period ahead. Generally, conditional moments of the exchange rate,
E[h(et} 1) ~ et], aze easily computed by integrating the function h(G(ft} 1)) over
Pe(ft.1-l~ft) given ft-G-1(et):
(4.9) E[h(etfl)~et] - Jh(G(v))dPE(v~ft), v- C((1-w)~ f~ft f E; f~~,
which is numerically approximated by the appropriate modification of (4.~. The
analysis of the same random walk specification as before reveals some interesting
properties of the model. First, there is endogenous mean reversion of exchange
rates in the model. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2, where the expected exchange
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rate (solid line) is plotted against the current ezchange rate (dotted line). If
the exchange rate were a r3ndom walk, the current and expected exchange rate would
be the same and the graph would be equal to the 45a line. In figure 4.2, the
expected exchange rate is always smaller than the current if et is above the
central parity. This mean reversion within the band is generated endogenously in
the tazget zone model. As is clear from the figure, the endogenous mean reversion
is not strong. Empirically it is probably necessary to include mean reversion in
the fundamental (~o c 1) as well.
Figure 4.3 shows the condidonal variance of the exchange rate. There is
endogenous conditional heteroskedasticity in the model because the conditional
variance is lower close to the bounds and higher in the middle because of the
possible censoring in the next period. A second thing to note is that the
conditional variance of the exchange rate is smaller than the conditional variance
of the fundamental. This is because the S-shaped relation between fundamental and
ezchange rate reduces the variance. This is Krugman's famous honeymoon effect.
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Summarising, the discrete time target wne model has all the properties of the
continuous time models, including the mitigating effect of the S-shaped exchange
rate function. The advantage of the discrete time model lies in its flexibility to
include different distributions for the fundamental. Which distribution is the best
is an empirical question that is addressed in the next section.
4.3 Fstimating We discrete time target zone model.
Estimates of the model can be obtained in several ways. A simple but inefficient
method is to select some moments of the marginal (unconditional) distribution of
the exchange rate and estimate the model by GMM. Because of the truncation of the
fundamental in every period, the marginal moments must be computed by simulation.
In Chapter 3 we azgued that this method is inefficient compared with likelihood-
based estimators as well as computationally unattractive. There aze several
alternative estimators. Deaton and Laroque (1991b) suggest to use the Quasi Maximum
Likelihood estimator of Gourieroux et al. (1984), which is based on the first two
condi[ional moments. We estimate the model efficiently by Full Information Maximum
Likelihood3.
The likelihood function is obtained as an immediate by-product of the
solution to the model obtained in the previous section. Given a series of
observations on the exchange rate (e1,..,eT) and conditional on the first
observation e0, the likelihood function is equal to the sum of the log-likelihood
contributions, tt, of each observation:
(4.10) ~ue) - ET~~tt
Because the exchange rate is a function of the current fundamental only, and
because the fundamental is a first order Markov process, the exchange rate is a
Mazkov process as well. As explained in Chapter 3, by the prediction error
decomposition the likelihood contributions are derived from the condidonal
distribution of et given et 1. The likelihood function is of the two-limit Tobit
type. The likelihood contribution for an observation at the one of the bounds is
equal to the probability that the exchange rate hits that bound; for an observation
within the band, the likelihood contribution is equal to its conditional density:
3 Deaton and Laroque also mention the FIML estimator, but they run into problems
because their model has a discontinuity, which causes non-differentiability of the
likelihood function. This is not a problem in the discrete time target zone model.
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(4.lla) tt - ln Pn(e~et 1) if et-e
(4.llb) lt - ln pn(et~et-1) if ecetcè
(4.llc) tt - ln(1-Pn(è~et-1)) if et-è
where P,~(.Iet-1) denotes the conditional distribution of the current exchange rate,
et, given the previous exchange rate, et-1'
The conditional distribution of the exchange rate is only implicit in the
model, and a transformation to the latent fundamental is needed. The fundamental is
constructed from the observed exchange rates by solving the equation et-G(ft) for
ft, given the value of the parameter vector e. T'he observations of the exchange
rate are generally different from the points in the grid (g1,..,gN), so that the
exact value of the fundamental is not immediately available. Therefore, the
function G(f) is approximated by cubic spline interpolation4. This method has the
advantage that the approximation is twice continuously differentiable and easily
inverted.
Having computed the fundamentals, the likelihood contributions are obtained
by a the change-of-variables technique described in Chapter 3. For observations at
the bounds, the contribution is equal to the probability that the fundamental hits
the bands. The likelihood contribution of an observation inside the band is
slightly more complicated, because it involves the Jacobian of the transformation
from exchange rate to fundamental. After the transformation, the likelihood
contributions are as follows:
(4.12a) tt - ln Pe(f~ft-1) if et-e
(4.12b) tt - ln pE(ft ~ ft 1) - ln G' (ft) if e cet c è
(4.12c) lt - ln(1-PE(i.~ft-1)) if et-è
5 We used the algorithm described in Cheney and Kincaid (1985, p.275-6).
Recall that m the continuous time model, the probability of having an
observation on the band is zero, because of the continuous marginal intervention.
In the discrete time model, however, this probability is non-zero.
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where PE denotes the conditional distribution of the fundamental, which is known by
assumption. The second term of (4.12b) is the logarithm of the Jacobian of the
transformation from et to ft.
Given a choice for the conditional distribution of the fundamental, the
likelihood function is complete. In the empirical work we use two distributions,
the normal and the Student-t distribution. For the autoregressive model the
associated density functions are
Normal distribution
i in r(ft-(1-ro)k-wft-1)2





r((vfl)l2))(~,z)an(1 } t- t-1 1
e t t 1 r(vl2 ) r( ll2) l c2 J
where r denotes the Gamma function and v is the degrees of freedom pardmeter of the
t distribution. The t distribution reduces to the normal for 1Iv-0.
Maximization of the log-likelihood function with respect to the parameters
v2, ~p and a yields a consistent, efficient and asymptotically normal estimator. If
one uses the Student-t distribution, llv is added as an extra parameter to be
estimated. The likelihood function is continuous in the parameters because the
exchange rate solution G(f) is continuously differentiable. If cubic spline
interpolation is used the numerical approximation to G(f) is (twice) continuously
differentiable as well, so that standard optimisation routines can be applied.
Asymptotic standard errors aze obtained by inverting the outer product of gradient
matrix.
We now turn to the empirical results on EMS data. Initially, the most recent
EMS period without realignments is chosen. Of course, absence of realignments dces
not imply that the target zone is fully credible. We shall therefore test the
credibility of the target zone afterwards. T'he data used are weekly spot exchange
rates from 14 January 1987 to 23 September 1992 6. This sample is slightly longer
6 T'hese data were kindly provided by Philip Stork.
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than the sample used in Chapter 3. As before, the exchange rate is expressed as the
percentage deviation from the central parity.
Table 4.1 reports the empirical results for the discrete time target zone
model given by (4.1) and (4.5), under the assumption that the mean ~-0. The
innovations in the fundamental follow a t-distribution.
Table 4.1 Fstimates of the fully credible discrete time target zone model on
Deutschemazk exchange rates; short sample (14I111987-2319192).
currency o~2 tc-1 ~ v lnl,(a) LRv LR~
Belgian franc 0.00388 -0.037 0.741 5.024 -25.85 25.40 1.38
(0.01269) (0.015) (0.471) (1.471)
Dutch guilder 0.00231 -0.165 0.415 4.370 282.21 27.64 0.00
(0.00432) (0.030) (0.672) (1.347)
Danish krone 0.00296 -0.024 0.805 7.046 -45.68 9.40 2.98
(0.00119) (0.014) (0.046) (3.019)
French franc 0.00174 -0.013 0.744 4.613 62.80 39.82 1.88
(0.00236) (0.010) (0.177) (1.156)
Su~ard emon in panmbesea; LRV u Iikdibood n6o pawaic ~~inu aoim~l d'Wribuuoo (IN-O).
[1t~ i~ likelibood ntio aatietic ~Q~imt í1-0. Rearictioo {1s0 impo~ed.
The table shows several interesting results. For all series, the mean reversion
within the band is significant and ~p is different from 1 at 59b level 7. Another
important result is that the normal distribution is not an adequate description of
the fundamental; the likelihood ratio test of a normal distribution against a t
distribution is always way above the x2(1) critical values at usual significance
levels. The parameter x that determines the forwazd looking aspect of the model is
never significant at 59b level, and for the Danish krone series only at 103b level.
Thus, the non-linear effect of the tazget zone is not very pronounced, which may be
due to a lack of credibility of the band. We address that issue in the next
section.
In Table 4.2 the estimates of the model with x-0 are presented; the
restriction that k-0 is now dropped. In this case, the exchange rate function G(f)
is linear, e-fl(1-a), and the model reduces to a standazd two-limit Tobit model.
7 Both under the null (~-1) and the alternative (y~c 1) the exchange rate is
stationary in this model. Therefore, the usual critical values for the t-test apply
and not the Dickey-Fuller critical values.
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Compared with the model with x~0, the results aze rather similar, except that the
standard errors are much smaller.
Table 4.2 Estimates of the fully credible discrete time target
zone model on Deutschemark exchange rates, a-0.
Sbort sample (14I111987 - 2319192)
CUrrency {~ P2 p-1 v 1RI,(9)
Belgian franc 0.577 0.04572 -0.056 4.865 -25.10
(0.257) (0.00664) (0.015) (0.096)
Dutch guilder -0.010 0.00544 -0.163 4.379 282.49
(0.031) (0.00085) (0.030) (0.115)
Danish krone 0.001 0.06080 -0.024 7.565 -46.43
(0.832) (0.00856) (0.018) (0.083)
French franc 0.000 0.02432 -0.014 4.540 61.83
(1.162) (0.00320) (0.016) (0.090)
5landard erton in parcmAew. À~0 reqriction.
Table 4.3 presents estimates of the model on a longer sample, that covers the
complete EMS period. Observations just after tealignments are ezcluded from the
analysis by setting their log-likelihoad contribution to zem. The estimates over
the longer sample differ in two respects from the estimates over the short sample:
both the kurtosis (llv) and the variance of the fundamentals distribution are
higher. Probably this reflects the greater uncertainty in the early EMS which
showed numerous realignments.
Table 4.3 Estimates of the fully credible discrete time target zone model
on Deutschemazk exchange rates, x-0.
Long sample (1314179 - 2319192)
currency ~ a~2 ~-1 v 1nL(e)
Belgian franc 0.863 0.06090 -0.064 3.373 -241.81
(0.181) (0.00520) (0.013) (0.055)
Dutch guilder -0.118 0.01359 -0.031 2.331 178.63
(0.181) (0.00138) (0.010) (0.145)
Danish krone 0.030 0.05516 -0.011 3.653 -201.94
(0.809) (0.00475) (0.005) (0.043)
French franc 0.007 0.03577 0.005 3.394 -64.94
(1.162) (0.00310) (0.005) (0.057)
Standa~d en~on in parcnihese~. À-0 rcstriction. Weelu wilh rcaligomeNa excluded fiom umple.
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4.4 Assessing target zone credibility.
Svensson (1991d) developed a method to assess the credibility of a target zone.
Assuming that Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) holds, the interest rate differential
of a currency versus (here) the Deutschemark is equal to the expected rate of
depreciation of that currency vis à vis the Mark over the relevant holding period.
The expected rate of depreciation consists of two parts. The first part is the
expected rate of depreciation within the band. Svensson argues that the annualised
expected rate of depreciation within the band can be fairly large, so that large
short term interest rate differentials need not imply a high risk premium or an
expected realignment. The second part of the expected rate of depreciation is what
Svensson calls the ezpected rate of devaluation, which is defined as the expected
change in the central parity due to realignments, corrected for the change of the
position of the exchange rate within the band. Bertola and Svensson (1993) argue
that the latter correction is not trivial, because with realignments the exchange
rate usually jumps from a weak position in the old band to a strong position in the
new band.
The decomposition can be formalised as follows (see also Beetsma (1992)). Let
st denote the spot rate, ct the central parity, et the spot rate "within the band",
i.e. the spot rate minus the central parity, and pt the probability of a
realignment. Let E[. ~ R] denote the conditional expectation, given a realignment,
and E[. ~ NR] the conditional expectation given no realignments. Then the expected
rate of depreciation can be decomposed as
Et[eSt-F 1] - Et[ectf 1]
f Et[eetf 1]
- pt(Et[eCtf 1 ~ R] t Et[eetf 1 ~ R]) }(1-pt)Et[eetf 1 ~~]
(4.13)
- pt(Et[eCtf 1 ~ R] f Et[eetf 1 ~ R] - Et[eett 1 ~~]) } Et[eetf 1 ~~]
g
Et[dtf 1] f Et[eetf 1 ~~l,
where Et[dt} 1] denotes the expected rate of devaluation. Assuming UIP, the
(annualised) unconditional expected rate of depreciation is equal to the interest
rate differential
(4.14) Et[eSt-~ 1]It - it - i~
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where it is the one-period domestic interest rate, it the one-period foreign
interest rate and ~ the length of one period in years. Assuming that the estimated
model is correct, the expected future exchange rate within the band is easily
calculated from equation (4.9). We use the Mazimum Likelihood estimates of the
model's parameters in Table 4.2 to compute the expected exchange rates. This is
different from Rose and Svensson (1991) and Beetsma (1992) who use a cubic function
to approximate the conditional expectation of the exchange rate within the band.
A
Having computed the expected exchange rate within the band, Et[et} 1 ~ NR], we
can conswct the expected rate of devaluation using data on the interest rate
differential as follows:
A
(4.15) Et[dtf 1~ - T(lt - lt) - Et[oett 1 ~~~'
Figures 4.4A-D show the spot exchange rate within the band, the interest rate
differential, the expected rate of depreciation within the band, and the expected
rate of devaluation of four EMS currencies vis à vis the Deutschemark over the
short sample period (87I1114-9219123). All graphs show that even in the relatively
stable years of the EMS between 1987 and 1992 there have been considerable expected
devaluations in all series, although the credibility of the band increased over the
years. We confirm the result of Rose and Svensson (1991) who estimated that the
probability of realignment for the Danish krone was rather high in 1989, and larger
than suggested by the interest rate differential only.
Another interesting results concerns the estimated rate of devaluation of the
Belgian franc. The estimates suggest that the expected rate of devaluation became
very small or even negative from week 160 (early 1990) onwards, whereas the
interest rate differential disappeared much later, from early 1991 onward. Thus we
cannot ignore the expected rate of depreciation within the band if we want to
assess target zone credibility.
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Discrete time target zone mode!
Figure 4.4C Data and expected rate of realignment for Danish krone I
Deutschemark exchange rate.
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4.5 Conclusion.
In this chapter we developed a discrete time model for EMS exchange rates. The
model has several advantages over continuous time models. First, the distributional
assumptions are flexible; the latent fundamental is not restricted to have normally
distributed innovations. Second, the model is easily solved numerically. Having
solved the model, the likelihood function and moments of the predictive
distribution of the exchange rate are immediately available, and standard
econometric methods can be used to estimate and test the model.
The empirical results generally support the model. Mean reversion of the
fundamental is significant, which suggests that intra-marginal interventions are
important in the EMS. The deviation from normality is empirically important as
well; a Student-t distribution for the innovations in the fundamental is strongly
preferred over the normal. We also tested the credibility of the band in the stable
EMS period from 1987 to 1992. Although there have been no realignments in that
period, the empirical results show that the band has never been fully credible,
except for the DeutschemarklDutch guilder exchange rate.
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Appendix. Existeoce of a unique solution.
In order to prove that (4.6) is a contraction, define the operator T by
Tg(~ - f f aJg(v~PE(v ~~
We shall prove that T satisfies Blackwell's sufficient conditions for a contraction
(Sargent (1987, p.344)):
(i) Monotonicity: for every gZh, Tg~Th.
(ii) Discounting: for every a~0, T(gfa)5Tg f~a, with OSR~1.
ad (i) Tg(f) - f f xfg(v)dPE(v ~ f)
- f f afh(v)dP~(v ~ fJ -f- xfIg(v)-h(v)]dPe(v ~ f)
~ f f afh(v)dPE(v ~ f) - Th(f).
Here we used the fact that the expectation, taken over the distribution function
dPE(v ~ f), of the positive function g(v)-h(v) is always positive.
ad (ii) T(g(f)fa) - f f 1f[g(v)-fa]dPE(v~f)
- f f afg(v)dP~(v I f) f aa
- Tg(f) f ka, Osa C 1.
Part II: Stock Markets
si
Chapter 5
A Comparison of the Cost of Trading French Shares
on the Paris Bourse and on SEAQ International
5.1 Introductiou.
The growing importance of London as an international stock market where shazes from
other European countries are iraded, constitutes a major change in the structure of
Europe's financial markets. In recent years, London's SEAQ International has
attracted considerable trading volume from the continental exchanges ( see for
example Worthington (1991)). This increased competition from London has induced the
domestic exchanges to modernise and adapt their trading systems. An example is the
move towazds fully automated trading systems in Spain and Italy.
It seems natural to suppose that London has attracted lazge volume because
trading costs aze lower, particulazly for lazge trade sizes. In this chapter we use
a lazge data set, a simultaneous record of all quotes, limit orders and
transactions in both London and Paris, to compare the implicit cost of trading
French shares on the Paris Bourse and on SEAQ International. The bid-ask spread is
a major component of the total cost of trading, and we will provide a number of
measures of the spread on both exchanges. We also briefly discuss published
informa[ion on explicit costs of trading (such as commissions) in order to gauge
the total cost of trading.
In the chapter two different types of estimates of the bid-ask spread aze
presented. First, the average quoted spread is estimated from the Paris limit order
book and mazket makers' quotes in London. Second, the average realised spread is
estimated from actual transaction prices. Estimates of the quoted and realised
spread aze presented for different times of day and for different transaction
sizes. The dependence of the spread on trade size is also of theoretical interest,
because it can be used to assess the validity of mazket micro-structure theories
that predict that the bid-ask spread will be increasing in trade size.
Both the quoted and the realised spread are not directly observable in our
data set. On the Paris Bourse part of limit order can be hidden from the public
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information system, so that the limit order book seems less deep than it actually
is. Uncorrected estimates would therefore overestimate the quoted spread in Paris.
In London the problem is that there is some misreporting of transaction times,
which causes a timing bias in our realised spread estimate. In order to circumvent
these problems we also present model-based estimates of the average realised spread
using transaction prices only. These estimators can be seen as refinements of
Roll's (1984) estimator.
The setup of the chapter is as follows. In section 2 we briefly discuss the
major theories that explain the existence and the size of the bid-ask spread. In
section 3, we describe the trading systems on the Paris Bourse and on SEAQ
International. In section 4 we describe our data. The spread estimates are
presented in sections 5, 6 and 7. In section 5 we compute the average quoted spread
and in section 6 the average realised spread, both in Paris and in London. In
section 7 we take a model-based approach to estimating the realised spread that
uses transactions data only. We summarise the main conclusions in section 8.
5.2 Theories of the bid-ask spread.
In the literature on stock market micro-structure there are a number of theories
that explain the bid-ask spread. Most theories view the spread as a compensation
for the services of a market maker, who takes the other side of all transactions.
In the literature, e.g. Stoll (1989), three cost components are distinguished:
order processing cost (including dealer oligopoly profit), inventory control cost
and adverse selection cost. In this section, these three components will be
discussed in more detail.
The order processing cost component reflects the cost of being in the market
and handling the transaction. To compensate for these costs, the market maker
levies a fee on all transactions by differentiating between buy and sell prices.
Much of the empirical literature, such as Madhavan and Smidt (1991) and Glosten and
Harris (198~, assumes that this fee is a fixed amount per share. However, it seems
more natural to suppose that order processing cost is largely fixed per
transaction, so that expressed as cost per share it should be declining in trade
size.
A second type of cost for the market maker is the cost of inventory
management. For example, a purchase of shares will raise the market maker's
inventory above a desired level. The market maker runs the risk of price
fluctuations on his inventory holdings and if he is risk averse he will demand a
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compensation for this risk. This intuidon is formalised in the model of Ho and
Stoll (1981), who show that the inventory control cost is an increasing function of
trade size and shaze price volatility.
The third type of cost for the mazket maker arises in the presence of
asymmetric information between the market maker and his potential counterpazties in
trading. This theory was first proposed by "Bagehot" (1971) and formalised in the
models of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985). A trader with superior
private information about the underlying value of the shares will try to buy or
sell a large number of shares to reap the profits of this knowledge. The mazket
maker, who is obliged to trade at the quoted prices, incurs a loss on transactions
with better informed counterparties. To wmpensate for this loss he will charge a
fee on every transaction, so that expected losses on trades with informed traders
are compensated with expected profits on transactions with uninformed "noise"
traders. Because the informed parties would tend to trade a large quantity in order
to maximise the profits from trading on superior information, the adverse selection
effect is related to trade size: large transactions are more likely to be initiated
by informed traders than small transactions, as in the model of Easley and O'Hara
(1987). Therefore, the asymmetric information cost is an increasing function of
trade size, and the mazket maker's quotes for large transactions will be less
favourable than the quotes for small sizes.
These theories have been developed for mazkets with competítive designated
market makers. Nevertheless, the theories aze frequently applied to exchanges with
different trading systems, such as the NYSE. The trading system on the Paris Bourse
also differs considerably because there aze no designated market makers. But we may
regard the issuers of public limit orders as market makers because they provide
liquidity to the market. Just like market makers they run the risk that their limit
order will be executed against a mazket order placed by somebody with superior
information. The inventory control theary is applicable to the extent that we can
regard those who place market orders as demanders of immediacy, while those who
place limit orders aze making the mazket by absorbing inventories in return for a
price concession. In practice, the distinction between the two groups is not sharp,
as any trader can place both types of orders.
Summarising, processing costs cause a decreasing, whereas both asymmetric
information and inventory control cause an increasing spread as a function of trade
size. The aim of this chapter is to compare the depth of the market in Paris and
London and to estimate the form of the dependence of the spread on trade size from
quote and transactions data. We shall not attempt to identify the relative
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importance of the three cost components in this chapter. This decomposition is the
focus of Chapter 6, where we concentrate on the dynamic effects of trades on quotes
and transaction prices.
5.3 Description of the markets in Frencó equities.
In this section we describe the trading systems on the major exchanges where French
equities aze traded: the Bourse in Paris and SEAQ International in London. Because
the trading systems are so different - Paris is a continuous auction mazket whereas
London is a dealership market - we devote two separate sub-sections to this
description.
5.3.1 The trading system on the Paris Bourse.
The Paris Bourse uses a centralised electronic system for displaying and
processing orders, the Cotation Assistée en Continu (CAC) system. This system,
based on the Toronto Stock Exchange's CATS (Computer Assisted Trading System), was
first implemented in Paris in 1986. Since then, trading in neazly all securities
has been transfen~ed from the floor of the exchange onto the CAC system. All the
most actively traded French equides are traded on a monthly settlement basis in
round lots of 5 to 100 shares set by the Société des Bourses Fran~aises (SBF) to
reflect their unit price. The SBF itself acts as a clearing house for buyers and
sellers, providing guarantees against counterparty default.
Every morning at 10 a. m. the trading day opens with a ba[ch auction where all
eligible orders are filled at a common market clearing price. Nowadays the batch
auction is relatively unimportant, accounting for no more than 10 to 154b of trading
volume. Its role is to establish an equilibrium price before continuous trading
starts. Continuous trading takes place from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m.
In the continuous trading session there aze two types of orders possible,
limit orders and market orders. Limit orders specify the quantity to be bought or
sold, a required price and a date for automatic withdrawal if not executed by then,
unless the limit order is good till cancelled ("à révocation"). Limit orders cannot
be issued at arbitrary prices because there is a minimum "tick" size of FF 0.1 for
stock prices less than FF 500, and FF 1 for higher prices. More than one limit
order may be issued at the same price. To these orders, strict time priority for
execution applies.
Market orders only specify the quantity to be traded and are executed
immediately "au prix du mazché", i.e. at the best price available. If the total
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quantity of the limit orders at this best price does not suffice to fill the whole
mazket order, the remaining part of the mazket order is transformed into a limit
order at the transaction price (for a detailed description of this system see Biais
et al. (1992)). Hence, market orders do not automatically walk up the limit order
book, and do not always provide immediate execution of the whole orderl.
After the opening, traders linked up to the CAC system will see an onscreen
display of the "market by price" as depicted in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1 Simplified trading screen of CAC system.
Accor, 245-1991, 10:08
Bid Ask Transactions
it shazes price price shazes it shares price time
1 200 763 770 800 3 400 765 10:08
1 500 762 774 100 1 50 765 10:08
1 400 761 775 200 1 50 770 10:06
4 450 760 778 1000 1 50 770 10:02
1 50 754 779 100 1 100 768 10:02
Nae: N denote~ tóe ~wmber of Gmit orden involved,
For both the bid side and the ask side of the mazket, the five best limit order
prices are displayed together with the quantity of shares available at that price
and the number of individual orders involved. The difference between the best bid
and ask price is known as the "fourchette". Traders can scroll down to further
pages of the screen to view limit orders available beyond the five best prices. In
addition, some information concerning the recent history of trading is given: time,
price, quantity and buyer and seller identification codes for the five last
transactions, the cumulative quantity and value of all transactions since the
opening, and the price change from the previous day's close to the latest
transaction.
In practice, the underlying limit order book tends to be somewhat deeper than
suggested by the visible display of limit orders. This is because traders who are
afraid that they might move the market by displaying a very large order may choose
to display only part of their limit order onscreen. The remaining part, known as
the "quantité caché" or undisclosed quantity, remains invisible onscreen but may be
1 A trader who wants to trade a certain quantity immediately ean circumvent this
mechanism by placing a limit order at a very unfavourable price. This limit order
will then be executed against existing orders on the other side of the market that
show a more favourable price.
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called upon to fill incoming orders as the visible limit orders become exhausted.
Strict price priority applies also to the hidden orders. Rcell (1992) suggests that
due to the quantité caché the visible depth of the market is about two thirds of
the actual depth when hidden quantities are included.
The member firms of the Bourse (the "Sociétés de Bourse") key orders directly
into the CAC system via a local terminal. All mazket participants can contribute to
liquidity by putting limit orders on display. In particular, the Sociétés de Bourse
may act in dual capacity: as agency brokers, acting on behalf of clients, and as
principals, trading on own account. Their capital adequacy is regulated and
monitored by the Bourse.
There is some scope for negotiated deals if the limit order book is
insufficiently deep. A financial intermediary can negotiate a deal directly with a
client at a price lying within the current fourchette, provided that the deal is
immediately reported to the CAC system as a"cross order". For trades at prices
outside the fourchette, the member firm acting as a principal is obliged to fill
all central mazket limit orders displaying a better price than the negotiated price
within five minutes.
S..?.2 The trading system on SEAQ International.
SEAQ International is the price collection and display system for foreign
equity securities operated by London's Stock Exchange. For each foreign equity
included in SEAQ Internatíonal, the system provides an electronic display of bid
and ask prices quoted by the market makers registered for that equity.
The French equities in our sample aze designated as firm quote securities,
which means that during the relevant mandatory quote period (9:30 to 16:00 London
time, i.e. 10:30 to 17:00 Paris time in our sample) the registered market makers
are obliged to display firm bid and ask prices for no less than the "minimum
mazketable quantity", also referred to as the Normal Market Size (NMS), a dealing
size set by the exchange's Council at about the median transaction size. Market
makers are obliged to buy and sell up to that quantity at no worse than their
quoted prices. In addition, when a market maker displays a larger quantity of
shares than the minimum marketable quantity, his prices must be firm for that
quantity. Outside the mandatory quote period, mazket makers may continue to display
prices and quantities under the same rules regarding firmness of prices.
SEAQ International mazket makers are not allowed to display prices on
competing display systems which are better than those displayed on SEAQ
International. Market making in French shares is fairly competitive, see Rcell
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(1992): during our sample period, most French equities were covered by at least ten
market makers, and usually many more.
5.4 Data description.
In this section we describe the data provided to us by the Paris and London
exchanges. We have quote and transaction data from both exchanges for the same
period in the summer of 1991.
5.4.1 The Paris Bourse.
The Paris data set is a transcription of all changes in the trading screen
information for all shazes on the CAC system for 44 trading days in the summer of
1991, starting May 25 and ending July 25. We have available a complete record of
the total limit order quantity at the five best prices on both the bid side and the
ask side of the mazket and all transactions. This enables us to reconstruct at
every point in time the visible limit order book for each security in the sample,
up to the cumulative volume of the observed best limit orders. However, we do not
observe the "quantité caché", so the actual limit order book might be deeper than
the observed quantities suggest.
Concerning transactions, there is an indicator showing whether the
transaction is a"cross" negotiated outside the CAC system. We also have available
broker identification codes of the buying and selling parties, which allow us to
identify series of small transactions that were initiated by the same person as
part of one lazge transaction. The transaction price per shaze for such
transactions is defined as the quantity weighted average of the price of the small
transactions that together make up the larger one.
In this chapter we shall concentrate on ten major French stocks, listed and
described in Table S.IA. This table also shows some descriptive statistics of our
sample of transactions on the Paris Bourse. The table shows that (excluding cross
transactions) the median transaction value is between FF 50,000 and FF 150,000
(f5,000-f 15,000 at the time). The distribution of transaction size is very skewed:
the mean is about twice the median, indicating that a few large transactions
account for a lazge share of total tumover. The table also shows descriptive
statistics for the "cross" transactions that are negotiated off-exchange. The
crosses are relatively large: their median value is about 2 to 5 times as large as
the median value of regular transactions, and the mean value is up to 10 times the
mean value of regular transactions. Although there aze relatively few crosses
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(between 2 and 5 4b of the total number of transactions) they account for a large
share of total trading volume.
Table S.lA Descriptive statistics of Paris trancactions data.
CAC crosses
Firm full name average median mean median mean
price value value nobs value value nobs
AC Accor 771 114 197 5255 384 2531 148
AQ Elf-Aquitaine 358 179 303 9855 183 1607 598
BN BSN 889 62 182 10728 266 1039 378
CA Carrefour 1919 90 164 9943 366 1268 307
CS Axa-Midi 989 62 120 6482 89 2266 221
EX Generale des Eaux 2518 129 247 9585 366 2070 475
OR 1'Oreal 584 64 145 6813 116 694 271
RI Pernod-Ricard 1162 84 131 3626 327 838 123
SE Schneider 685 68 134 4329 388 876 183
UAP Un. Ass. de Paris 538 134 222 5206 54 728 402
Naes: price ir rven~e tnnuc4oo price in FF;
value of tnna~ctioo~ in FFI000; oobr i~ mimber of ob~ervuioro.
5.4.2 SEAQ International.
The data from the London exchange cover May to July 1991. Table S.1B shows
some statistics for the ten stocks under consideration. There are fewer
transactions in London than in Paris, but the median size of the transactions is
much larger. The NMS is generally valued at about FF 1 million (f100,000), a rather
large transaction by Paris standards. The average value of transactions in London
is about 10 times the average value of regular transactions in Paris, and still
somewhat larger than the mean value of crosses in Paris.




AC 1094 2049 393 20Cu;
AQ 1473 2966 1168 50(}0
BN 862 1487 853 2500
CA 950 2293 771 500
CS 758 1858 291 1000
EX 1106 2545 905 500
OR 732 1691 449 2500
RI 630 1479 210 1000
SE 1100 1970 204 2000
UAP 1532 2460 518 2000
Notei: v~lue expn:ued in FFI000; robs ir wmber of trma~ctioor i~ umple
NMS u Nomul Muta Size in number of ~ham
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Percentiles of the distribution of trade size in London and Paris are given in
Table 5.2. The results indicate that there are many very large transactions in
London compared with Paris. For example, the 99`s percentile in Paris is in the
order of magnitude of one NMS, whereas the 90~ percentile in London already is
about 5 times NMS.
Table 5.2 Pereentiles of traasaction size distribution.
Paris London
9b 90 95 99 99.5 99.9 90 95 99 99.5 99.9
AC 0.25 0.50 1.0 1.4 2.5 2.5 4.4 12.4 15.0 20.0
AQ 0.40 0.60 2.0 3.0 16.2 3.0 4.6 15.7 22.0 50.0
BN 0.21 0.36 0.8 1.2 2.4 1.6 2.4 5.0 6.0 12.0
CA 0.40 0.60 1.6 2.1 5.0 5.0 8.0 30.0 40.0 51.0
CS 0.29 0.48 1.1 3.0 5.5 4.0 6.0 13.3 21.6 32.8
EX 0.46 0.80 2.0 4.0 12.0 4.2 7.5 18.0 26.7 72.8
OR 0.22 0.39 1.0 1.5 2.8 2.2 3.4 9.8 18.8 20.2
RI 0.25 0.43 1.2 1.8 3.0 3.3 5.1 8.8 8.8 9.1
SE 0.25 0.48 1.0 1.5 2.5 3.8 5.2 9.7 10.0 10.7
UAP 0.20 0.75 2.5 4.6 5.5 5.0 7.5 12.5 15.5 21.2
Ndee: petcentiles ezpreeeed in NMS; croeeea included in Psri~ umple.
5.4.3 Distribution of transactions by time of day.
Figure 5.2 depicts the distribution of trades by time of day in Accor shares
in Paris. In this figure the trading day is split up into seven hours, ranging from
IO:OOam to 17:OOpm (the period of continuous trading) and the number of
transactions in each interval for all days in the sample is counted. There is a
clear lunch break effect between lpm and 2pm. More interestingly, most trading
takes place in the hour after opening and the hour before closing. The graphs for
the other series show very similar patterns. Hence, our data match the U-shaped
trading pa[tern found by McInish and Wood (1990) for the Toronto Stock Exchange, by
Niemeyer and Sandas (1992) for the Stockholm exchange and by Kleidon and Werner
(1993) for the SBcP 100 firms on the NYSE. In contrast, Schmidt and Iversen (1991)
found an inverted U-shaped trading pattern with the trading sessions of the German
MATIS.
92





10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
time of day
S.S The quoted spread [or French equities.
In this section we provide an analysis of the cost of immediacy on the Paris Bourse
and SEAQ International. T'he cost of an urgent transaction is determined by the
available orders in the limit order book in Paris and by the market maker quotes in
London. An important determinant of the cost of immediacy therefore is the quoted
spread. For Paris, the average quoted spread is determined as the average
difference between bid and ask prices in the limit order book for a certain size.
In London, the quoted spread is the difference between the best bid and ask quotes
of the market makers. Although prices are negotiable in London, one cannot always
count on "within-the-touch" prices for an immediate transaction.
In order to compute the quoted spread in Paris it is necessary to construct
the limit order book. We observe all new limit orders, as well as all transactions
that fill limit orders and orders that are withdrawn, so that we can recursively
build up the order book over the day. There are two problems in constructing the
order book, however. First, there is the unobserved "quantité caché", which makes
the book deeper than observed. Second, we observe only the limit orders at the five
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best prices, so that we do not have prices for larger order sizes. In constructing
the book we impute the fifth best limit order price for all sizes beyond the range
for which the bid and ask price are observed 2. Clearly this biases the average
quoted spread downwards. On the other hand, ignoring the quantité caché biases the
average upwards. The net effect of these data imperfections on the estimates of the
quoted spread is indeterminate.
A first way to measure the average quoted spread is by a simple calendar time
average of the observed spreads between bid and ask prices:
(5.1) SC(z) - ~i-1(ti-l-l-ti)(A[ti,z]-B[ti,zl)) i ~-1(ti-fl-ti)~
where ti is the calendar time index (in seconds) of the i~ change in the limit
order book, A[ti,z] denotes the marginal ask price at time ti for an order of size
z, B[ti,z] denotes the corresponding bid price, and N is the number of quote
changes in the sample period. Thus, each quote is weighted in proportion to the
calendar time for which it appears on the trading screens (that is, the time until
the next quote change). This measure computes the quoted price for the marginal
unit only. The average spread for a hypothetical transaction of size z is obtained
by averaging the marginal spread over all smaller sizes:
(5.2) SC(z) - Ei-1(ti-I-l-ti)Fiy-1z 1fA[ti,Y]-B[ti~Yl, ~ ~-1(tifl-ti)'
For London, the average quoted spread or "market touch" can be derived directly
from the market maker's quotes. The London quotes apply to all sizes smaller than
or equal to NMS.
Table 5.3 hows the average quoted spread in London and Paris for sizes up to
NMS. The averages are taken over the period of continuous trading in Paris and the
mandatory quote period in London. All quotes outside normal trading hours aze
ignored. There is no point in going beyond NMS because the data on the limit order
2 An alternative procedure is to exclude those observations for which we do not
observe the quoted bid and ask price up to the required size. That procedure
introduces a selection bias in the spread measure because the five best limit
orders add up to a large size only when the market is deep. Hence, that procedure
underestimates the spread. Comparison of this alternative procedure with the
procedure described in the main tezt showed that the selection bias is more serious
than the bias caused by imputing the fifth best price for unobserved limit orders.
See also Anderson and Tychon (1993) who report large selection biases for Belgian
stocks.
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book in Paris for larger sizes are very sparse and therefore spread estimates for
lazge sizes are unreliable.
Table 5.3 Calendar time average quoted spread.
paris London
size 0.0 0.1 0.5 1.0 s1.0
AC 0.287 0.277 0.444 0.646 1.268
AQ 0.187 0.206 0.300 0.409 0.977
BN 0.176 0.218 0.359 0.519 0.852
CA 0.216 0.245 0.372 0.504 1.346
CS 0.363 0.427 0.655 0.898 2.309EX 0.135 0.147 0.210 0.285 1.004
OR 0.308 0.383 0.672 0.980 1.646RI 0.367 0.413 0.650 0.912 2.106
SE 0.370 0.452 0.838 1.200 2.061
UAP' 0.4~2 0.467 0.68~ 0.972 , 1.712
Nau: peroeouge quaed ~pread by SC(z) definition.
The table reveals that the calendar time average of the spread, SC(z), in Paris is
very small for small sizes, betweEn 0.15-0.496, and rises for lazger sizes. For
example, at NMS the average quoted spread in Paris is between 0.3 and 1.29b. The
quoted spread in London (the "touch") is considerably bigger than the quoted spread
in Paris for all sizes below NMS. The quoted spread for NMS in Paris is only half
of the quoted spread in London. Róell (1992), who had available a number of
snapshots of the complete limit order book (including the quantité caché) concludes
that the Paris quotes are narrower than the London quotes for order sizes of up to
2 times the NMS, but that for larger sizes the limit order book runs out quickly.
Figure 5.3 shows a breakup by time of day of the average quoted spread for
Accor shazes. For Paris, the average fourchette (the difference between best bid
and ask prices at the smallest lot size) and the quoted spread for 0.1, 0.5 and 1
times NMS are shown. For London, the average "touch" is graphed. T'he graph shows
hourly time intervals, except for the early morning hour which is split in two
because the London mandatory quote period starts only at 10.30 a.m. Paris time. It
is clear that the Paris market is very tight, the fourchette is only about 0.254b
for the series plotted and doesn't change much over the day, although it is
slightly higher in the first half hour, which falls outside the mandatory quote
period in London. The quoted spread in London, graphed as the dotted line in Figure
5.3, is much larger than the fourchette and also lazger than the average quoted
spread at NMS in Paris for all times of the day.
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An obvious drawback of the above spread measure is that it is a calendar time
average, hence periods in which there is hardly any trading aze given the same
weight as periods of equal length in which trading is heavy. A second estimator
conditions on the actually observed trade pattern by taking a transaction time
average of the difference between bid and ask prices:
(5.3) ST(z) - N ~-1Fy-1(AIti,Y]-BLti,Yl, ~z,
where ti denotes the calendar time index of transaction i.
T'here are no large differences between the calendar time average, SC(z), and
the transaction time average, ST(z), reported in Table 5.4. For Paris, the
transaction time average quoted spread is slightly smaller than the calendar time
average at small sizes, and about the same at NMS. For London, the calendaz time
and transaction time average quoted spreads are also very similaz. The timing of
transactions therefore dces not seem to be very sensitive to variations in the
spread. This is also evident from a comparison of Figures 5.2 and 5.3: trading
volume does not seem to be concentrated at times of day when the fourchette is
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particularly narrow. Trading volume is U-shaped over the day, while the fourchette
does not display an inverted U-shape3. Therefore, the transaction time average of
the quoted spread is rather similar to the calendar time average.
Table 5.4 Tran.saetion time average of the percentage quoted spread.
pans London truncation
size 0.0 0.1 0.5 1.0 s1.0 0.1 0.5 1.0
AC 0.228 0.258 0.427 0.629 1.315 0 0 18
AQ 0.174 0.197 0.305 0.426 0.954 0 2 45
BN 0.174 0.219 0.386 0.531 0.852 0 2 22
CA 0.195 0.223 0.349 0.478 1.228 0 4 33
CS 0.336 0.405 0.655 0.913 2.208 0 6 50
EX 0.130 0.143 0.211 0.290 1.006 0 1 13
OR 0.293 0.369 0.673 0.987 1.624 0 7 50
RI 0.339 0.394 0.649 0.921 2.159 0 5 56
SE 0.334 0.414 0.782 1.150 2.025 0 11 66
UAP 0.390 0.436 0.665 0.959 1.685 0 0 17
Naw: perceolaye quoted iprcad by SC(z) defioitioo;
'wocation" giva the percedage of ob~ervaGom for which the we the
ob~erved limit orden didn't add up to 0.1, 0.5 or 1 NMS, rcrpectivdy,
0o eilher Ihe bid or the aek aide (or botó).
A further refinement of the quoted spread measure is obtained if we condition
not only on the pattern of trades over the day, but also on the size of
transactions. The results of Biais et al. (1992) suggest that indeed lazge
transactions tend to take place at times when it is relatively cheap to trade lazge
quantities. This is formalised in the third estimator, which averages the quoted
spread over times that transactions in a particulaz size class occurred:
(5.4) SQ(z,z) -~~ lI(z C zisz)~ i 1 l A[ti,Y)-B[ti~Y)) Izi I~~ II(z G zisz),
where I(.) is an indicator function that takes the value one if the trades size
excceds the lower bound z and is smaller than or equal to the upper bound, z, and
takes the value zero otherwise. Table 5.5 reports the quoted spread SQ for several
size classes.
3 Schmidt and Iversen (1991) did find a clear U shaped spread pattern that was just
the opposite of the inverted U shaped trading pattern.
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Table 5.5 Transaction time average of pereentage quoted spread by size class.
A. Paris.
50.1 0.1-0.5 0.5-1 ~ 1.0 all
AC 0.237 0.271 0.472 0.523 0.252
AQ 0.179 0.218 0.324 0.363 0.201
BN 0.182 0.228 0.422 0.555 0.197
CA 0.209 0.234 0.336 0.375 0.225
CS 0.356 0.434 0.697 0.720 0.389
EX 0.134 0.154 0.225 0.263 0.148
OR 0.309 0.396 0.706 0.782 0.342
RI 0.359 0.404 0.662 0.778 0.378
SE 0.356 0.449 0.831 0.993 0.386
UAP 0.421 0.465 0.716 0.925 0.453
B. London.
50.1 0.1-0.5 0.5-1 1-2 2-5 ~ 5 all
AC 1.325 1.346 1.336 1.241 1.301 1.345 1.315
AQ 0.995 0.953 0.961 0.960 0.897 0.972 0.954
BN 0.880 0.852 0.845 0.830 0.812 0.849 0.852
CA 1.260 1.245 1.276 1.219 1.160 1.183 1.228
CS 2.418 2.206 2.285 2.132 2.054 2.166 2.208
EX 0.957 0.974 1.061 1.008 0.996 1.075 1.006
OR 1.505 1.652 1.625 1.656 1.680 1.716 1.624
RI 2.208 2.130 2.253 2.201 2.095 1.909 2.159
SE 2.003 2.072 1.954 1.972 2.158 1.922 2.025
UAP 1.841 1.655 1.740 1.681 1.706 1.488 1.685
Ndee: pereentage qude" gr~d by SQ(z,z) defuvtion.
For Paris, the value of SQ is usually slightly smaller than the value of S.I.,
indicating that indeed the size of transactions is related to the quoted spread.
Like SC and ST, SQ is increasing in trade size, neazly doubling from the smallest
to the largest size class. For London, only the "touch" was averaged by transaction
size class, and these show no clear pattern. In London, therefore, trade size dces
not seems to depend on the "touch".
In summary, the results of this section show that the quoted spread in Paris
is much smaller than the quoted spread in London for small transaction sizes below
NMS. However, for larger transactions the quoted spread in Paris rises quickly as
the limit order book runs out. Some care has to be taken with these results because
the estimates of the quoted spread in Paris ignore the hidden quantities and aze
marred by the problem that we only have data on the five best limit orders.
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5.6 Realised spread.
In this section we compute spread estimates that are based on transaction prices
rather than on quoted prices and will therefore be referred to as measures of the
realised spread. The limit order and quote data are used to construct a measure of
the mid-price of the stock only. The estimator of the realised spread that we
propose is twice the average absolute difference between the quoted mid-price and
the transaction price:
(5.5) SR(z,z) - 2~-1I(zCZisz). ~p[i]-m[i]~ I ~-1I(zCzisi),
where as before I(.) is the indicator function, p[i] is the actual transaction
price (average price paid per share) and m[i] is the mid-price at the time of the
i~ transaction, defined as the average of the best bid and ask quote (or best buy
and sell limit orders) for the smallest possible order size.
For Paris, there are at least two important differences between the realised
spread measure and the quoted spread measures of the previous section. The first is
that the limit order book data are n~uired only to construct the mid-price. This
means that the realised spread estimate in Paris is not affected by the quantité
caché and the availability of only the five best limit order prices. The second
important difference is that the implicit assumption that the market is equally
deep on both sides is dropped. One would expect that large trades are more likely
to take place on the deeper side of the market. If so, the realised spread measure
should be lower than the quoted spread measure for larger trade sizes. In London
transactions are routinely priced within the touch, and therefore the quoted spread
will be an overestimate of the realised cost of trading.
The realised spread is the measure that is relevant for a patient trader, who
can wait for the best moment to trade, but it is probably not a good indicator of
the cost of immediacy. First of all, an impatient trader cannot choose the deeper
side of the market. Moreover, in London transaction prices for larger deals are
generally negotiated within the touch, and the same is true for Paris cross
transactions. This means that the realised spn„ad, which measures the average cost
of actual transactions, understates the cost of a hypothetical urgent transaction,
where the trader cannot rely on negotiating within the quote prices.
The estimates SR of the average realised spread are reported in Table 5.6. In
calculating the estimates we excluded all transactions outside the continuous
trading (Paris) or the mandatory quote period (L.ondon) because outside normal
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trading hours the mid-quote is not a reliable prozy for the mazket consensus
valuation of the stock.
Table 5.6 Average pereeatage realised spread SR
A. Paris.
50.1 0.1-0.5 0.5-1 ~ 1.0 all
AC 0.245 0.236 0.251 0.230 0.242
AQ 0.193 0.202 0.188 0.160 0.196
BN 0.187 0.188 0.201 0.181 0.187
CA 0.227 0.212 0.221 0.200 0.221
CS 0.372 0.378 0.429 0.327 0.375
EX 0.151 0.154 0.158 0.145 0.153
OR 0.325 0.315 0.305 0.171 0.322
RI 0.368 0.352 0.384 0.401 0.364
SE 0.362 0.359 0.311 0.178 0.361
UAP 0.458 0.416 0.434 0.381 0.438
Nate: Avenge Mrcd on alI tranuc6one in coolinuou~ ~nding period (10.17).
B. London.
s0.1 0.1-0.5 0.5-1 1-2 2-5 1 5 all
AC 1.357 1.164 I.O55 1.286 1.382 0.688 1.191
AQ 1.759 1.237 1.337 1.028 1.298 2.046 1.300
BN 1.495 0.993 1.072 1.296 1.364 5.273 1.202
CA 1.720 1.521 1.137 1.158 1.226 1.390 1.323
CS 3.032 1.856 1.330 1.177 1.668 1.987 1.728
EX 1.452 1.105 1.067 1.035 1.128 1.478 1.148
OR 2.098 1.166 1.456 1.422 1.870 1.739 1.447
RI 2.146 1.192 0.980 1.783 1.410 1.101 1.409
SE 1.374 1.695 1.574 1.744 1.025 1.008 1.503
UAP 1.664 1.242 1.150 1.429 1.371 1.295 1.313
Noles: Tnneectionr ody in msndalory quote period (9.30.16).
C. Londoa, bias corrected.
s0.1 0.1-0.5 0.5-1 1-2 2-5 ~5 all
AC 1.339 1.169 1.169 1.286 1.382 0.688 1.191
AQ 0.963 1.360 0.963 1.028 1.298 2.046 1.300
BN 0.857 1.134 0.857 1.296 1.364 5.273 1.202
CA 1.260 1.404 1.260 1.158 1.226 1.390 1.323
CS 2.270 1.859 1.859 1.177 1.668 1.987 1.728
EX 0.998 1.153 0.998 1.035 1.128 1.478 1.148
OR 1.607 1.394 1.394 1.422 1.870 1.739 1.447
RI 2.182 1.354 1.345 1.783 1.410 1.101 1.409
SE 2.016 1.601 1.601 1.744 1.025 1.008 1.503
UAP 1.709 1.232 1.232 1.429 1.371 1.295 1.313
No~e: Tnnnctiom ody in mendatory quote periad (9.30.16)
Bus cortection deacribed in Appeodix.
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Table 5.6, panel A shows the average realised spread in Paris. All transactions
within the continuous trading period were used, including "crosses". The table
cleazly shows that the realised spread in Paris does not increase with trade size.
In contrast, in the previous section we have seen that the quoted spread increases
with size. The dependence of the quoted and realised spread in Paris on trade size
is illustrated in Figure 5.4, where a quoted spread estimate (ST) and the realised
spread estimate (SR) for the Accor series are graphed.
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Estimates of the average realised spread in London are reported in Table 5.6,
panel B. The most striking result here is that the realised spread in London seems
to be declining in trade size. This effect was also observed by Breedon (1992),
Tonks and Snell (1992) and Rcell (1992). A comparison of Table 5.4 and Table 5.6
shows that in London the average realised spread for transactions smaller than NMS
is generally lazger than the quoted spread. This seems impossible: the rules of
SEAQ International oblige market makers to stand firm at the best quoted price for
transactions smaller than NMS. A likely explanation for this anomaly is a timing
bias. Unlike in Paris, the reported time of transactions in London can be
inaccurate and the market maker quotes are not updated very frequently so that they
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may well be stale. In the Appendix we show that this biases our realised spread
measure upwards, because the market mid-price may have moved between the actual
transaction time and the reported time. In Table 5.6, panel C we report bias-
adjusted realised spreads for London.
The observation that realised spreads do not increase or even decline with
trade size is important because it is not in line with the inventory control and
adverse selection models of the spread discussed in secdon 2, or with the
assumption that order processing cost is fixed per share. Constant processing costs
per transaction, and therefore declining per share, could be an explanation for the
empirical result that the cost per share is smaller for large trade sizes. We
return to this issue in section 5.7 where we estimate a parametric model for the
dependence of the realised spread on trade size.
Comparing the realised spread in London with the realised spread in Paris, it
appears that the London realised spread is considerably higher than the Paris one,
so Paris seems to be cheaper. There are a number of caveats. First, there are few
transactions larger than NMS in Paris (indeed most of those are cross transactions)
while in London roughly half the transactions exceed NMS. Second, the full cost of
trading also includes taxes and other explicit transaction costs. We return to this
point in the concluding section.
5.7 Model-based estimates of the realised bid-ask spread
The spread measures of the previous section relied on data from the limit order
book or quotes to construct an estimate of the unobserved consensus value of the
stock. The estimators proposed in this section do not require such a proxy, and are
therefore less sensitive to the problems encountered in section 5.6. In particular,
timing bias is not a problem. The price paid for this improvement is the need to
make some parametric assumptions about the process that generates prices. We build
some simple models to estimate the realised spread and to estimate the dependence
of the spread on trade size.
The simplest model that we consider is based on the work of Stoll (1989) and
George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991). In their models it is assumed that the
transaction price, pt is equal to the (unobserved) mid-price prior to the trade,
yt, plus or minus one-half times the total spread, S. We allow for an error term,
ut, in the price equation, that picks up various effects on the transactions price
that are not captured by the mid-price and the transactions type, such as price
discreteness and trade size. Thus, the price equation is
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(5.6) pt - yt f(Sl2)Qt f ut,
where Qt indicates whether the transaction is initiated by the buyer (~-1) or the
seller (-1). The variable Qt will henceforth be referred to as the "sign" of the
trade. The mid-price yt in this equation is not observed, so we cannot estimate
this model directly. In order to obtain an equation in observables only, we first
difference (5.6) and make assumptions on the dynamics of the mid-price.
If there is asymmetric information between market makers and other traders,
the market maker will revise his mid-price after a trade has occurred. Moreover,
for inventory control reasons he will also change his quotes because the trade
changes his inventory. Let (1-a) be the fracáon of the spread attributable to
asymmetric information and inventory control, and n the fraction attributable to
processing cost, then the revised mid-price immediately after the transaction is
(5.~ mt - Yt t ( I-n)(Sl2)Qt.
Finally, between two trades public information on the stock's value may come in so
that the new mid-price prior to the subsequent trade is a revision of mt
(5.8) yt - RO f mt-1 } et,
where where p~ is the average and et is the unexpected mid-price return resulting
from public information between the two transactions. Under these assumptions the
transaction price returns can be expressed as
(5.9) ept - pfi f(Sl2)Qt - n(S~2)Qt-1 f et f eut.
This is an equation in observables (ept and Qt) and random error terms only. It is
a valid regression model under the additional assumption that Qt is exogenous, so
that Qt and (et,ut) are uncorrelated at all lags4. Under this assumption, a and S
can be estimated consistently by least squares, where the coefficient of Qt is half
the realised bid-ask spread.
4 If the pricing error ut is due to rounding, Qt and ut might be correlated. In
that case, an instrumental variables technique could be used to estimate (5.9). We
ignore this point in the estimation.
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If we furthermore assume that (et,ut) is a joint white noise process, the
regression has a first order moving average error structure. Moreover, the
innovations in the true price are probably heteroskedastic, as suggested by the
results of Hausman, Lo and MacKinlay (1992). One of the reasons for the
heteroskedasticity is the difference in the calendar time span between
transactions. However, there may be other factors that cause a time-varying
conditional variance. Instead of specifying the form of heteroskedasticity, we
estimate by OLS, which under the stated assumptions gives consistent point
estimates, and compute heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC)
standard errors using the method proposed by Newey and West (198~.
In the literature several spread estimators have been developed for cases
where no data on sign or size of the transactions are available. Roll (1984)
proposes an estimator of the spread based on the first order autocovariance of the
returns, rop-E(nptopt-1)' In the simple model (5.9), Roll's estimator is consistent
only under some very restrictive assumptions: no serial correlation in expected
returns; no error term in the price equation (0~~-0); no serial correlation in the
transaction type (E[QtQt-1~-0); and no asymmetric information or inventory control
effects (n-1). Under these assumptions, the first order autocovariance of the
returns is equal to -(Sl2)2, and Roll's estimator of the spread is given by
A
(5.10) S - 2 -p.
Roll's estimator is biased downward if there is positive serial correlation
in the transaction sign Qt (i.e. if transactions at the bid tend to be followed by
further transaction at the bid and similarly for the ask). Choi, Salandro and
Shastri (1988) adjust to Roll's estimator for serial correlation in Qt, retaining
the assumptions that there are no pricing errors (c~-0), no serial correlation in
mid-price returns and no asymmetric information or inventory control effects (n -1).
Choi et al. (1988) assume also that Qt follows a first order Markov process. Under
these assumptions, the first order autocovariance of the returns is
(5.11) y~p - -(Sl2)2(1-a~)2,
where ~Q is the first order autocovariance of the transaction sign. From (5.11),
the CSS estimator follows directly
(5.12) S - 2 -p~(1-a~),
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This estimator takes the form of a simple correction by a factor ll(1-r) of Roll's
estimator.
The details of the estimation procedures are as follows. In line with the
previous sections, we exclude all transactions outside the mandatory quote period
(I.ondon) and the period of continuous trading (Paris). We include all other
transactions, including the crosses in Paris. We take logarithms of the transaction
prices and multiply those by 100 to obtain estimates of the percentage spread. The
estimation equation is thus specified in returns, but only within-day returns were
used because overnight returns are unlikely to follow the same process as intra-day
returns, see Harris (1986). The classification of the trade as buyer initiated or
seller initiated is done by comparing the transaction price with the mid-price. If
the transaction price exceeds the mid-price, the trade is classified as buyer
initiated (Qt-1), and if the transaction price is lower than the mid-price the
trade is classified as seller initiated (Qt--1). If the transacdon price is
exactly at the mid-price, the trade is not classified and the value 0 is assigned
to Qt. This procedure is exact for the Paris transactions that were executed
through the CAC system, but for the crosses and the London data there might be some
incorrect classifications due to reporting lags.
The model-based estimates of the realised spread in London and Paris are
given in Table 5.7. Like our previous results in Section 5.6, the model based
estimates suggest that the realised spread in London substantially exceeds the
realised spread in Paris. Comparing the average realised spread SR in Table 5.5
with the regression-based estimated spread, the latter is smaller for all stocks,
suggesting that the average of best bid and ask quotes is not a good approximation
of the unobserved true mid-price. This discrepancy is particularly striking in the
case of the London data. There, because the market maker quotes are updated
relatively infn~uently, our data on the quoted mid-price may be a particularly
inappropriate basis for computing realised spreads.
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iable 5.7 Model baged esti~ates of realiaed spread.
model: Apt - ~0 } ~1Qt } ~2Qt-1 } et
Paris London
Roll CSS 2~1 Roll CSS 2~1
AC 0.178 0.259 0.214 1.075 1.802 0.890
(47.855) (10.214)
AQ 0.143 0.196 0.167 1.136 2.040 1.290
(65.196) ( 13.740)
BN 0.147 0.182 0.169 0.679 1.354 0.781
(86.701) (12.666)
CA 0.154 0.241 0.179 1.003 1.991 0.809
(56.733) (11.010)
CS 0.274 0.359 0.330 2.152 3.997 1.131
(48.947) (6.961)
EX 0.109 0.157 0.123 0.954 1.717 0.771
(58.959) (12.077)
OR 0.246 0.328 0.285 0.849 1.401 0.992
(59.805) (11.418)
RI 0.248 0.336 0.305 0.748 1.284 0.819
(35.139) (6.765)
SE 0.253 0.371 0.316 2.071 4.186 1.901
(41.965) (4.396)
UAP 0.349 0.521 0.404 0.902 1.444 0.842
(49.420) (11.575)
He4rodcaLMicily ~nd mlocorteVtioa coo~iaeat t-n~ in p~rcntàew;
P~timNU bued on dl lntwction~ vitbin rcgular indiug houn;
Sprcad e~rcseed a~ a percentage of the uanaacGon price.
In addition to the effect of the sign of the trade (buyer or seller initiated) the
size of the trade may also be an important determinant of the price. The
microstructure theories discussed in section 5.2 predict that due to asymmetric
information and inventory control the spread will be an increasing function of
trade size. To estimate the effect of size we extend model (5.6) in the spirit of
Glosten and Harris (1988) and Madhavan and Smidt (1991). The price equation is
extended with a linear term in the size of the transaction. In section 5.5 we found
some evidence for a fixed processing cost per transaction that would generate a
decreasing processing cost for large trade sizes. This effect is captured by adding
the inverse of trade size to the price equation. Together, we add two additional
variables to (5.6) and obtain
(5.6') pt - Yt f(Sl2)Qt f azt f 7z11 f ut,
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where zt is the signed trade size. First differencing (5.6' ) we obtain the
equivalent of regression equation (5.9) but now including current and lagged trade
size and the inverse of size as regressorss:
(5.9') npt - p0 t(Sl2)Qt f azt f rzil f lagged terms f et f nut.
In order to reduce the influence of very large transactions (outliers) on the
estimates, we "censor" large trade sizes. For Paris, we pick the threshold at 2
NMS, which is about the 99.5 4b quantileó. In London many more trades would be
censored at 2 NMS, between 10 and 25 percent. Therefore, we use a threshold of 5
NMS for the London data, which corresponds to the 954b quantile.
T'he estimation results are reported in Table 5.8. For Paris, the coefficients
of the size and the inverted size are small but significant for most cases. The
Wald test of joint significance of the size and inverted size parameters is larger
than its 546 critical value (5.99) for all series except one. On the other hand, for
London less evidence for a trade size effect on the realised spread is found. The
size effect is jointly significant only for BSN (BN) and Axa-Midi (CS). Partly this
may reflect the smaller sample size of the London series.
Hasbrouck ( 1991a) uses a more extensive model to assess the dynamic effects of
transactions. More specifically, in his model the price effect of a transaction can
last for more periods than the one period assumed implicitly in equation (5.~. Our
regression based spread estimator can be extended easily to include more complex
dynamics by adding lagged regressors to the regression models (5.9) and (5.9' ). The
parameters of interest are the coefficient of the current sign, trade size and
inverted size, whereas the coefficients of the lagged variables are merely nuisance
parameters. The parameter estimates using four (rather than one) lags of trade sign
show only minor differences with the reported estimates and the conclusions do not
change.
5 We do not impose restrictions on the coefficients of the lagged regressors. We do
not want to run the risk of imposing invalid restrictions and thus misspecifying
the model. Not imposing such restricGons does not affect the consistency of the
e~stimators of the parameters of interest (S, a and 7).
Hausman et al. (1992) also censor trade size at the 99.54b quantile.
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Table 5.8 Model based eatisates of realised spread. with size effecta.
model: Apt -~0 t SQt t azt t ylzt t lags f et



































SE 0.313 -0.056 0.561 9.337
(29.231) (-2.053) (1.270)
UAP 0.348 -0.000 3.764 77.760
(30.332) (-0.021) (7.981)
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B. London (size censored at 5 NMS)
2S 2a 2T Wald
0.976 -0.066 -7.459 4.123
(8.018) (-1.311) (-1.817)
1.283 0.002 3.167 0.241
(11.391) (0.048) (0.486)
0.591 0.187 13.980 30.103
(6.777) (1.569) (5.450)
0.819 -0.095 2.325 4.263
(9.655) (-1.501) (1.370)
0.793 0.188 6.996 27.599
(3.184) (1.794) (5.240)
0.737 0.037 1.724 3.261
(10.204) (0.572) (1.770)
0.735 0.113 70.061 9.312
(7.021) (2.189) (2.677)
0.680 0.036 21.844 1.943
(3.696) (0.408) (1.381)
2.163 -0.166 -13.606 3.896
(4.362) (-1.081) (-1.971)
0.814 0.012 0.606 0.534
(8.692) (0.346) (0.719)
2
NoW: W~Id i~ x(2) teet of join~ siQnific~nce of a and 7;
HAC t-tatiw below p~nmeter e~tim~W; ~ee ~Iw oola~ b Table 5.6.
The following tables show the bid-ask spread for different transaction sizes,
estimated from the parameters of Table 5.8.
Estimated bid-ask spread Paris.
size 0.1 0.5 1.0 2.0
AC 0.199 0.213 0.241 0.299
AQ 0.155 0.154 0.160 0.173
BN 0.162 0.177 0.196 0.234
CA 0.173 0.178 0.184 0.196
CS 0.313 0.340 0.376 0.449
EX 0.117 0.123 0.132 0.148
OR 0.265 0.281 0.305 0.352
RI 0.293 0.289 0.292 0.299
SE 0.311 0.286 0.257 0.201
UAP 0.367 0.351 0.349 0.348
Estimated bid-ask spread London.
size 0.1 0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
AC 0.932 0.935 0.906 0.841 0.644
AQ 1.289 1.285 1.286 1.288 1.294
BN 0.666 0.696 0.783 0.967 1.525
CA 0.818 0.774 0.726 0.631 0.347
CS 0.882 0.901 0.988 1.173 1.734
EX 0.747 0.757 0.775 0.811 0.921
OR 1.026 0.848 0.867 0.975 1.306
RI 0.902 0.741 0.738 0.763 0.865
SE 2.079 2.067 1.991 1.829 1.334
UAP 0.819 0.821 0.827 0.839 0.876
Nolt: eize meaeurrA in NMS.
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5.8 Summary and conclusions.
In this chapter we compared the cost of trading French shares in Paris and in
London. The estimates of the average quoted spread, which reflect the cost of
immediate trading, suggest that the Paris Bourse is cheaper than London's SEAQ
International for small transactions, roughly up to the normal mazket size. For
larger sizes, however, the Paris limit order book often does not contain enough
limit orders and the average quoted spread rises steeply, hence the Paris mazket is
not very deep. The London mazket with its competing market makers provides more
liquidity at lazger trade sizes. The quoted spread in London for small sizes is
however relatively large.
The estimates of the realised spread show a slightly different picture. It
appears that the few large transactions that aze executed in Paris (often
"crosses") have a fairly low spread, lower than the spread in London. Our
regression-based estimates suggest that at trade sizes of twice NMS the realised
spread is still considerably lower than in London. On the whole, we conclude that
if the trader is padent and prepared to wait for counterparties, transaction cost
for large sizes can be fairly low in Paris compared with SEAQ-International.
The full cost of trading on either ezchange includes taxes and other levies
as well. Information on such explicit transaction costs are presented in London
Stock Exchange (1992a). The commissions and fees in London are on average 0.144b of
the transaction value and in Paris about 0.5 qb (these percentages aze for a large
transaction of 1 million ECU, roughly FF 7 million). Thus explicit transaction
costs are higher in Paris for large transactions. One reason is that in London many
lazge deals are done on a"net" basis, i.e. wmmissions are included in the price.
A theoretically interesting result is that the realised spread is virtually
flat in trade size. Hence, we do not confirm the predictions of the pure inventory
control or adverse selection microstructure theory (that the spread should be an
increasing function of trade size) except for the quoted spread (where the spread
increases with trade size by construction). Our estimates of a simple model for
transaction prices confirm this result and indicate mild support for the hypothesis
that part of the order processing cost is fixed per transaction rather than per
share.
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Appendix. Adjustment for bias due to misreported transactiou times.
As explained in the main text, the SR(z) estimates of the average realised spread
in London for transaction sizes smaller than NMS aze sometimes larger than the
average quoted spread, SQ(z). This seems impossible, because the true realised
spread has to be smaller than the quoted spread since market makers aze obliged to
provide the best quoted price for transactions smaller than NMS. This anomaly is
probably explained by a timing bias due to misreported transaction times in London.
In this appendix we propose a model for the impact of timing bias on estimates of
the realised spread that can also be used to correct the SR estimates for this
bias.
Let S(z) be the average realised spread (as a function of size) that we would
want to estimate. Suppose that the transaction is reported late, say at time ttk.
In general the midprice recorded at time tfk is different from the mid-price at
time t, so that in fact we estimate
(SA.1) SR(z) - E~S(z) t xt~
where xt denotes the change in the mid-price in the interval between the time that
the transaction actually took place and when it was reported. Suppose that xt is
normally distributed with mean 0 and variance cZ. Then we can apply the expressions
in Amemiya (1985, p. 36Tj, who shows that for a normally distributed variable
y- N(~,a~2), the conditional expectation of y, given y~ 0 is
(SA.2) E(Y~Y~O) - p f
c.~(w~)
~(~~~)
where m and ~ are the standard normal density and the cumulative standard normal
distribution, respectively. Using this result the expectation of the absolute value
in (SA.1) can be written as
(SA.3) SR(z) - S(z)(2~(a)-1) f 2cm(a), a- S(z)lo~
Figure 5.5 shows that the realised spread measure SR(z) is always larger than the
S(z) that we want to estimate. The estimates reported in Table 5.6, panel B will









Figure 5.5: Timing bias for true spread 0, 0.5, 1 and 1.5
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We now turn to a method to correct for timing bias. Fundamental to the
correction is the assumption that the variance of the timing error, a~2, is
independent of the transaction size. Moreover, it is known that most small
transactions are at the touch (I.ondon Stock Exchange (1992b)). Thus, for small
transactions the quoted spread and the true realised spread should be the same:
S(z)-SQ(z). In Table 5.5, panel B the average quoted spread by size class can be
found. The first step in the correction procedure is to solve (SA.3) for Q, given
S(z)-SQ(z) in the smallest size class. The second step is to compute S(z) for all
other size classes from (SA.3), given the estimate of ~ obtained in the first step
and the estimated values of SR(z) from Table 5.6, panel B.
There is one problem with the procedure outlined just before. If we take the
smallest size class to be the class from 0 to 0.1 NMS, we estimate quite a large o~.
In fact, the estimated P is so large that (SA.3) sometimes does not have a
solution. Therefore, we choose to base the estimate of o~ on the average quoted
spread for all transactions up to 1 NMS. Because quotes are firm up to 1 NMS, the
quoted spread is an upper bound for the realised spread for this size class.
Therefore, the estimated ~ from solving ( A.3) given S(z)-SQ(0,1) gives a lower
bound for the true timing error. This estimate of v will therefore yield a
conservative correction of the realised spread for other size classes.
Chapter 6
Intra-day price effects of trading on the Paris Bourse
6.1 Introductiou.
In this chapter we analyse the dynamic price effects of trading on the Paris
Bourse. The issue is of interest both for practitioners and theorists. Traders,
especially of lazge `blocks' of shazes, may be worried that their transactions
might put a downwazd or upward pressure on future stock prices. A closely related
aspect of the quality of a securities mazket is `resiliency', i.e. the speed at
which the stock price reverts to its equilibrium value after a large trade. The
issue is also of interest for the theory of stock mazket micro structure, because
it allows us to shed some light on the main theoretical explanations for the price
effect of transactions: inventory control by market makers and adverse selection
due to asymmetric information.
The inventory control literature, e.g. the paper by Ho and Stoll (1981),
usually considers a dealership mazket where a professional mazket maker provides
liquidity and absorbs order imbalances. All trades are assumed to be executed
through the market maker, whose position in the stock (inventory) in general
deviates from his desired inventory level. Therefore, the mazket maker poses bid
and ask quotes to encourage trades that will restore his inventory to the desired
level. For example, stazting out from a balanced inventory, after a lazge sale to
the market maker (at the bid), inventory will be higher than desired, and the
market maker will revise his quotes downward to encourage purchases by the public.
Hence, the trade moves the price in the direction of the trade.
The second explanation that is offered in the literature for price effects of
trading supposes that there is asymmetric information between the mazket maker and
the public, because some traders might have superior information on the true value
of the stock. Traders with superior information will have an incentive to trade on
one side of the mazket only. For example, a trader who knows that the quoted price
is lower than the true value will have an incentive to buy. A trade at the ask,
initiated by a buyer, therefore gives the mazket maker a signal that his quoted
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prices are too low, and he will revise his quotes upward. Moreover, informed
traders have an incentive to trade large quantities, in order to maximise the
benefits of trading on perishable asymmetric information, cf. Glosten and Harris
(1988) and Easley and O'Hara (198~. Therefore, there is also adverse selection in
the size of the transaction: large trades are more likely to be initiated by
informed traders than small trades.
The market structure of the Bourse (discussed in detail in Chapter 5) differs
considerably from a dealership market. There are no specíalists or professional
mazket makers. Instead, liquidity is provided by the public limit order book. In
line with most research on the micro structure of securities markets (especially
most papers that analyse NYSE data), we assume that microstructure theories
developed for dealership markets also apply to the continuous auction mazket of the
Paris Bourse. Another motivation for using these theories is that the issuers of
limit orders generally face the same decision problems as market makers, and
therefore require similaz compensation for their services.
In this chapter we discuss and apply various methods to measure the price
effects of trading. Estimates of the price effects of inventory control and
asymmetric information allow us to split the quoted bid-ask spread into components
related to these effects and a third component due to the pure processing cost of a
transaction. In Section 2, we analyse the price effects of trading using the
structural model of Madhavan and Smidt (1991). We slightly extend the model to take
the dependence of the processing wst on the size of transactions into account. It
appears that the inventory control component of the spread is not identified in the
Madhavan and Smidt model if the inventory level cannot be observed. In the next
sections we try to solve this problem. We measure the adverse selection and
inventory control costs by the price effect of a transaction on subsequent quote
mid-points or transaction prices. The key identifying assumption is that adverse
selectíon causes a permanent shift in prices, whereas the other spn„ad components
have only temporary price effects. In Section 3 the price effects of trading aze
estimated assuming that the trading process is exogenous. In Section 4 we develop a
model for simultaneous determination of prices and trades. Section 5 reports the
empirical results with the simultaneous model. In Section 6 we conclude.
6.2 Structural models of transaction prices.
In this section we describe some structural models for transactions data. We
propose an extension to the model of Madhavan and Smidt (1991) to allow for
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dependence of processing cost on trade size. It is demonstrated that several other
microstructure models can be written as special cases of the extended Madhavan and
Smidt model. One special case, the Glosten and Milgrom (1988) model, is estimated
on Paris Bourse data.
6.2.1 The Madhavan and Smidt model.
Madhavan and Smidt (1991), hereafter referred to as MS, present an elegant
model for transaction prices. In the model, the market maker poses bid and ask
quotes based on his best guess of the true value of the stock and on his current
inventory. His expectation of the value of the stock after a transaction is updated
using Bayes' rule. Define the following variables:
pt - transaction price
Qt - `sign' of the transactionl
zt - signed size (number of shazes traded)
It - inventory of mazket maker óefore the transaction
yt - expected value of the stock before the transaction
~t - expected value of the stock after the transaction
et ~ publicly observed change in the value of the stock
The first eyuation of the Madhavan and Smidt model states that the transaction
price is equal to the expected value of the stock after the transaction, minus a
discount if inventory is positive, plus a fixeá `processing cost':
(6.1) pt - ut - a~It t y,Qt.
The expected value after the transaction, ~t, is based on all publicly available
information after the transaction, and includes the adverse selection price effect;
inventory control is modelled through the a~It term. In the Bayesian updating scheme
of expectations assumed by MS, the `posterior' mean ~t is obtained by taking a
weighted average of the `prior' mean (the expected value before the transaction)
and the `excess demand' for shares
(6.2) {~t - nyt f (1-a)(Ptfztla].
1 The sign is defined as follows: f 1 if the transaction is initiated by the buyer
(at the ask) and -1 if the transaction is initiated by the seller (at the bid).
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The pardmeter ~ reflects the degree of information asymmetry between the market
maker and the public; if there is no asymmetry then A-1. The parameter a is related
to the slope of the demand function for shares. To close the model, it is supposed
that the expected value before the transaction, yt, is equal to the expected value
after the previous transaction plus the publicly observed rise in the value of the
shares between the two transactions
(6.3) yt - t`t-1 } et'
Together, (6.1)-(6.3) constitute the model. Substituting (6.2) in (6.1), one
obtains the transaction price as a function of the expected value before the
transaction, minus the discount for inventory, plus the price effects of a
transaction
(6.4) pt - yt - (2'l,r)It f azt f(~Gln)Qt,
where as(1-n)laa. Thus, the transaction price is equal to the quote midpoint,
yt-(~Ix)It' plus or minus half the quoted bid-ask spread for that particular size,
xztf(y~ln)Qt. Note that the quoted bid-ask spread does not depend on the cost of
inventory control. This feature of the model, which was introduceá implicitly in
eyuation (6.1), is rather counter-intuitive, and we shall relax this assumption in
the next sub-section.
Substituting yt out of (6.2) using (6.3), and then substituting ~t-pt}~It~Qt
from (6.1), yields an equation in observables only:
(6.5) npt - xzt - (a~ln)It } 7It-1 } (~In)Qt - ~Qt-1 f et.
This is the equation that MS estimate2 on a sample of NYSE transaction price
series. Their estimated coefficients of zt and Qt are often significantly positive,
which supports the presence of both adverse selection and processing costs. The
estimates of the weight of prior information, n, based on the ratio of the
coefficients of Qt and Qt-1, lie around 213. On the other hand, the estimated
coefficients of It and It 1 are usually not significant and always nearly equal,
but of different sign, which would imply a value of n close to 1.
2 Except for a constant term that is included if the desired inventory level or the
expected value of et are non-zero.
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A special case of the MS model arises when there is no asymmetric
information, so that n-1, and all trades are executed via the market maker, so that
It-It-1-zt-1' ~~at case,
the model reduces to
(6.6) opt - rzt-1 } ~(Qt~t-1) f et,
which is precisely the Ho and Macris (1984) inventory model. In this model the
quoted spread is constant (2y~) and does not depend on trade size. Ho and Macris
justify this assumption by assuming that all trades are of the same size. The cost
of carrying inventory is then included in the coefficient ~i. Note also that
inventory data are not required to estimate the Ho-Macris model.
6.2.2 An extension to size-dependent inventory control and processing costs.
7'he assumption in (6.1) that the transitory cost components (inventory
control and processing costs) do not depend on trade size is clearly unrealistic.
Therefore, we propose to augment the price equation (6.1) with processing cost and
inventory control costs that depend on trade size.
The first change to (6.1) is a term pzt that reflects the part of the
processing cost that depends on trade size, as in the model of Glosten and Harris
(1988) (which dces not have an inventory control component, however).
T'he model of Ho and Stoll (1981), which is a pure inventory control model,
suggests that the proportional part of the inventory control cost is equal to zzt,
where a~ is the coefficient of the inventory level in the pricing schedule. Stoll
(1989) provides an intuitive motivation for this: a transaction of size zt moves
the mid-quote by -~ times the change in inventory, nIt} 1. Therefore, using that
oIt} 1--zt, the `inventory control' price effect of a transaction is rzt.
The third extension is a random pricing error, ut, that captures other
influences on the transaction price, such as price discreteness and omitted
variables, i.e. other factors that influence the spread, but are not modelled. We
assume that ut is uncorrelated with the other variables in the price equation.
With these changes to (6.1), the pricing equation becomes
(6. ~ pt -~t - a~It f(sf a~)zt f~Qt f ut~
The informational structure of the model is not changed and the updating equations
(6.2) and (6.3) are retained. Hence, the transaction prices in the augmented model
are determined by
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(6.8) pt - yt -(rln)It f(a f RIA f ylA)zt f(yrlA)Qt f ut.
The quote mid-point is yt-(rl n)It and the quoted spread for size ~ z ~ is
S(z) - 2(y~ln f(a f~IR t rlA)~z~)
The decomposition of the half-spread into cost components is as follows:
Processing cost y~ f S~z~
Inventory control cost 7 ~ z ~
Adverse selection cost y~~` f(a f p~` t a~') ~ z ~
where ~~`-(1Rn)~, R~`-(ln~)R, and a~'-(1~~)y. From this decomposition it is clear that
there is interaction between adverse selection and the other cost components: the
presence of the other cost components strengthens the adverse selection effect.
Glosten (198~ provides an intuitive argument for this: if there are other
transaction costs besides adverse selection costs, noise traders are less likely to
trade ( compared with the situation where there are no other costs) and therefore
transactions that do take place give stronger signals about the true value of the
shares.
Similar substitutions as before yield the following regression equation:
(6.9) opt - (x}(RfY)In)zt - (pfa~)zt-1
- (a~ln)It f a~It-1 } (J~In)Qt - J~Qt-1 } Et,
where ~t~tfnut. If data on the inventory level are available, this equation can be
estimated and all structural parameters are identified.
If all trades are executed through a market maker, the size and inventory
variables are multicollinear because It-It-l-zt-1' Upon substitution of
this
identity, an equation similar to (6.5), the regression equation of MS, is obtained
(6.10) npt - (afRlntrln)zt f (R-a'')It - RIt-1 } (V~In)Qt - Y~Qt-1 f ~t.
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Compared with (6.5), the coefficient of the trade size zt has changed; it now
depends on all cost components. The coefficients of the inventory levels also have
changed; both depend on the proportional part of the processing cost, R. If r-0,
the coefficients of current and lagged inventory are equal except for their sign (p
and -R, respectively), which is what MS found empirically. Probably the hypothesis
that r-0 cannot be rejected for the MS estimates. Our wnclusion is that the
evidence of MS for the inventory effect is very weak; processing costs proportional
to trade size seem more likely to be empirically relevant.
Other evidence for the inventory control effect is at best weak. Madhavan and
Smidt (1992) and Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1992) estimate inventory control models on
samples of data from the NYSE. In particular, they test for mean reversion in the
inventory levels of specialists. Both papers are only able to find mean reversion
in the inventory levels if they allow for speculative shifts in the desired
inventory level. Moreover, the estimated reversion to the desired level is very
slow, and takes a number of days. Therefore, for analysing intra-day price effects,
inventory control is perhaps not so relevant.
Another problem with the inventory effect is that estimation of equations
(6.9) or (6.10) requires data on the inventory level of market makers. For the
Paris Bourse, such data are not directly available. We also cannot construct
inventory levels because we do not observe all transactions. For example, we do not
know who trades in London or on the inter-dealer market. Therefore, we assume that
there is no inventory effect3 (~-0). In this case, equation (6.9) takes a
par6cularly simple form:
(6.11) npt - (xtsln)zt - Rzt-1 } (~G~n)Qt - ~Qt-1 f gt.
The components of half the spread for size ~ z ~ in this model are
Processing cost y~ f p ~ z ~
Adverse selection cost ~~` i- (x f p~`) ~ z ~
In fact, this is the Glosten and Hams (1988) model, where both adverse selection
and processing cost components have a constant, size-independent part and a part
3 Alternatively, we could assume that there is no asymmetric information, so that
n-1. From the estimates it will become clear that this hypothesis is rejected by
the data.
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that varies with trade size. The components of the spread in the Glosten-Harris
model can be estimated directly by the following re-parametrisation of (6.11)
(6.12) ept -(af~~)Zt f snZt f,~~`Qt f~anQt f~t.
The permanent effects, attributed to adverse selection, are measured by the
coefficients of the level variables, whereas the transitory processing cost is
measun~ by the coefficients of the variables in first differences.
A number of econometric issues concerning the estimation of equations (6.9) to
(6.12) require special attention. Following Harris (1987) and Hasbrouck (1991b),
who argue that observed covariance patterns in transaction returns are more
consistent with transaction time than with calendar time, we assume that the
relevant `clock' is transaction time. Contrary to Hasbrouck (1993), we include a
constant term in the model to capture the average return between transactions (i.e.
a non-zero mean of et). The variance of the errors is unspecified by the model. For
several reasons, it is likely that the errors are heteroskedastic. For ezample, the
variance may depend on the time of day, and the variance may depend on the trade
size. Moreover, due to the presence of the pricing error ut, ~t has an MA(1) serial
correlation pattern. With this error structure, OIS gives consistent point
estimates, but the usual standard error formula is incorrect. We compute
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors by the
method of Newey and West (1987)4.
6.2.3 Data and empirical results.
Our data set consists of a complete record of transactions on the Paris
Bourse in a two month period in the summer of 1991. In this chapter, we use the
same data as in Chapter 5. Recall that these data concern time series of limit
order prices and transactions for ten large firms; the data are described in detail
in Section 5.3. In this chapter we analyse the dynamic effects of transactions on
the Paris Bourse only. French shares are also traded on other exchanges, especially
London's SEAQ International. It would appear natural to merge the transaction files
of both exchanges to one large data set. T'here are good arguments not to include
the London data in the analysis, however. Transactions in London are negotiated
between traders and market makers over the phone, and are often reported to other
traders with a considerable time lag or not at all. The trading process in London
4 We also estimated the model by a more efficient GLS estimator that takes account
of the MA(1) error structure. These estimates were very close to the OLS estimates.
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is hardly visible for outsiders; the only thing that is publicly observed are the
market makers' quotes, but these are often adjusted slowly and do not give a good
indication of actual transaction prices (see Section S.Tj. Therefore, we decided to
analyse only the transactions from the Paris Bourse.
In Table 6.1 the estimates of the Glosten-Harris model (6.12) are presented.
iable 6.1 Eatioatea of the Gloaten-Narris ~odel (6.12).
Apt - K f (ats~)zt f SAzt } ~~Qt } ~OQt ; ~t
K at~' ~ ~i4 ~ n S(0) S(1)
AC 0.0036 -0.0219 -0.0040 0.0302 0.0816 0.73 0.2234 0.1876
(2.53] [1.65I [0.35) [11.26] [31.22] (0.27) (0.09)
AQ 0.0046 0.0157 -0.0227 0.0208 0.0590 0.74 0.1595 0.1453
[6.60] [3.51] (3.79] [15.32I [43.19] (0.26) (0.50)
BN 0.0045 0.0196 -0.0103 0.0163 0.0653 0.80 0.1631 0.1817
[7.57] [3.52] (2.03] [14.84I [62.62] (0.20) (0.40)
CA 0.0015 0.0211 -0.0212 0.0181 0.0779 0.83 0.1919 0.1919
[1.80] [4.04] [4.54] [11.40] [46.31] (0.19) (0.41)
CS 0.0152 0.0255 0.0059 0.0425 0.1227 0.74 0.3304 0.3932
[5.45] [1.52] [0.42] [9.66] [30.19] (0.26) (0.35)
EX 0.0029 0.0079 -0.0101 0.0179 0.0496 0.74 0.1350 0.1306
[4.38] [2.13] [2.98) (13.08] [36.36] (0.27) (0.40)
OR 0.0068 0.0011 -0.0139 0.0344 0.1051 0.75 0.2790 0.2533
[5.161 [0.08] [1.19] [13.39] (41.26] (0.25) (0.28)
RI 0.0135 -0.0027 -0.0311 0.0484 0.1195 0.71 0.3358 0.2681
[4.56] [0.13] [1.59] [9.69] [23.95] (0.29) (0.34)
SE 0.0029 -0.0048 -0.0254 0.0370 0.1178 0.76 0.3097 0.2495
[1.61] (0.30] [1.85] [11.551 [33.801 (0.24) (0.26)
UAP 0.0120 -0.0083 -0.0431 0.0642 0.1672 0.74 0.4629 0.3600
(4.93] [0.60] [3.391 [13.15] [33.16] (0.28) (0.31)
Now: depeodeat veriebk ia pnceou8e ebu~e io tnnaactioo price;
model eatimued by OIS, overni8bt retuma omiaed; aize (z) ceo.wed N 2 NMS;
aempk 2~5-91 to 31~-91. Newey-Weat (198~ t-veluea io qwm bncteu.
S(0) u the spread for z-0, S(1) u apread for z-NMS with the fraetion of S attributed to advene aelection in parentheaea.
Like in Chapter 5, we excluded overnight returns and opening prices from the
estimation. The size of the transaction is censored at 2 times NMS, which
corresponds roughly to the 99.5 percentile of the size distribution, see Tables 5.1
and 5.2, so that only about 5 out of every 1000 transactions are affected. The
reason for censoring is to mitigate the effect of very large trades on the
estimates, see also Hausman, Lo and MacKinlay (1992). In the estimation, the
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dependent variable is the percentage change in transacdon prices5, so that the
parameter estimates can be interpreted as relative (percentage) price effects.
The table shows that the fixed processing cost per transaction, ~i, is always
highly significant, but varies quite a lot, from 0.0696 for Elf-Aquitaine to 0.174b
for UAP. The proportional processing cost, p, is negative in all cases but one
(Axa-Midi) where it is positive but insignificant. The highly significant estimates
of ~p~ indicate that the adverse selection cost has a fized, size-independent
component for all series. This result strongly contradicts the findings of Glosten
and Harris (1988), who report no significant fixed adverse selection costó. Only in
four cases the proportional part of adverse selection cost is significantly
positive. In the other cases the proportional adverse selection cost is not
significant. The weight of the prior mid-price in the new mid-price, n, is
estimated close to 0.75 for all series, which is slightly higher than the average
of 2l3 reported by Madhavan and Smidt (1991).
Together, the processing cost and adverse selection cost make up the bid-ask
spread. Table 6.1 also shows estimates of the bid-ask spread for a very small
transaction and a transaction at NMS, which is quite a large transaction by Paris
standards7. The estimates suggest that usually the spread is declining in trade
size, so that the declining processing cost dominates the increasing adverse
selection cost. In only two cases the spread increases with trade size. The
estimated spreads are comparable to the results obtained in Table 5.8. Table 6.1
also reports the proportion of the spread that can be attributed to adverse
selection. For the smallest size, about 2546 of the spread is due to adverse
selection. Because of the decreasing processing cost and increasing adverse
selection cost, the adverse selection component at NMS is usually much larger,
about 4096 of the spread.
6.3 Reduced form estimation of price effects of transactions.
In the structural model of the previous section, the inventory control cost is not
identified if no data on the inventory level are available. Moreover, the estimates
of the asymmetric information cost component use the ad hoc assumption that the
5 npt - 100-1n(Pt~Pt-1), `vhere Pt is the observed transaction price.
6 In their empirical work, Glosten and Harris found that only the fixed part of the
processing cost and the part of the adverse selection cost that is proportional to
J~ade size were significant.
Table 5.2 shows that 1 NMS is about the 99th percentile of the transaction size
distribution on the Bourse.
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price effect of a transaction is fully revealed in the prices after one
transaction. An alternative method to estimate the adverse selection cost is by the
expected long run price effect of a transaction. If the asymmetric information
becomes public immediately after the transaction, the initial price effect is equal
to the sum of the adverse selection effect and the inventory control effect. These
observations allow us to base estimates of the adverse selection cost and inventory
control cost components of the spread on the estimated price effects of trading.
In this section, the long run price effects aze computed under the assumption
that the transaction sign is exogenous, but possibly correlated over time. In order
to estimate the spread and the initial price effect of a transaction we use the
model of Stoll (1989) and George et al. (1991), which was also used in Section 5.7.
The pricing equation of the model is
(6.13) pt - yt f(Sl2)Qt f ut.
The transaction size is not included in the pricing equation; we could think of S
as the spread for a transaction of average size8. The mid-quote yt now includes the
price discount due to inventory holdings.
If there is asymmetric information or inventory control, the market maker
will revise his mid-quotes after a transaction. Let s be the fraction of the spread
by which the mid-quote initially is revised
(6.14) mt - yt f sS . Qt.
Between two trades public information on the stocks value may come in and therefore
the mid-quote prior to the subsequent trade is a revision of the current mid-quote
(6.15) ytf 1- mt f etf 1'
The processing cost wmponent of the spread can be estimated directly by a
regression model. Combining (6.13)-(6.15), the transaction price changes can be
expressed as
8 Suppose the true pricing equation were pt-yttaQttbzt. This equation can be
written as pt - yt f(a~-bE ~ z ~)Qt t b(ztE ~ z ~ Qt) - yt f(Sl2)Qt f ut, where ut is by
construction uncorrelated with Qt.
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(6.16) npt - ~'Qt } ~oQt } ~t,
where ~'-aS, tb-(1-2a)(Sl2) and ~t-etfnut. This form gives direct estimates of the
processing cost, V~, and the initial price effect, ~i', of a transaction of average
size. An estimate of a is easily found as a function of ~ and tb'.
So far, the model is a simplified version of the Madhavan and Smidt model9.
New in this section is that we split up the initial price effect aS into components
due to asymmetric information and inventory control by using the long run price
effect as a measure of the adverse selection cost. Following Hasbrouck (1988) and
Stoll (1989), we compute the long run price effect under the assumption that the
process generating the transaction sign is exogenous to the price process.
There is some debate in the theoretical li[erature about the effect of trading
on future transaction signs. In the presence of inventory control, there is an
expected reversal of the sign of the transaction, i.e. after a buy we expect that
the probability of the subsequent transaction being a sale increases. This effect
is caused by efforts of the market maker to rebalance his inventory to the desired
level. 7'he effect of asymmetric information on the bid-ask bounce is less clear,
however. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) merely assume that there is no serial
correlation in the sign, but give no explicit reason for that. Stoll (1989) and
Madhavan and Smidt (1991) assume that all private information is revealed to the
public immediately after the transaction, and that therefore there is no effect on
future trades, except for the shift in expected value. In other models, e.g. Kyle
(1985) and Easley and O'Hara (198~, it takes longer for all private information to
become public. In such a case the informed traders will keep trading on the same
side of the market for a while in order to maximise the profits from having
superior information. If so, the trade sign shows positive serial correlation. 1'his
is completely the opposite of the reversal of sign predicted by inventory control
models.
Stoll (1989) assumes that there is a fixed probability (denoted by n) of a
trade reversal, i.e. the probability that the next transaction is of opposite sign.
In our opinion, an important shortcoming of Stoll's analysis is his definition of
the inventory control component. Stoll's definition takes only takes the price
effect one period ahead into account, where a definition that takes account of the
complete future of trading seems more appropriate, because it usually takes more
than one transaction to rebalance the market maker's inventory. Instead, we adopt
9 With ~-r-R-O, yr-(1-2s)(Sl2), y~~`-aS, S-2(~f~,~) and R-1-2a.
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the approach of Hasbrouck (1988) by allowing for a more general serial correlation
pattern in the trade sign Qt.
As explained in the introduction, the adverse selection price effect can be
measured by the long run price effect of a transaction. The initial price effect is
a mixture of both inventory control and adverse selection effects. We use the
following measure of the effect of a transaction on the mid-quotes after T trades:
(6.1Tj dPT(~ - F(YtfTryt~Qt-v - ~tfTyt).
In words, dpT is the expected mid-quote change after T transactions, given the sign
of the current transaction, minus the unconditionally expected mid-quote change. To
compute dpT(q) in the model, rewrite (6.ITj as follows:
(6.18) dPT(v - E(ET-ioytfi~Qt-q, - E(~T~ioyt~-i,
Substituting nyt} 1-aS. Qtfet} 1(derived from (6.14) and (6.15)) in (6.18) yields
(6.19) dP-r(~ - sS Er-u (E(Qtfk~Qt-~ - ~Qtfk),'
where we assumed that the price changes between future transactions do not depend
on the sign Qt, Et(etfi~Qt)-Et(etfi), so that the terms including et}i cancel. In
the analysis, transactions at the bid and at the ask are treated symmetrica11y10,
Therefore, our summary measure of the price effects of trading is
(6.20) dpT - EIQtdP,.(Qt)] - aSE~Lóa~Q
where rQ denotes the autocorrelation of order k of Qt.
The long run price effect, which measures the asymmetric information effect,
is lim,~dpT-~:o7Q. Hence, the components of the spread are
10 Several authors, e.g. Holthausen et al. (1990), Keim and Madhavan (1992) and Chan
and Lakonishok (1993), report that the price response to buyer and seller initiated
transactions on the US stock market is asymmetric. We assume symmetry here to
facilitate comparison of the results with the results of parametric models, where
the asymmetry is not easily included.
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Processing cost 1-2a
Adverse selection cost 2a.~ioyQ
Inventory control cost 2a-(1-~~07~
The inventory control component is positive if and only if there is reversal of the
sign: after a buy the cumulative number of expected sells must be lazger than the
cumulative number of expected buys ~3oyQC 1, or ~~IrQCO).
The estimates of equation (6.16) are reported in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 Co~ponents of the bid-ask epread with ezogenoue trading.
model: Apt - K t~r'Qt t t~AQt }~t
t~' ~ S y PC AI IC
AC 0.0272 0.0822 0.2189 0.2527 0.75 0.56 -0.31
(13.71] [37.57]
AQ 0.0237 0.0549 0.1572 0.2275 0.70 0.60 -0.30
(22.821 (47.111
BN 0.0183 0.0642 0.1649 0.1518 0.78 0.34 -0.11
[19.91] (68.52]
CA 0.0211 0.0740 0.1923 0.3303 0.77 0.74 -0.51
[18.54] [50.88]
CS 0.0465 0.1233 0.3397 0.1878 0.73 0.44 -0.16
[13.341 [35.09]
EX 0.0198 0.0474 0.1345 0.2215 0.71 0.61 -0.31
[19.83] [41.34]
OR 0.0345 0.1038 0.2766 0.1812 0.75 0.41 -0.16
[17.011 [46.51]
RI 0.0478 0.1159 0.3275 0.1931 0.71 0.40 -0.10
[11.91] [26.691
SE 0.0364 0.1146 0.3020 0.2568 0.76 0.40 -0.16
[13.93] [37.72]
UAP 0.0622 0.1519 0.4427 0.2348 0.72 0.53 -0.25
[17.11] [37.091
Now: ~a dp Tabk 6.t; Sa7.(I~Pt~ i~ Ibe etim~tad rven~a bid-uk q~ead.
7 u ónt order ~ubconelatioo of rijo. Sum of ~uto-cwati~ncw of ásn tnmcated ~t K~20.
Componeoh of tbe qrcad: I~C: proceaing cod; AS: dvene reketim ceat: IC: inveotory cootrol cow.
As before, the dependent variable is the percentage transaction price change. The
estimated spread and initial price effects for a transaction of average size are
similaz to those estimated by the Glosten-Harris model in Table 6.1. The numerical
breakdown of the components of the spread yields very counter-intuitive results.
Because the sum of the autocorrelations ~ 7k is always positive, we obtaint-t Q
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negative estimates of the inventory control component. This is illustrated in
Figure 6.1, where the autocorrelations of the trade sign for the Accor series are
graphed. The most striking result is the very strong positive serial correlation at
low lags, which is in sharp contradiction with the assumptions of Stoll (1989) that
the sign immediately reverses. Even in the long run there seems to be no reversal,
ail covariances are positive, which casts doubt on the existence of an inventory
control effect for this series. The pattern for the other series is very similar.
Hasbrouck (1988) reports similar results for NYSE stocks.
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Summarising, the results cast doubt both on the existence of an inventory control
effect and on the assumption that information carried by trades is immediately
disseminated to the market after a transaction. We refrain from possible
explanations of this result until the concluding section.
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6.4 A simultaneous modet for prices and transactioas.
In this secdon, we develop measures for the price effects of a transaction that do
not need the assumption that the trading process is exogenous.
6.4.1 Nonparametric measures of price e„~ects.
In the previous section we already defined a measure (dpT) for the price
effects of trading. It is easy to prove that dpT is equal to the covariance between
yt-~Tyt and Qt'
(6.21) dPT - E[dPT(Qt)Qt~
- E~~tfTyt~Qt-c~Qt - E(Yt~-~yt)Qt~
- E((Yt f~yt)Qt, -~YtfTyt)E(Qt)
- Cov(ytf~yt'Qt)'
This definition of the price effects of trading needs no assumptions on the joint
dynamic process of price changes and sign (except covariance stationarity).
It is difficult, however, to extend this non-parametric measure to more
explanatory variables. For example, the transaction size, which we found in Section
6.2 to be an important determinant of the bid-ask spread, is a continuous variable.
Non-parametric measures conditional on size can only be computed if we categorise
the data or use kernel-type estimators. Another problem is that the price effect
probably also depends on the past (lagged values of price, sign and size), which
requires high dimensional non-parametric measures, which are much harder to
compute. In this section, a parametric simultaneous dynamic model of price changes
and transaction characteristics, based on the work of Hasbrouck (1991a,b), is used
to analyse the price effects of trading conditional on five lags of returns, sign
and size.
6.4.2 Framework for dynamic analysis of prices.
To analyse the dynamic effects of processing costs, inventory control and
asymmetric information, consider the following decomposition of the stock price,
due to Hasbrouck (1993):
Intra-day price effects 127
(6.22) pt - ~t f st.
The fust part, ~t, is the semi-strong form `efficient price' of the stock, i.e. ~t
is the best guess of the stocks value given all publicly available information. The
second part, st, is a disturbance term that measures the deviation of the
transaction prices from the efficient price. These deviations aze assumed to be
transitory, hence st is (weak-sense) stationary, so that in the absence of new
shocks the transaction prices eventually converge to the efficient price, ~t.
Clearly, in the presence of asymmetric information trading affects ~t. Because of
their transitory nature, the processing cost and inventory control effect belong to
the stationary part, st.
The price, being the sum of a non-stationary and a stationary term, is itself
non-stationary. The empirical model is therefore specified on the first differences
of prices (returns, rt-npt). The returns can be split up in the uncorrelated
efficient price change (wt-n~t) and an overdifferenced part:
(6.23) rt - wt ~- nst.
In general, wt is uniquely identified, but different identifying assumptions for st
aze possible, see Hasbrouck ( 1993). We use a vector auto regressive (VAR) model to
identify wt and st, which corresponds to the Beveridge and Nelson (1981)
identification.
6.4.3 A parametric model of price effects.
The building blocks of the VAR model are dynamic equations for returns and
trade attributes, such as sign and size. Returns are regressed on their own past
and current and lagged values of a vector of trade attributes, xt:
(6.24) rt - a(1-)rt-1 f b~zt f b(I..)xt-1 } elt'
where a(L) and b(L) aze conformable vectors of lag polynomials. The coefficient
vector b~ measures the instantaneous price effect of a transaction. The trade
attributes xt are modelled by an autoregressive model with possible feedback from
previous returns
(6.25) xt - c(I-)rt-1 } d~)xt-1 } e2t'
128 Chapter 6
Because xt is included in the equation for rt, we impose the identification
restriction that the innovations elt and e2t are uncorrelated. Together, (6.24) and
(6.25) constitute a bivariate Vector Auto Regression (VAR):
(6.26) (o ~ol (x~ - (~~, d~,~ (xt-~~ } (~J ~ ~(~~ - (02 ~~ .
This model allows a very general dependence of price changes and trade sign (and
size) on the past, without the restriction that xt is exogenous.
The effects of shocks on future returns and other variables are more easily
found by inverting the VAR to a Vector Moving Average (VMA) representationll;
(6.2~
(xU - (c~~) d~~)J (e2t1
The coefficients of the lag polynomials in (6.2~ are the effects of past shocks to
the current return and trade attributes. For example, bi is the effect of e2,t-T on
rt. The effects of a shock on the price level can be obtained by taláng partial
sums of the coefficients of the lag polynomials a~`(L) or b~`(L). The long run
effects of shocks can be computed by the following decomposition of the VMA, in
obvious notation
(6.281 (rtl - (a~~l~ a~~l~l (eltl f (1-L)B'(I-~t.x c e2
The efficient price change is thus equal to the long run component of rt,
(6.29) wt - a'(1)elt f b'(1)e2t'
The sums of the VMA coefficients, a'(1) and b~(1), measure the long run effect of
shocks to the system on prices. Assuming that the system is in equilibrium
initially, b~`(1) measures the long run price effect of an unexpected shock to the
trading process. Thus, the elements of b'(1) provide an alternative to the non-
parametric measures of the adverse selection cost.
11 ~s transformation is described e.g. in Judge et al. (1982, p.65~.
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6.4.4 The variance of long and short run price e„Q`'ects.
Equation (6.29) shows that there are two sources of changes in the efficient
price: shocks to the return equation and shocks to the trade attributes. The former
are due to publicly available information that is unrelated to trades, whereas the
latter reflect information that is revealed by the trading process. Hasbrouck
(1991b) proposes to use the proportion of the variance in the efficient price
changes that is due to trading as summary statistic for the informativeness of
trades. The variance of wt is, because el and e2 are uncorrelated
(6.30) ~w - a~`(1)ZO~2 t b'(1)nb~`(1)'.
The fraction of the variance of wt that is explained by the attributes of a
transaction thus is
(6.31) RZ - ~,Z I~,2, ~Z ~ b~(1)nb~(1)' .
w,x a,x w w,z
The remainder of the variance can be attributed to public information that is
unrelated to the trading process.
The transitory deviation of the transaction price from the efficient prices
in this model is st-p(L)et, where p(L) is the first row of B~`(L) in (6.28).
Hasbrouck (1993) proposes to use o~s, the standard deviation of the stationary part
of the returns st, as a summary measure the quality of a security market;
intuitively, cs reflects how close the transaction price tracks the efficient price
on average. This `dynamic' measure of transaction costs can be seen as a
generalisation of Roll's (1984) estimator. Under Roll's special assumptions, o~s is
equal to half the bid-ask spread (cf. Section 5.~). The Appendix provides details
on the computation of o~s.
6.5 Frnpirical results witó the simultaueous model.
In this section we report the empirical results of using the simultaneous model of
Section 6.4 to estimate the dynamic price effects of trading on the Paris Bourse.
Initially, we estimate the price effect of trading by the conditionally expected
mid-quote changes given the sign of the transaction only, so that the results can
be compared with the results of Section 6.3. Using mid-quotes instead of
transaction prices has the advantage that the short run effect is not affected by
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the processing cost component of the spread, but it relies on the assumption that
the mid-point of quotes12 is a good approzimation of the theoretical mid-price yt.
6.S.1 Nonparametric estimates of price e,jjects.
Figure 6.2 gives an ezample of the pattern of mid-quote adjustment for
intervals between 1 and 100 transactions after the trade, using the non-parametric
measure dpT; the estimates are based on data of the Accor series. The most striláng
result of this figure is that the initial price effect is much lower than the
medium and long run price effect. Even after 100 transactions, there is no price
reversal visible. This picture is typical for all series in the sample.






6.S.2 Fstimates of the VAR on mid-quote changes and transaction sign.
To facilitate comparison of the results of the VAR model with the non-
parametric estimates, we define he returns as the change in the logarithm of the
mid-point of the quotes: rt-ytf 1-yt' ~e VAR is estimated by OLS13, but because of
12 The mid-point of the quotes is defined as the average of the best limit buy and
~11 orders just before the time of the transaction.
Including the sign of the transaction in a simultaneous dynamic model creates
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possible heteroskedasticity the standard errors are computed by the method of Newey
and West (1987). Overnight returns and opening trades are excluded from the
analysis. Following Hasbrouck (1991a), 5 lags of all variables were used as
explanatory variables, which seems sufficient given the general absence of residual
serial correlation in the estimated equations. Table 6.3 shows an example of an
estimated VAR on mid-quote returns and trade sign for the Accor series.
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Model eetimued by OLS, full e~mple; Newey-Wea wodard erron in bnckw.
some problems for estimation and computing dynamic effects, because Qt is a limited
dependent variable that can only take the values -1 and f 1. The estimation problem
is that (6.23) cannot be a conditional expectation of Qt for all values of rt i e~t
if the coefficients of rt i are non-zero. However, for moderate values of rt-i the
linear equation may be a good approximation of the true conditional expectation,
and the bias in OLS estimates is probably not too serious. Using Qt as an
explanatory variable in the equation for rt causes no problems, because the errors
of the return equation and the other equations of the VAR are uncorrelated, see
Heckman (1978).
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The initial effect of a trade on the return can be read immediately from the
estimated ccefficient of Qt. For the Accor series, the initial effect is 0.0294b of
the price, which is almost equal to the 0.02796 estimated from the Glosten-Milgrom
model (see Table 6.1). There is a strong positive dependence of Q on lagged tradet
sign, which is of course related to the observed positive serial correlation in the
Qt series. The general pattern of sign and magnitude of the estimated VAR
coefficients is remarkably similar to the estimates reported by Hasbrouck (1991a,b)
for NYSE data.
Figure 6.3 graphs the effects of shocks in the sign on the quote midpoints,
obtained by taking partial sums of the VMA coefficients of the returns. The long
run effect of a shock in the sign on the price level is estimated at 0.057296, more
than twice the initial effect. The graphs for the other series are very similar to
the graph for Accor.
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6.5.3 Summary of simultaneous analysis of mid-quote changes and sign.
Table 6.4 reports the non-parametric and VAR based estimates of the price
effects of a shock to the trade sign for all series under consideration.
Table 6.4 Mid-quote effects of shocks to sign
dp~ dp~~ VARi VARm
AC .0294 .1674 .0291 .0576
AQ .0242 .0707 .0241 .0523
BN .0181 .0378 .0189 .0284
CA .0239 .0748 .0239 .0450
CS .0427 .0836 .0445 .0833
EX .0168 .0436 .0166 .0317
OR .0363 .1254 .0374 .0653
RI .0452 .2437 .0479 .0768
SE .0436 .1381 .0446 .0835
UAP .0492 .2287 .0492 .1046
Noas: 7be table ~bow~ the percenage price effau of a tnaaactim by tbe o0o-
panmetric meaarc in (6.21) and Ihe VAR model (6.26) eaimaled on mid~ude
reWrne and the lnnascuon sign.
VAR a~ VAR arc ihe VAR-baaed initid and loog nw price effacb eMimatea.
1 co
The results confirm the intuition obtained from Figure 6.1. The initial effect is
very small, about 0.024b to 0.054b of the price level. Compare this with the
estimated bid-ask spread of 0.15~ to 0.359b from Table 6.2. The non-pardmetric and
the VAR-based estimates of the initial price effects are very close, but the non-
parametric estimate of the long run effect is usually much larger than the VAR-
based estimate. The non-parametric approximation dp~~ (the price effect after 100
transactions) ranges from 0.043b to 0.24b, which is much larger than the short run
effect. Also the VAR based estimates of the long run price effects are bigger than
the short run effec[s, although smaller than the non-parametric estimates. This
confirms the conclusion of the previous section: due to the strong positive serial
correlation in the trade sign, the price effects of trading increases over time.
A possible explanation for the difference between non-parametric and VAR
based long run price effects is that the VAR estimates are essentially based only
on short run covariances between retums and trade attributes. The long run effects
in the VAR are computed by extrapolation of the short run dynamics. Campbell and
Deaton (1992) demonstrate that small differences in the dynamic specification of a
model, which do not change the short run analysis very much, can have a profound
influence on the estimates of long run effects.
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6.5.4 Simultaneous anulysis of mid-quotes, sign and size.
We now extend the VAR model with the transaction size. Five lags of zt are
included as explanatory variables in each equation. For reasons of space, the full
estimation results of the trivariate VAR are not reported here, but some specific
coefficient estimates deserve some attention. For all series, the current trade
size is significant in the esluation for the returns, which is not too surprising
given that we already know from Section 6.2 that the spread depends on trade size.
The sign of the trade shows a very strong positive dependence on lagged trade size.
Also in the transaction size there is positive serial correlation, which is in line
with the positive serial correlation found in the sign.
The impulse responses to shocks in sign and size follow broadly the same
pattern. Typically, both the initial and long run price effect of a transaction of
the Normal Market Size is twice the effect of a very small transaction. For both
types of shocks, the long run effect is larger than the short run effect. This
result is illustrated by Figure 6.4, where the impulse responses of a shock in the
sign and a simultaneous shock in sign and size are graphed for the Accor series.
These can be interpreted as the dynamic price effects of a very small trade and a
trade of the Normal Market Size.
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The short run and long run price effects of a shock in sign and size,
computed from the estimated VAR, are summarised in Table 6.5.
Ta61e 6.5 Mid-quote effects of shocks to sign and size
short run long run
Qt Zt Qt Zt
AC .0262.0194 .0511 .0422
AQ .0207.0175 .0459.0340
BN .0162 .0279 .0235 .0551
CA .0210.0159 .0785.0310
CS .0371 .0488 .0685 .0963
EX .0147 .0082 .0274 .0149
OR .0357.0158 .0564.0813
RI .0445 .0258 .0719 .0371
S1r .0421 .0224 .0794.0372
UAP .0459 .0192 .0964 .0430
Notes: The table ~bowe ihe percenuge ptice effecb of ~[nneeclioo by the VAR
model (6.29) eetima~ed on iransection price changes, sign and aiu. Tbe fi`ri two
colunuu ohow the initial price effect of ~ very eoull irane~ction ud s iraneactioo
of unit eize (NMS), roepectively. The eecood pair of coluvw ~hows the
corresponding long nin price effecls.
Because the long run effect of a large transaction is larger than the long run
effect of a small transaction, we confirm the results of Section 6.2 that the
adverse selection cost is positively related to trade size.
6.5.5 Simultaneous analysis of transaction prices, sign and size.
The next step in the analysis is to estimate a VAR on transaction prices
rather than mid-quotes, where the returns are now defined as rt-ptpt-1' Table 6.6
summarises the most important characteristics of the estimated VAR on transaction
prices, sign and size for all ten series. Table 6.6 reports the estimated short run
and long run price effects of a transaction.
Note that the initial price effect now estimates all cost components,
including the processing cost, which did not appear in the analysis of the mid-
quotes. The realised bid-ask spread is estimated as twice the initial price effect.
The estimated spreads are very similar to the estimates obtained from the Glosten-
Milgrom model in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.6 Su~ary results of VAR on transaction pricee.
Qt zt S(0) S(1) o'S o'w
RM,x
AC 0.1054 0.0146 0.2110 0.2403 0.1038 0.0815 0.40
{0.0517} {0.0315} (0.49) (0.69)
AQ 0.0843 -0.0051 0.1686 0.1584 0.0823 0.0682 0.45
{0.0444} {0.0289) (0.52) (0.92)
BN 0.0831 0.0148 0.1663 0.1960 0.0780 0.0483 0.34
{0.0233) {0.0551} (0.28) (0.80)
CA 0.0915 -0.0001 0.1830 0.1817 0.0931 0.0700 0.28
{0.0341} {0.0312} (0.37) (0.72)
CS 0.1620 0.0301 0.3241 0.3843 0.1662 0.1214 0.35
{0.0643) {0.0885} (0.40) (0.79)
EX 0.0612 0.0020 0.1225 0.1265 0.0620 0.0473 0.38
{0.0271} {0.0196) (0.44) (0.74)
OR 0.1435 -0.0001 0.2869 0.2853 0.1371 0.1013 0.36
{0.0559} {0.0799} (0.39) (0.95)
RI 0.1548 -0.0083 0.3097 0.2830 0.1519 0.1118 0.34
{0.0710} {0.0118} (0.46) (0.56)
SE 0.1627 -0.0360 0.3255 0.2535 0.1514 0.1141 0.36
{0.0750) {0.0122) (0.46) (0.69)
UAP 0.2071 -0.0401 0.4142 0.3324 0.1827 0.1398 0.49
{0.1074} ( 0.0080) (0.52) (0.69)
NoW: 7Le firw two oolumw yive the le~diup coe[ficieoU of riyn and ~iu in the rewm eqwtion.
7be wnu of the VMA caefficieala of riyn ~od ~ize oo rowm (.e. lony n~n price effecU) ~re
reported below the lead'wg coefficieob in {}.
The ~econd pair of oolumoe give the eeti'wted bid-ut ~presd u~ize 0 ud 1 NMS, wilh the
eetimated fnction due W~dvene selection in Q below it.
7be fiM columo repoN Ihe qand~rd devistion of the wtioosry p~rt of Ihe tnnyction prica.
7he ehndard deviutioa of the efficient price changee is rcponed in the eixth colurtw. The laet
columne 'howa the proportioo of lhe verience of the efficien[ price change~ due to Ihe tnding
proceu.
The estimates of the long run effects of a trade are similar to the results
obtained by the VAR on quote midpoints, only the estimated long run effect of a
shock in the trade size is somewhat lower for several firms. This is comforting,
because under our assumptions the difference between transaction prices and quote
midpoints belongs to the stationary part st. Hence, the long run effect of a trade
should not be affected by the different defmitions of rt. The long run effect of
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small transactions is about half of the initial effect, and for NMS the long run
effect is often more than 804b of the initial effect. These estimates of the adverse
selection cost component are much larger than the estimate obtained from the
Glosten-Milgrom model, which assumes that all private information is reflected in
the prices immediately after the trade. We already noticed before that this is not
the case: the price effect of trading lasts for many more periods.
The esdmated standard deviation of the transitory stock price component is
nearly equal to half the estimated bid-ask spread. This result is not easily
interpreted; if there were no asymmetric information or inventory control this is
what you expect. With the large asymmetric informa6on component that we find, ~s
reflects both processing cost and other deviations from ihe efficient price. There
are temporary deviations from the efficient price after trading because it takes
some time for the prices to converge to their new equilibrium values. Apparently,
the sum of processing costs and temporary deviations from the efficient price is on
average about equal to half the bid-ask spread. In short, the `dynamic' measure
(o~s) proposed by Hasbrouck (1993) yields transaction cost estimates that are not
very different from the usual `static' measure, the realised bid-ask spread.
The final columns of Table 6.6 report the standard deviation of the efficient
price changes and the proportion explained by the trading process, RW X. In line
with the results in Hasbrouck (1991b), we find that between 30~ and 40Rb of the
variance of wt is explained by trading; the remainder is attributable to public
information that is unrelated to the trading process. This R2 has to be interpreted
with some caution. Recall that the regression error e2t includes the linearisation
error of the discrete sign Qt, and is therefore a combination of innovations in the
trade process and measurement errors. Hence, the variance of e2t is larger than the
variance of information revealed by trading. Another word of caution is needed if
prices can be quoted only at discrete ticks, or when it is costly to changes quotes
or limit orders. In these cases, quoted prices will sometimes deviate from the
value predicted by the theory, and only be adjusted after a transaction. If so, the
variance of price changes attributed to trades is not completely due to asymmetric
information.
6.6 Conclusioas.
In this chapter we analysed the intra-day price effects of trading at the Paris
Bourse. Special attention was paid to estimating components of the bid-ask spread:
processing cost, inventory control cost and adverse selection cost due to
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asymmetric information. The components were estimated by structural models and by
estimates of transitory and permanent price effects of transactions.
We extended the structural model of Madhavan and Smidt (1991) to allow for
dependence of inventory control cost and processing cost on the transaction size.
It appeared that the inventory control cost cannot be identified if there are no
data on the inventory level of market makers available. T'herefore, we estimated a
simplified model with only processing cost and adverse selection cost. T'he
estimates show that processing cost decreases with transaction size, which explains
the finding in Chapter 5 that the bid-ask spread is sometimes decreasing with trade
size. In line with theoretical predictions, the adverse selection cost increases
with size and accounts for 25~ to 404b of the quoted bid-ask spread for average
transactions.
The dynamíc price effects of trading are analysed both non-parametrically and
with a simultaneous model for prices and transaction chazacteristics such as sign
and size. T'he main result of the dynamic analysis is that the long run price effect
of trading is lazger than the short run price effect, caused by a strong positive
serial correlation in the transaction sign and size. The results sharply contradict
the hypothesis that asymmetric information is revealed immediately after a
transaction; slow dissemination of information seems more likely. The results are
very similaz to the findings of Hasbrouck (1991a,b) for NYSE stocks, but contradict
those of Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990), who found that the speed of
adjustment to the new equilibrium value after block trades on the NYSE was very
fast (less than 3 trades). However, Holthausen et al. analysed the lazgest
transactions in their sample, whereas we censor these transactions. Keim and
Madhavan (1992) also present evidence of slow adjustment of prices to new
information, although their results are not directly comparable to ours because
they analyse only lazge transactions.
An explanation of the slow price adjustment could be the presence of `lame
duck' limit orders. Many transactions on the Bourse involve one or more limit
orders. If prices of limit orders adjust only slowly to new information, probably
because of costly monitoring and changing of existing orders, there will from time
to time be orders which are either too cheap or too expensive. If so, a number of
trades will take place on the same side of the market, causing positive serial
correlation in transaction sign and increasing price effects. Berkman (1992)
reports similar findings for the European Options Exchange in Amsterdam, which also
operates with a public limit order book.
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We don't find any evidence for an inventory control effect. At the most
general level, inventory control theory predicts a reversal of trade sign and
prices, but the empirical results do not show such a pattern at all. The adverse
selection cost component is identified by the long run price effects of a
transaction. The esdmates based on a VAR model for transaction prices suggests
that the bid-ask spread can be attributed to adverse selection cost for 503b (for
small transactions) up to 809b (for large transactions). These numbers are larger
than the estimates obtained from the strucural models, and indeed than many of the
numbers reported in the literature (e.g. Stoll (1989)). The reason for this
difference is precisely the slow adjustment of prices to new information. If prices
adjust slowly, the usual estimators, which are based on the initial and short run
effect of a transaction, understate the adverse selection component of the spread.
Appendix. T6e variance of tóe stationary part of prices.
The variance of the stationary part of the transaction price, st, can be derived as
follows. Let B(L)-~-ó kLk be the lag polynomial of the VMA (6.28), and let
B~`(L)-(1-L) 1(B(L~B(1)). The coefficients of B~`(L) can be derived as follows.
First, note that
B~)-B(1) - ~-ókLk - ~-ók - ~-ók~k-1)
- -~-ók(1-L)(1fLf fLk-1).
Dividing both sides by (1-L) and rearranging coefficients one obtains
k
B~(L) - ~-ó kL , bk - -~-kbi.
The stationary part of the price is equal to the first element of B~`(L)et.
Therefore, the variance of st is equal to the upper-left element of
~2 0
Var(B~`(L)et) - ~-ók 0 ~ bk'
All these quantities are readily compu[ed once the lag polynomial of the VAR has
been inverted to the polynomial B(L) of the infinite MA representation.
Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusions
In this thesis we analysed some aspects of European financial markets. The first
part analysed the impact of the European Monetary System on monetary policy in the
EC countries and the behaviour of exchange rates in the EMS target zone. The second
part compared the cost of trading French shares on the domestic exchange and the
international exchange in London. In this chapter, we briefly summarise the main
results of the research and draw some conclusions.
Chapter 2 dealt with the public finance consequences of the EMS membership. In
financing public expenditure, the government faces a tradeoff between taxation and
seigniorage revenues, i.e. an inflation tax on nominal money holdings. The limited
exchange rate flexibility restricts the scope for inflationary policies. Therefore,
inflation becomes more costly than without EMS membership. On the other hand,
joining a fixed exchange rate regime may increase the credibility of monetary
policy because it increases the cost of high inflation. In Chapter 2 it is
demonstrated that countries with high costs of tax collection or a high budget
deficit may benefit from entering the EMS and hence pegging their currencies to the
Deutschemark. If governments follow optimal taxation and seigniorage policies, the
model with EMS anchor predicts that tax rates, domestic and foreign inflation are
cointegrated. The empirical support for this hypothesis is weak. The model is also
tested against a more conventional `stagflation' model of inflation, and is clearly
rejected.
Chapters 3 and 4 analysed EMS exchange rates by target zone models of exchange rate
determination. Chapter 3 tested the continuous time Krugman target zone model on
EMS data. The basic assumptions of this model are that the target zone is fully
credible, defended by marginal interventions only, and that the underlying
stochastic process that generates the exchange rate is a Brownian motion. The model
is rejected by the data on several points: mean reversion, fat-tailed distributions
and conditional heteroskedasticity. The discrete time model of Chapter 4 models
these properties explicitly. The empirical results support the discrete time model
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with a mean-reverting fundamental. This suggests that intra-marginal interventions
aze an important instrument to stabilise exchange rates in the EMS.
The apparent success of the discrete time specification should not be
interpreted as a rejection of continuous time models. T'here is no a priori economic
reason why a discrete time model should be preferred over a continuous time model.
The main advantage of discrete time is technical: the discrete time model is easier
to solve than the continuous time models for more general stochastic
specifications. Another advantage is that standazd econometric methods can be used
to estimate the discrete time model, whereas simulation techniques or complex
likelihood methods are required to estimate continuous time models.
The main deficiency of the models of Chapter 3 and 4 is the assumption that
the tazget zone is fully credible. This hypothesis has strong implications for
interest rate differentials. Using the discrete time model to compute expected
depreciations within the band, we demonstrate that observed interest rate
differentials contain a substantial premium for devaluation risk. The hypothesis
that the band is fully credible is clearly rejected for most currencies, even in
the most stable period of the EMS (January 1987-September 1992). This point is
strongly confirmed by the turmoil in September 1992 and the virtual collapse of the
EMS in August 1993. If tazget zone models are to say anything about a revived EMS
or other systems of managed exchange rates, proper modelling of realignment risk
seems essential. The discrete time model of Chapter 4 seems a promising starting
point for modelling realignments.
Chapter 5 compared the transaction costs on the Paris Bourse and SEAQ International
in London. For immediate trades the transaction costs in Paris are small for small
transactions, but the costs rise steeply for lazger transactions. Often the public
limit order book does not provide enough liquidity for even moderately lazge
transactions. The quoted bid-ask spread on the London market is higher than the
transaction cost in Paris for small trades. On the other hand, the London mazket is
much deeper: the combined market makers are able to absorb large transactions. An
ex-post comparison of the realised spread in Paris and London shows a different
picture. The estimated realised spread in Paris is smaller than the estimated
realised spread in London for all transaction sizes. One of the causes is that
lazge transacdons in Paris are often "crosses" which are negotiated outside the
exchange, at a price that is usually within the "fourchette". Another explanation
might be that trading in Paris only takes place when the limit order book is
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relatively deep. Even if we take explici[ transaction costs into account, the
realised transaction cost in Paris are slighdy lower than the cost in London.
The conclusion, therefore, is that the Paris market is nearly always cheaper
for small orders, and also for large orders if one is prepared to wait for a
counterparty. For an urgent, lazge transaction the London market is more suited. A
point which we did not address in the chapter is that traders might prefer London
over Paris because there is no obligation on SEAQ to report transactions to other
parties on the mazket, whereas in Paris all information concerning transactions
immediately appeazs on the public trading screen. Especially traders of lazge
blocks might be afraid that in Paris their order might move the market too much,
and prefer to negotiate with market makers in London.
Chapter 6 assesses the price effects of stock transactions on the Paris
Bourse. The results show that prices are significantly affected by trading: a buyer
initiated transaction pushes subsequent transaction prices upwards, and a seiler
initiated transaction pushes prices downwazds. 1'his effect is caused by new
information about the value of the shares that is revealed by trading. The
estimates show that the new information is not immediately revealed in prices:
price adjustment takes place slowly. A possible explanation for this effect is the
presence of `lame duck' limit orders with too high or too low prices that are not
quickly adjusted or withdrawn as soon as new information comes in. An economic
rationale for the existence of such orders might be that monitoring or price
adjustment is costly.
The analysis can be extended in several directions. We only analysed the
majority of small and medium-sized transactions. It would be interesting to
estimate the effects of very large transactions. One problem with this is that
transaction prices in London, where most lazge blocks aze traded, are not revealed
to the public. Another possible extension is to differentiate between buyer- and
seller-initiated transactions.
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Samenvatting
Dit prcefschrift bestaat uit twee delen. Het eerste deel heeft als onderzceksobject
het Europese Monetaire Stelsel (EMS) en het tweede deel de microstructuur van
aandelenmarkten, met name de markt in Franse aandelen. Hoofdstuk 1 geeft een
inleiding tot beide onderwerpen.
De belangrijkste factor in het monetaire beleid van de laatste 15 jaar in Europa is
het EMS, een stelsel van vaste, maar aanpasbare wisselkcersen tussen de valuta van
de belangrijkste landen in de EEG. In het EMS kunnen de wisselkcersen beperkt
fluctueren in een band rond de spilkcers. Om de wisselkcers van hun munt binnen de
gegeven bandbreedtes te houden intervenieren de centrale banken in tijden van
spanning in de valutamarkt door middel van de aan- en verkoop van grote partijen
buitenlandse valuta. Aanpassingen van de spilkcers kan alleen plaatsvinden met
toestemming van de andere deelnemers aan het EMS.
Hoofdstuk 2 beschouwt de gevolgen van deelname aan het EMS voor de inkomsten
van de overheid uit geldschepping, hetgeen voor met name zuid-Europese landen
traditioneel een belangrijke bron van inkomsten is. Deelname aan het EMS dwingt
landen tot stabilisatie van hun wisselkcers en dus tot lagere inflatie en een
krapper geldbeleid. Om toch de overheidsuitgaven te financieren zullen andere
belastingen, zeker op lange termijn, omhoog mceten. Als het innen van belastingen
kostbaar is, lijkt dit een ongunstig effect van tcetreding tot het EMS. Anderzijds
kan het EMS juist ook gebruikt worden om een geloofwaardig anti-inflatiebeleid van
de grond te krijgen. Voor landen met een grote staatsschuld of een inefficiënte
belastinginning kan tcetreding tot het EMS geloofwaardigheid van monetair beleid
`kopen'. In hoofdstuk 2 wordt ook enig empirisch werk naar de afweging tussen
monetaire financiering en belastingheffing gerapporteerd. De theorie voorspelt dat
belastingvceten, inflatie en de depreciatie van de wisselkcers gecoïntegreerd zijn.
Veel ondersieuning voor de theorie vinden we niet, behalve voor enige landen met
een traditioneel hoge inflatie. De theorie wordt geconfronteerd met een alternatief
`stagflatie' model, waarin inflatie wordt verklaart uit prijsschokken van
grondstoffen (olie) en een loon-prijsspiraal. Dit model blijkt het empirisch veel
beter te dcen dan het eerste model.
Naast deze macro-economische implicaties van het EMS is er een veel directere
invloed van het EMS op de wisselkcersen zelf en op de rentestanden. Het ligt voor
de hand dat door de beperkte fluctuatiemarges de wisselkcersen stabieler zijn dan
in een stelsel van volledig vrije wisselkcersen. Krugman (1991) heeft een model
onwikkeld ter beschrijving van wisselkcersen binnen banden. De achterliggende
geàachte van het model is dat de wisselkcers een speculatieve prijs is die tot
stand komt als de verdisconteerde waarde van economische `fundamentals', met name
de relatieve geldhceveelheid in de betrokken landen. De geldhceveelheid is in een
vast wisselkcersregime echter een gereguleerde grootheid. De monetaire overheid
beïnvloedt de geldhceveelheid onder andere door interventies in de valutamarkt.
Rationele speculanten nemen de mogelijkheid van interventies mee in hun bepaling
van de wisselkcers. Krugman toont aan dat hierdoor de wisselkcers ook binnen de
band gestabiliseerd wordt.
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzcekt de geldigheid van het model van Krugman voor EMS
wisselkcersen. In het hoofdstuk wordt een nieuwe schattingsprocedure voor de
parameters van dit model voorgesteld. Aangezien het model in continue tijd is
gespecificeerd, is er een vertaalslag van het continue model naar een conditionele
verdeling voor de op discrete tijdstippen waargenomen wisselkoersen nodig. Met
behulp van deze verdeling construeren we een schatter die een zeer goede benadering
is van de maximale aannemelijkheidsschatter. De voorgestelde schatter is
efficiënter dan alternatieven die gebaseerd zijn op simulatie van het model. De
empirische resultaten zijn helaas niet erg gunstig: weliswaar wordt er enige
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ondersteuning voor stabilisatie van wisselkoersen binnen de band gevonden, maar de
specificatie van het model laat te wensen over. Relatief grote
wisselkcersveranderingen blijken vaker voor te komen dan het model voorspelt en
bovendien varieert de volatiliteit van de kcersen meer door de tijd dan door het
model voorspeld wordt.
Hoofdstuk 4 probeert een aantal van de met Krugmans model gesignaleerde
problemen weg te nemen. Hiertce specificeren we het model direct in discrete tijd
in plaats van continue tijd. Dit heeft een aantal voordelen. Ten eerste is het
model in discrete tijd gemakkelijker en onder algemenere voorwaarden op te lossen
dan het model in continue tijd. Ten tweede zijn de statistische eigenschappen van
het model gemakkelijker te analyseren en de zijn benodigde schatters eenvoudiger.
Het discrete tijd model, uitgebreid met een dikstaartige verdeling van de
`fundamental' en interventies binnen de band, blijkt aanzienlijk beter in staat de
waargenomen wisselkcersen te beschrijven dan de veel beperktere specificatie van
Krugman. Een nadeel van de analyse blijft echter dat de band volledig betrouwbaar
wordt vemndersteld. In hoofdstuk 4 wordt daarom tevens onderzocht hce betrouwbaar
de band is. Aan de hand van waargenomen renteverschillen, die gecorrigeerd worden
voor de verwachte depreciatie binnen de band, wordt aangetoond dat de EMS banden
nooit volledig betrouwbaar werden geacht, al is de geloofwaardigheid na verloop van
tijd wel tcegenomen. Een open einde is het modelleren van herschikkingen van de
spilkcersen. De aanpak in discrete tijd, zoals voorgesteld in Hoofdstuk 4, lijkt
hiervoor veelbelovend.
Het tweede deel van het prcefschrift behandelt de microstructuur van
aandelenmarkten, met name de markten in Franse aandelen. De twee belangrijkste
markten voor Franse aandelen zijn de Bourse in Parijs en de Franse sector van SEAQ
International in Londen. Deze handel op deze markten loopt volgens geheel
verschillende systemen. Ons onderzcek heeft mede tot dcel om de implicaties van dit
verschil voor de kwaliteit van deze beurzen te meten.
Hoofdstuk 5 vergelijkt de transactiekosten op de Bourse en SEAQ
International. Zowel voor een (hypothetische) urgente transactie als voor de
feitelijk gerealiseerde transacties wordt het gemiddelde bied-laat kcersverschil
(de `spread') geschat. Hiertce gebruiken we zowel niet-parametrische schatters als
een lineair model, dat minder gevcelig is voor een aantal onvolkomenheden in de
data. De resultaten laten zien dat de impliciete transactiekosten voor een urgente
transactie in Parijs snel oplopen voor grotere hceveelheden. In Londen daarentegen
is de spread voor kleine transacties relatief groot, maar voor grote transacpes
juist vrij gunstig. De spread voor gerealiseerde transacties is in Parijs kleiner
dan in Londen voor elke transactieomvang. Als we de expliciete transactiekosten
meenemen blijkt Parijs goedkoper voor kleine transacties, en ongeveer even duur als
Londen voor grote transacties. Het grote voordeel van de Londense markt is echter
de mogelijkheid om tegen relatief gunstige tarieven grote orders snel te verwerken.
Hoofdstuk 6 beschouwt de prijseffecten van een transactie op de Parijse
Bourse. Met name zijn we geinteresseerd in het lange termijn effect, da[ iets zegt
over de nieuwe informatie die door de transactie op de markt is gekomen. Het dcel
van de analyse is om de kostencomponenten van de spread te meten. De literatuur
onderscheidt drie kosten: kosten van orderverwerking, voorraadbeheerskosten en
kosten die voortvlceien uit adverse selectie als gevolg van asymmetrische
informatie. Uit de schattingen blijkt dat de eerste en de derde component
significant zijn, en bovendien van de grootte van de transactie afhangen: de kosten
van orderverwerking (per aandeel) nemen af voor grotere transacties, terwijl de
adverse selectie component van de spread juist tceneemt met de transactieomvang. Er
wordt geen bewijs gevonden voor het bestaan van voorraadbeheerskosten. Een ander
resultaat is dat nieuwe informatie langzaam in de kcersen verwerkt wordt. Zelfs na
enige tientallen transacties is er nog een merkbaar prijseffect.
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